## Crusius über die Vernünftigkeit des Wollens und die Rolle des Urteilens

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• In this paper, I consider the relevance of judgment for practical considerations by discussing Christian August Crusius’s conception of rational desire. According to my interpretation of Crusius’s distinction between rational and non-rational desire, we are responsible at least for our rational desires insofar as we can control them. And we can control our rational desires by judging whether what we want complies with our human nature. It should become clear that Crusius’s conception of rational desire is normative in that we necessarily desireIn this paper, I consider the relevance of judgment for practical considerations by discussing Christian August Crusius’s conception of rational desire. According to my interpretation of Crusius’s distinction between rational and non-rational desire, we are responsible at least for our rational desires insofar as we can control them. And we can control our rational desires by judging whether what we want complies with our human nature. It should become clear that Crusius’s conception of rational desire is normative in that we necessarily desire things that are compatible with our nature, such as our own perfection. Therefore, a desire is rational if the desired object is apt to satisfy the desires compatible with our nature. From a contemporary perspective, such a normative conception of rational desire might not appear very attractive; it is apt, however, to stimulate a debate on the normative criteria and the role of judgment for rational desire, which is the ultimate aim of this paper.

Author: Sonja Schierbaum urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-245582 Journal article Fakultät für Humanwissenschaften (Philos., Psycho., Erziehungs- u. Gesell.-Wissensch.) / Institut für Philosophie German Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 2192-1482 0012-1045 2021 69 4 607 618 Zeitschrift für Philosophie (2021) 69:4, 607-618. https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2021-0051 https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2021-0051 1 Philosophie und Psychologie / 10 Philosophie / 100 Philosophie und Psychologie Christian August Crusiusjudgment; non-rational desire; rational desire 2022/03/17 2021/09/18 Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG-geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz frei zugänglich. Deutsches Urheberrecht