Refine
Has Fulltext
- yes (15) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- yes (15)
Year of publication
Document Type
- Doctoral Thesis (14)
- Book (1)
Keywords
- Kognition (15) (remove)
Institute
- Institut für Psychologie (15) (remove)
Worauf achtet der Fahrer? Steuerung der Aufmerksamkeit beim Fahren mit visuellen Nebenaufgaben
(2009)
Die Arbeit befasst sich mit der Steuerung der Aufmerksamkeit während visueller Nebenaufgaben beim Fahren. Es wird angenommen, dass für die visuelle Wahrnehmung beim Fahren drei Prozesse zur Steuerung der Aufmerksamkeit beitragen. (1) Über top-down Prozesse wird die Aufmerksamkeit auf für die aktuelle Handlung besonders relevante Situationsbestandteile gelenkt. (2) Explorative Wahrnehmung dient dazu, ein umfassenderes Situationsmodell zu entwickeln, das neben aktuell handlungssteuernden Situationsbestandteilen auch andere, potentiell aufgabenrelevante Ob¬jekte zu einem umfassenderen Abbild der Situation integriert. (3) Saliente Reize können über bottom-up Aktivierung die Aufmerksamkeit auf sich ziehen. Es ist bekannt, dass Fahrer während der Bearbeitung visueller Zweitaufgaben mit ihrem Blick und damit mit ihrer Aufmerksamkeit wiederholt zwischen Fahr- und Nebenaufgabe wechseln. Grundlage der experimentellen Arbeiten ist die Idee, dass hierbei die Ausrichtung der Aufmerksamkeit in der Fahraufgabe über top-down Prozesse gesteuert wird und auf einem mentalen Abbild der Situation basiert. Vor dem Beginn der Nebenaufgabe fokussiert der Fahrer auf die Fahrsituation, bewertet sie und entwickelt eine Antizipation der zukünftigen Situationsentwicklung. Das entstehende Situationsmodell entscheidet darüber, wie viel Aufmerksamkeit während der Nebenaufgabe auf die Fahraufgabe verwendet wird, und welche Situationsbestandteile durch die Blicke zur Straße kontrolliert werden. Der Fahrer lenkt über top-down Prozesse seine Aufmerksamkeit auf als relevant für die Situationsentwicklung bewertete Objekte. Andere Objekte, sowie eine von der aktuellen Fahraufgabe unabhängige, explorative Wahrnehmung der Fahrsituation werden während der Nebenaufgabe vernachlässigt. Aus der Literatur ergeben sich außerdem Hinweise darauf, dass eine reizbasierte bottom-up Ausrichtung der Aufmerksamkeit während visueller Ablenkung zumindest eingeschränkt, wenn nicht sogar zeitweise vollständig unterdrückt ist. Die durchgeführten experimentellen Arbeiten finden in der Fahrsimulation Belege für die angenommen top-down Steuerung der Aufmerksamkeit während visueller Nebenaufgaben beim Fahren. Es werden zwei unterschiedliche Messansätze verwendet. Studie 1 und 2 greifen auf die Analyse des Blickverhaltens zurück. In diesen beiden Studien absolvieren die Testfahrer längere, anspruchsvolle Fahrten, während denen visuelle Nebenaufgaben bearbeitet werden. Es ergeben sich Hinweise auf eine tiefere visuelle Verarbeitung der Fahrszene direkt vor dem Beginn der Nebenaufgabe. Während der Bearbeitung der visuellen Nebenaufgaben passen die Fahrer ihre Aufmerksamkeitsverteilung an die Erfordernisse der Fahrsituation an: In anspruchsvollen Fahrsituationen wird häufiger und länger auf die Straße geblickt als in weniger beanspruchenden Situationen. Es finden sich außerdem Hinweise dafür, dass spezifische Fahrfehler mit einer fehlerhaften Ausrichtung der Aufmerksamkeit in der Fahrsituation in Zusammenhang stehen. Studie 3 und 4 verwenden das Phänomen der Change Blindness als Indikator für die Ausrichtung der Aufmerksamkeit. Im Rahmen von Fahrten mit kontrollierten Situationsbedingungen wird die Hypothese untersucht, dass während der Bearbeitung visueller Nebenaufgabe die fahrbezogene Aufmerksamkeit auf fahrrelevante Situationsbestandteile gelenkt wird. Die Testfahrer nähern sich wiederholt Kreuzungen an. Während der Anfahrten wird über Okklusion ein Blickverhalten vorgegeben, das dem bei der Bearbeitung visueller Nebenaufgaben ähnelt. Die Fahrer sollen mit Tastendruck reagieren, wenn sie plötzliche Änderungen bemerken. Die Änderungen können sowohl relevante als auch irrelevante Fahrzeuge betreffen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen eine schlechte Entdeckungsleistung für Änderungen an irrelevanten Fahrzeugen. Änderungen an relevanten Objekten werden dagegen so gut wie immer bemerkt. Ob die Änderung durch Okklusion maskiert wird oder ob sie stattfindet, während die Fahrer die Straße sehen, hat keinen eindeutigen Ein¬fluss auf die Entdeckungsleistung. Dies kann ein Hinweis darauf sein, dass in der untersuchten Doppelaufgabensituation keine bottom-up Ausrichtung der Aufmerksamkeit erfolgt. Die angenommene top-down gesteuerte Beschränkung der Aufmerksamkeit auf als relevant bewertete Bestandteile der Fahrsituation hat Konsequenzen für die Analyse von Verkehrsunfällen. Unfälle infolge von visueller Ablenkung durch selbst initiierte Zweitaufgaben sind dann besonders wahrscheinlich, wenn das Situationsmodell des Fahrers falsch oder ungenau ist. Dies kann beispielsweise geschehen, wenn ein peripheres, nicht beachtetes Objekt plötzlich relevant wird und eine Reaktion des Fahrers erforderlich macht. In Übereinstimmung mit Befunden zur Gefahrenwahrnehmung sind besonders Fahranfänger aufgrund ihrer noch nicht ausreichend entwickelten mentalen Modellen anfällig für Fehleinschätzungen von Fahrsituationen. Dies führt bei Ablenkung durch Nebenaufgaben zu einer erhöhten Unfallgefährdung.
Humans spontaneously blink several times a minute. These blinks are strongly modulated during various cognitive task. However, the precise function of blinking and the reason for their modulation has not been fully understood. In the present work, I investigated the function of spontaneous blinks through various perceptual and cognitive tasks. Previous research has revealed that blinks rates decrease during some tasks but increase during others. When trying to understand these seemingly contradictory results, I observed that blink reduction occurs when one engages with an external input. For instance, a decrease has been observed due to the onset of a stimulus, sensory input processing and attention towards sensory input. However, for activities that do not involve such an engagement, e.g. imagination, daydreaming or creativity, the blink rate has been shown to increase. To follow up on the proposed hypothesis, I distinguished tasks that involve the processing of an external stimulus and tasks that involve disengagement.
In the first part of the project, I explored blinking during stimulus engagement. If the probability of blinking is low when engaging with the stimulus, then one should find a reduction in blinks specifically during the time period of processing but not during sensory input per se. To this end, in study 1, I tested the influence of task-relevant information duration on blink timing and additionally manipulated the overall sensory input using a visual and an auditory temporal simultaneity judgement task. The results showed that blinks were suppressed longer for longer periods of relevant information or in other words, blinks occurred at the end of relevant information processing for both the visual and the auditory modality. Since relevance is mediated through top-down processes, I argue that the reduction in blinks is a top-down driven suppression. In studies 2 and 3, I again investigated stimulus processing, but in this case, processing was triggered internally and not based on specific changes in the external input. To this end, I used bistable stimuli, in which the actual physical stimulus remains constant but their perception switches between different interpretations. Studies on the involvement of attention in such bistable perceptual changes indicate that the sensory input is reprocessed before the perceptual switch. The results revealed a reduction in eye blink rates before the report of perceptual switches. Importantly, I was able to decipher that the decrease was not caused by the perceptual switch or the behavioral response but likely started before the internal switch. Additionally, periods between a blink and a switch were longer than interblink intervals, indicating that blinks were followed by a period of stable percept. To conclude, the first part of the project revealed that there is a top-down driven blink suppression during the processing of an external stimulus.
In the second part of the project, I extended the idea of blinks marking the disengagement from external processing and tested if blinking is associated with better performance during internally directed processes. Specifically, I investigated divergent thinking, an aspect of creativity, and the link between performance and blink rates as well as the effect of motor restriction. While I could show that motor restriction was the main factor influencing divergent thinking, the relationship between eye blink rates and creative output also depended on restriction. Results showed that higher blink rates were associated with better performance during free movement, but only between subjects. In other words, subjects who had overall higher blink rates scored better in the task, but when they were allowed to sit or walk freely. Within a single subject, trial with higher blink rates were not associated with better performance. Therefore, possibly, people who are able to disengage easily, as indicated by an overall high blink rate, perform better in divergent thinking tasks. However, the link between blink rate and internal tasks is not clear at this point. Indeed, a more complex measurement of blink behavior might be necessary to understand the relationship.
In the final part of the project, I aimed to further understand the function of blinks through their neural correlates. I extracted the blink-related neural activity in the primary visual cortex (V1) of existing recordings of three rhesus monkeys during different sensory processing states. I analyzed spike related multi-unit responses, frequency dependent power changes, local field potentials and laminar distribution of activity while the animal watched a movie compared to when it was shown a blank screen. The results showed a difference in blink-related neural activity dependent on the processing state. This difference suggests a state dependent function of blinks.
Taken altogether, the work presented in this thesis suggests that eye blinks have an important function during cognitive and perceptual processes. Blinks seem to facilitate a disengagement from the external world and are therefore suppressed during intended processing of external stimuli.
Honest actions predominate human behavior. From time to time, this general preference must yield to dishonest actions, which require an effortful process of overcoming initial honest response activation. This thesis presents three experimental series to elucidate this tug-of-war between honest and dishonest response tendencies in overtly committed instances of lies, thereby joining recent efforts to move from a sheer phenomenological perspective on dishonest responding as being more difficult than honest responding to a precise description of the underlying cognitive processes. The consideration of cognitive theories, empirical evidence, and paradigms from different research fields – dishonesty, cognitive control and sensorimotor stage models of information processing – lay the groundwork for the research questions and methodological approach of this thesis.
The experiments pinpoint the underlying conflict of dishonest responding in the central, capacity-limited stage of information processing (Experiments 1 to 4), but they also demonstrate that cognitive control processes (Experiments 5 to 7) and the internalization of false alibis (Experiments 8 to 11) can reduce or even completely eliminate this conflict. The data reveals great flexibility at the cognitive basis of dishonest responding: On the one hand, dishonest responding appears to rely heavily on capacity-limited processes of response selection to overcome honest response tendencies alongside up- and downstream consequences of response activation and monitoring. On the other hand, agents have powerful tools to mitigate these effortful processes through control adaptation and false alibis. These results support and expand current theorizing of the cognitive underpinnings of dishonest responding. Furthermore, they are alerting from an applied perspective on the detection of lies, especially when considering the flexibility of even basic cognitive processes in the face of false alibis. A promising way to move forward from here would be a fine-grained discrimination of response activation, passive decay and active inhibition of honest representations in dishonest responding and the assessment of the adaptiveness of these processes.
Das Wissen über kognitive Prozesse oder metakognitives Wissen ist seit den 1970er-Jahren Gegenstand der entwicklungspsychologischen Forschung. Im Inhaltsbereich der mathematischen Informationsverarbeitung ist das Konstrukt jedoch – trotz elaborierter theoretischer Modelle über Struktur und Inhalt – empirisch nach wie vor weitgehend unerschlossen.
Die vorliegende Studie schließt diese Lücke, indem sie die Entwicklung des mathematischen metakognitiven Wissens im Längsschnitt untersucht. Dazu wurde nicht nur der Entwicklungsverlauf beschrieben, sondern auch nach den Quellen für die beobachteten individuellen Unterschiede in der Entwicklung gesucht. Auch die aus pädagogischen Gesichtspunkten interessanten Zusammenhänge zwischen der metakognitiven Wissensentwicklung und der parallel dazu verlaufenden Entwicklung der mathematischen Kompetenzen wurden analysiert.
Das Wissen über Kognition oder metakognitives Wissen ist seit den 1970er Jahren Gegenstand der entwicklungspsychologischen Forschung. Besonders umfangreich wurde Entwicklung und Bedeutung des metakognitiven Wissens im Kontext der Gedächtnisentwicklung vom Vorschul- bis ins Grundschulalter untersucht. Das metakognitive Wissen im Inhaltsbereich der mathematischen Informationsverarbeitung ist – trotz elaborierter theoretischer Modelle über Struktur und Inhalt – empirisch weitgehend unerschlossen. Die vorliegende Studie wurde durchgeführt, um systematisch zu untersuchen, wie sich das mathematische metakognitive Wissen in der Sekundarstufe entwickelt, welche Faktoren für individuelle Unterschiede in der Entwicklung verantwortlich sind und in welchem Zusammenhang die metakognitive Wissensentwicklung mit der parallel verlaufenden Entwicklung mathematischer Kompetenzen steht. Zur Klärung der Fragestellungen wurden vier Messzeitpunkte einer breiter angelegten Längsschnittuntersuchung ausgewertet. Der dabei beobachtete Zeitraum umfasste die fünfte und sechste Jahrgangsstufe. Die Stichprobe bestand aus 928 Schülern der Schularten Gymnasium, Realschule und Hauptschule. Die Messinstrumente zur Erfassung der Entwicklungsveränderungen im mathematischen metakognitiven Wissen und der Mathematikleistung wurden auf Grundlage der item response theory konstruiert und mittels vertikalem linking fortlaufend an den Entwicklungsstand der Stichprobe angepasst. Zusätzlich wurden kognitive (Intelligenz und Arbeitsgedächtniskapazität), motivationale (mathematisches Interesse und Selbstkonzept) und sozioökonomische Merkmale (sozioökonomischer Status der Herkunftsfamilie) der Schüler erhoben. Die Lesekompetenz wurde als Methodenfaktor kontrolliert. Entwicklungsunterschiede und -veränderungen im metakognitiven Wissen wurde mit Hilfe von latenten Wachstumskurvenmodellen untersucht. Im beobachteten Zeitraum zeigte sich eine stetige Zunahme des metakognitiven Wissens. Allerdings verlief die Entwicklungsveränderung nicht linear, sondern verlangsamte sich im Verlauf der sechsten Jahrgangsstufe. Individuelle Unterschiede in Ausprägung und Veränderung des metakognitiven Wissens wurden durch kognitive und sozioökonomische Schülermerkmale vorhergesagt. Die motivationalen Merkmale wirkten sich demgegenüber nicht auf den Entwicklungsprozess aus. Geschlechtsunterschiede zeigten sich im Entwicklungsverlauf als Schereneffekt zugunsten der Mädchen. Unterschiede zwischen den Schülern der drei Schularten erreichten bereits zum Eintritt in die Sekundarstufe Signifikanz. Zudem gewannen Gymnasiasten und Hauptschüler im Entwicklungsverlauf stärker an metakognitivem Wissen hinzu als Realschüler. Explorative Mischverteilungsanalysen in der Stichprobe ergaben drei latente Entwicklungsklassen mit jeweils charakteristischem Veränderungsverlauf. Die Klassenzuweisung wurde von der besuchten Schulart sowie kognitiven und sozioökonomischen Schülermerkmalen vorhergesagt. Die Entwicklungsprozesse im mathematischen metakognitiven Wissen und der mathematischen Leistung standen in einem substanziellen, wechselseitigen Zusammenhang. Geschlechts- und Schulartunterschiede blieben ebenso wie die korrelativen Zusammenhänge zwischen den Entwicklungsprozessen auch nach Kontrolle der individuellen Unterschiede in kognitiven, motivationalen und sozioökonomischen Merkmalen erhalten. Die Befunde bestätigen die konstruktivistischen Entwicklungsannahmen der gedächtnispsychologisch geprägten Grundlagenforschung zum metakognitiven Wissen. Zudem wird mit der Untersuchung des mathematischen metakognitiven Wissens in der Sekundarstufe der traditionelle Forschungsfokus inhaltlich erweitert. Das im Rahmen der Studie konstruierte Instrument zur Erfassung des mathematischen metakognitiven Wissens ermöglicht die Untersuchung weiterer, bislang offener Fragen auf dem Gebiet der metakognitiven Entwicklung.
Mediators of Social Anxiety - External Social Threat-Cues vs. Self-Related Negative Cognitions
(2009)
Based on a review of models and empirical findings a working model is proposed, suggesting that self-related negative cognitions and biased processing of external social threat-cues are mediators of social anxiety. Hypotheses derived from this model were tested in three experiments. The first experiment examined whether levels of trait social anxiousness predicted fearful responding to external social threat-cues (angry vs. neutral and happy facial expressions) during social evaluation. Higher trait social anxiousness predisposes to an inward focus on one’s fear reaction to social threat. Using this strategy was expected to enhance fearful responding to angry facial expressions. A strategy of identifying with angry faces was expected to counteract fearful responding, but was expected to fail more often with increasing levels of trait social anxiousness. To examine these hypotheses, affective modulation of the startle eye-blink was assessed in forty-four undergraduate students. This measure served as a probe into the activation of brain structures involved in the automatic evaluation of environmental threat-cues. Trait and state anxiety as well as explicit emotional responding to the stimuli were assessed with questionnaires and ratings. Processing angry faces potentiated startle amplitudes as expected. Low arousal induced by the stimuli was a probable reason, why startle potentiation to happy faces emerged instead of attenuation. Trait social anxiousness and the cognitive strategies did not influence these effects. Yet, increased trait social anxiousness predicted decreased startle latency, indicating motor hyper-responsivity, which is part of the clinical representation of social anxiety disorder (SAD). Processing facial expressions and identifying with them disrupted this association. Previous studies support that similar strategies may enhance treatment of SAD. Individuals with SAD were expected to respond with increased arousal to external social threat-cues. Therefore, the second experiment examined whether nine individuals with SAD showed attentional (prepulse inhibition, PPI) or affective startle modulation to angry as compared to neutral and happy facial expressions. Corrugator supercilii activity was assessed as a behavioral indicator for effects of facial expressions. The remaining setup resembled the first experiment. Facial expressions did not modulate the startle reflex, but corrugator supercilii activity was sensitive to facial valence. However, the effects were not related to trait social anxiousness. Apparently, angry facial expressions do not act as phobic stimuli for individuals with SAD. The third experiment examined whether focusing on self-related negative cognitions or biased processing of external social threat-cues mediates relationships between trait social anxiety and anxious responding in a socially challenging situation. Inducing self-related negative cognitions vs. relaxation was expected to reveal a functional dependency on the supposed mediation in a multivariate assessment of criteria of the working model. Within this design, the impact of external social threat-cues (facial expressions and emotional words) was compared to control stimuli and context effects, using the startle paradigm. The findings provide first evidence for full statistical mediation of the associations between trait social anxiety and self-reported anxiety as well as parasympathetic withdrawal by self-related negative cognitions, when thirty-six undergraduate students anticipated public speaking. Apprehensive arousal, as indicated by increased skin conductance levels and heart rate, was present in all participants. Observer ratings of behavior during public speaking matched the self-rated quality of the performance. None of these measures were correlated with trait social anxiousness. Startle amplitude correlated with state and trait social anxiety, but was no mediator. Finally, there was no affective modulation of the startle amplitude by external social threat-cues. These studies advance both our current understanding of the factors that mediate social anxiety responses to situations and our knowledge of the physiological and anatomical mechanisms involved in social anxiety. Based on these findings a revised version of the working model on mediators of social anxiety is proposed in the hope it may aid further research for the ultimate goal of developing an empirically validated functional anatomical model of social anxiety.
One of the features that defines humans as extraordinarily social beings is their striking susceptibility to the gaze of others. The research reported in this dissertation was undertaken to advance our understanding of the role of gaze cues in low-level attentional and higher-order cognitive processes. In particular, effects of gaze were examined with regard to three aspects of human cognition: (1) social attention, (2) social interaction and (3) social understanding. Chapter 1 consists of three manuscripts that investigate the boundary conditions of attention capture by direct gaze and how gaze direction is integrated with facial context information. Manuscript 1 and 2 suggest two necessary requirements for attention capture by direct gaze: a meaningful holistic facial context and sharp foveal vision, respectively. Manuscript 3 shows approach/avoidance-congruency effects between gaze direction and emotion expression on attention. Chapter 2 of this dissertation explores the role of gaze in more naturalistic social scenarios. Manuscript 4 demonstrates that gaze behavior during a conversation shapes our perception of another person. Manuscript 5 builds on these findings by showing that these perceptions define our willingness to act in a prosocial way towards our interaction partner. Finally, chapter 3 adopts a broader perspective on social cognition research with a special focus on methodological aspects. Manuscript 6 is a review highlighting the significance of methodological aspects in social cognition research and stressing the importance of sophisticated decisions on task and stimulus materials. Manuscript 7 introduces a new instrument for the assessment of social understanding in adolescents. Initial application in a young sample group indicates that an understanding of another person’s mental states is a capacity that is still developing throughout adolescence. Both manuscripts of this final chapter include eye tracking data that suggest a relationship between gaze behavior and social understanding, a finding that further emphasizes the complex and multifaceted nature of social cognition. I conclude from the findings of this dissertation that research can benefit from adopting a broad view in terms of methodological as well as temporal aspects in order to capture human social cognition in its entirety.
Human actions are generally not determined by external stimuli, but by internal goals and by the urge to evoke desired effects in the environment. To reach these effects, humans typically have to act. But at times, deciding not to act can be better suited or even the only way to reach a desired effect. What mental processes are involved when people decide not to act to reach certain effects? From the outside it may seem that nothing remarkable is happening, because no action can be observed. However, I present three studies which disclose the cognitive processes that control nonactions.
The present experiments address situations where people intentionally decide to omit certain actions in order to produce a predictable effect in the environment. These experiments are based on the ideomotor hypothesis, which suggests that bidirectional associations can be formed between actions and the resulting effects. Because of these associations, anticipating the effects can in turn activate the respective action. The results of the present experiments show that associations can be formed between nonactions (i.e., the intentional decision not to act) and the resulting effects. Due to these associations, perceiving the nonaction effects encourages not acting (Exp. 1–3). What is more, planning a nonaction seems to come with an activation of the effects that inevitably follow the nonaction (Exp. 4–5). These results suggest that the ideomotor hypothesis can be expanded to nonactions and that nonactions are cognitively represented in terms of their sensory effects. Furthermore, nonaction effects can elicit a sense of agency (Exp. 6–8). That is, even though people refrain from acting, the resulting nonaction effects are perceived as self-produced effects.
In a nutshell, these findings demonstrate that intentional nonactions include specific mechanisms and processes, which are involved, for instance, in effect anticipation and the sense of agency. This means that, while it may seem that nothing remarkable is happening when people decide not to act, complex processes run on the inside, which are also involved in intentional actions.
Humans actively interact with the world through a wide range of body movements. To understand human cognition in its natural state, we need to incorporate ecologically relevant body movement into our account. One fundamental body movement during daily life is natural walking. Despite its ubiquity, the impact of natural walking on brain activity and cognition has remained a realm underexplored.
In electrophysiology, previous studies have shown a robust reduction of ongoing alpha power in the parieto-occipital cortex during body movements. However, what causes the reduction of ongoing alpha, namely whether this is due to body movement or prevalent sensory input changes, was unknown. To clarify this, study 1 was performed to test if the alpha reduction is dependent on visual input. I compared the resting state alpha power during natural walking and standing, in both light and darkness. The results showed that natural walking led to decreased alpha activity over the occipital cortex compared to standing, regardless of the lighting condition. This suggests that the movement-induced modulation of occipital alpha activity is not driven by visual input changes during walking. I argue that the observed alpha power reduction reflects a change in the state of the subject based on disinhibition induced by walking. Accordingly, natural walking might enhance visual processing and other cognitive processes that involve occipital cortical activity.
I first tested this hypothesis in vision. Study 2 was performed to examine the possible effects of natural walking across visual processing stages by assessing various neural markers during different movement states. The findings revealed an amplified early visual response, while a later visual response remain unaffected. A follow-up study 3 replicated the walking-induced enhancement of the early visual evoked potential and showed that the enhancement was dependent on specific stimulus-related parameters (eccentricity, laterality, distractor presence). Importantly, the results provided evidence that the enhanced early visual responses are indeed linked to the modulation of ongoing occipital alpha power. Walking also modulated the stimulus-induced alpha power. Specifically, it showed that when the target appeared in the fovea area without a distractor, walking exhibited a significantly reduced modulation of alpha power, and showed the largest difference to standing condition. This effect of eccentricity indicates that during later visual processing stages, the visual input in the fovea area is less processed than in peripheral areas while walking.
The two visual studies showed that walking leads to an enhancement in temporally early visual processes which can be predicted by the walking-induced change in ongoing alpha oscillation likely marking disinhibition. However, while walking affects neural markers of early sensory processes, it does not necessarily lead to a change in the behavioural outcome of a sensory task. The two visual studies suggested that the behavioural outcome seems to be mainly based on later processing stages.
To test the effects of walking outside the visual domain, I turned to audition in study 4. I investigated the influence of walking in a particular path vs. simply stepping on auditory processing. Specifically, the study tested whether enhanced processing due to natural walking can be found in primary auditory brain activity and whether the processing preferences are dependent on the walking path. In addition, I tested whether the changed spatial processing that was reported in previous visual studies can be seen in the auditory domain. The results showed enhanced sensory processing due to walking in the auditory domain, which was again linked to the modulation of occipital alpha oscillation. The auditory processing was further dependent on the walking path. Additionally, enhanced peripheral sensory processing, as found in vision, was also present in audition.
The findings outside vision supported the idea of natural walking affecting cognition in a rather general way. Therefore in my study 5, I examined the effect of natural walking on higher cognitive processing, namely divergent thinking, and its correlation with the modulation of ongoing alpha oscillation. I analyzed alpha oscillations and behavioural performance during restricted and unrestricted movement conditions while subjects completed a Guilford's alternate uses test. The results showed that natural walking, as well as missing body restriction, reduces the occipital alpha ongoing power independent of the task phase which goes along with higher test scores. The occipital alpha power reduction can therefore be an indicator of a changed state that allows improved higher cognitive processes.
In summary, the research presented in this thesis highlights that natural walking can change different processes in the visual and auditory domain as well as higher cognitive processes. The effect can be attributed to the movement of natural walking itself rather than to changes in sensory input during walking. The results further indicate that the walking-induced modulation of ongoing occipital alpha oscillations drives the cognitive effects. We therefore suggest that walking changes the inhibitory state which can influence awareness and attention. Such a mechanism could facilitate an adaptive enhancement in cognitive processes and thereby optimize movement-related behaviour such as navigation.
During natural behavior, cognitive processes constantly coincide with body movements such as head or eye movements or blinks. However, during experimental investigations of cognitive processes, movements are often highly restricted which is rather unnatural. In order to improve our understanding of natural behavior, this thesis investigates the interaction between cognition and movements by focusing on spontaneous blinks, which naturally interact with other body movements.
Spontaneous blinks are inevitably connected to vision as they shut out incoming visual information. Both sensory-based and cognitive factors, for example, stimulus occurrence and evaluation, were reported to influence blink behavior. Our first study investigated if such influences are comparable for visual and non-visual input. The chosen experimental design allowed dissociating sensory-driven and cognitive influences, which then could be compared between the visual and auditory domain. Our results show that blinks are more strongly modulated during passive observation of visual input compared to auditory input. This modulation is however enhanced for both input modalities by an increased attentional demand. In addition, the cognitively defined meaning of a stimulus changes blink latency independent of the sensory domain. Overall, our findings show that spontaneous blinks and cognitive processes are linked beyond vision. Moreover, the underlying cognitive processes that influence blinks are largely the same across different sensory input indicating that blinks are profoundly integrated into our system.
When investigating natural behavior, it is important to consider that movements rarely occur in isolation, but are executed side by side. As these movements interact and have a link to cognitive processes, the complexity of our system increases. In order to take this complexity into account, the second part of the experimental research focused on movement interactions, more specifically on the interactions between blinks, pupil size and speaking. Our results reveal that speech-related motor activity increases blink rate and pupil size as well as modulates blink timing. This is in line with previous research that described a relation between different body and eye movements. Importantly, each bodily-induced change in eye movements affects visual information intake. Therefore, different movements can be tightly linked to perceptual processes through complex interactions.
Altogether, the work of this thesis provides rich evidence that movements and cognitive processes are deeply intertwined. Therefore, movements should be seen as an integral part of our system. Taking the relevance of movements and their interactions into account during experimental investigations is necessary in order to reveal a more realistic and complete picture of human natural behavior.