100 Philosophie und Psychologie
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Whether, and in what sense, research in phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology has—in addition to its descriptive and hermeneutic value—explanatory power is somewhat controversial. This paper shows why it is legitimate to recognize such explanatory power. To this end, the paper analyzes two central concerns underlying the debate about explanation in phenomenology: (a) the warning against reductionism, which is implicit in a conception of causal explanation exclusively based on models of natural/physical causation; and (b) the warning against top-down generalizations, which neglect the specificity of the individual. While acknowledging that these two caveats express serious concerns regarding the debate on explanatory models, I show that phenomenology has the resources to respond to them. These can be found in analyses of different types of causation relating to different regions of reality and in the structure of explanatory models based on exemplarity. On the basis of these analyses, I defend a pluralist account vis-à-vis explanatory models.
Husserl’s taxonomy of action
(2022)
In the present article I discuss, in confrontation with the most recent studies on Husserl’s phenomenology of acting and willing, the taxonomy of action that is collected in the volume ‘Wille und Handlung’ of the Husserliana edition Studien zur Struktur des Bewussteins. In so doing, I first present Husserl’s universal characterization of action (Handlung) as a volitional process (willentlicher Vorgang). Then, after clarifying what it means for a process to have a character of volitionality (Willentlichkeit), I illustrate the various types of actions, which Husserl distinguishes as ‘straightforward’ (schlicht) or ‘deciding’ (entscheidend), ‘primary’ (primär) or ‘secondary’ (sekundär), ‘inner’ (innere) or ‘outer’ (äußere), ‘immediate’ (unmittelbar) or mediate (mittelbar), ‘simple’ (einfach) or ‘compound’ (zusammengesetzt). Finally, I consider Husserl’s discussion of the direction and foundation of action.
Seit jeher üben Roboter eine Faszination auf den Menschen aus. Es ist die Ähnlichkeit zum Menschen, die technische Systeme, die mit einer höheren Intelligenz ausgestattet sind, gleichermaßen faszinierend wie erschreckend erscheinen lässt. Der Gedanke daran, technische Kreaturen zu erschaffen, die uns erhabenen menschlichen Wesen „das Wasser reichen“ oder uns gar übertreffen können, lässt uns nicht mehr los. Die Erkenntnis von dem Nutzen, den uns derartige Wesen in allen denkbaren Bereichen bringen könnten, mündet jedoch sehr schnell in eine Skepsis im Hinblick auf eine Entmündigung und Entwertung des Menschen. Denn schon heute, obgleich die Forschung in vielen Bereichen noch in den Kinderschuhen steckt, geraten wir in zahlreichen Lebensbereichen in Kontakt mit technischen Systemen, die eine starke Wirkung auf uns ausüben und viele grundlegende Fragen aufwerfen.
Die Arbeit widmet sich der ethischen Dimension autonomer (Pflege-)Systeme und thematisiert zu diesem Zweck konkrete Anwendungsszenarien. Dabei geht es nicht um allgemeine ethische Fragen, sondern konkret um den Aspekt der Vereinbarkeit autonomer technischer Systeme mit der Menschenwürde ihrer Nutzer. Auch der Gesichtspunkt des Einflusses von autonomen technischen Innovationen auf das Selbstverständnis des Menschen (Menschenbild) ist Teil der Arbeit.
Als Maßstab für moderne technische Entwicklungen dient der Würdegrundsatz aufgrund seiner enormen Bedeutung für das Recht sowie für das zugrundeliegende und allgemeine Menschenbild. Im Rahmen einer an einem humanistischen Weltbild orientierten Gesellschaft steht die Menschenwürde als oberster Wert, dem moralische und rechtliche Entwicklungen gerecht werden müssen, über allem. Daher gilt es, moderne Entwicklungen immer auch im Hinblick auf ihre Vereinbarkeit mit der Menschenwürde zu überprüfen. So lässt sich feststellen, ob ein Regulierungsbedarf besteht und wie Regulierungen im Einzelnen auszugestalten sind.
Gleichzeitig muss aber auch die Menschenwürde gesellschaftlichen Entwicklungen gerecht werden. Demgemäß wird sie vom Bundesverfassungsgericht als Grundsatz, der sich aktuellen Herausforderungen stellt und zur Erzwingung eines gesellschaftlichen Diskurses führt, angesehen.
Die hiesige Arbeit soll einen Beitrag zu der bereits angestoßenen gesellschaftlichen Debatte rund um den technischen Fortschritt und konkret um die Probleme, die mit der zunehmenden Autonomie technischer Systeme einhergehen, leisten.
Any account of intentional action has to deal with the problem of how such actions are individuated. Medieval accounts, however, crucially differ from contemporary ones in at least three respects: (i) for medieval authors, individuation is not a matter of description, as it is according to contemporary, ‘Anscombian’ views; rather, it is a metaphysical matter. (ii) Medieval authors discuss intentional action on the basis of faculty psychology, whereas contemporary accounts are not committed to this kind of psychology. Connected to the use of faculty psychology is (iii) the distinction between interior and exterior acts. Roughly, interior acts are mental as opposed to physical acts, whereas exterior acts are acts of physical powers, such as of moving one’s body. Of course, contemporary accounts are not committed to this distinction between two ontologically different kinds of acts. Rather, they might be committed to views consistent with physicalist approaches to the mind. The main interpretative task in this paper is to clarify how Scotus and Ockham explain moral intentional action in terms of the role and involvement of these kinds of acts respectively. I argue that Scotus’s account is close to contemporary, ‘Anscombian’ accounts, whereas Ockham’s account is incompatible with them.
How are fictions given? Conjoining the ‘artifactual theory’ and the ‘imaginary-object theory’
(2021)
According to the so-called ‘artifactual theory’ of fiction, fictional objects are to be considered as abstract artifacts. Within this framework, fictional objects are defined on the basis of their complex dependence on literary works, authors, and readership. This theory is explicitly distinguished from other approaches to fictions, notably from the imaginary-object theory. In this article, I argue that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive but can and should be integrated. In particular, the ontology of fiction can be fruitfully supplemented by a phenomenological analysis, which allows us to clarify the defining modes of givenness of fictional objects. Likewise, based on the results of the artifactual theory, some assumptions in the imaginary-object theory, which are liable to be interpreted as laying the ground to phenomenalism, can be corrected.
Die Rückkehr des Realen
(2020)
We are witnessing a return of the real which philosophy seems illequipped to handle. I argue (1) that this return of the real must be read as a rejection of those philosophical tendencies which were prevalent in the past decades and which I call philosophies of mediation: They supplanted all references to something real by the sole reference to those processes in which reality was supposed to be given or shaped (in interpretations, linguistic structures, historical or social conditions, media…). The current urgency of the question of the real indicates that those philosophies have lost credibility. On the other hand (2), the contemporary attempts to resuscitate philosophical realism cannot be considered satisfactory either. It is curiously the real itself they fail to fully appreciate. All in all (3), the return of the real has to be interpreted as the effect of an event that has little to do with philosophy, namely the return of politics.
In this paper, I consider the relevance of judgment for practical considerations by discussing Christian August Crusius’s conception of rational desire. According to my interpretation of Crusius’s distinction between rational and non-rational desire, we are responsible at least for our rational desires insofar as we can control them. And we can control our rational desires by judging whether what we want complies with our human nature. It should become clear that Crusius’s conception of rational desire is normative in that we necessarily desire things that are compatible with our nature, such as our own perfection. Therefore, a desire is rational if the desired object is apt to satisfy the desires compatible with our nature. From a contemporary perspective, such a normative conception of rational desire might not appear very attractive; it is apt, however, to stimulate a debate on the normative criteria and the role of judgment for rational desire, which is the ultimate aim of this paper.