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Institute
- Institut für Philosophie (18) (remove)
Any account of intentional action has to deal with the problem of how such actions are individuated. Medieval accounts, however, crucially differ from contemporary ones in at least three respects: (i) for medieval authors, individuation is not a matter of description, as it is according to contemporary, ‘Anscombian’ views; rather, it is a metaphysical matter. (ii) Medieval authors discuss intentional action on the basis of faculty psychology, whereas contemporary accounts are not committed to this kind of psychology. Connected to the use of faculty psychology is (iii) the distinction between interior and exterior acts. Roughly, interior acts are mental as opposed to physical acts, whereas exterior acts are acts of physical powers, such as of moving one’s body. Of course, contemporary accounts are not committed to this distinction between two ontologically different kinds of acts. Rather, they might be committed to views consistent with physicalist approaches to the mind. The main interpretative task in this paper is to clarify how Scotus and Ockham explain moral intentional action in terms of the role and involvement of these kinds of acts respectively. I argue that Scotus’s account is close to contemporary, ‘Anscombian’ accounts, whereas Ockham’s account is incompatible with them.
Husserl’s taxonomy of action
(2022)
In the present article I discuss, in confrontation with the most recent studies on Husserl’s phenomenology of acting and willing, the taxonomy of action that is collected in the volume ‘Wille und Handlung’ of the Husserliana edition Studien zur Struktur des Bewussteins. In so doing, I first present Husserl’s universal characterization of action (Handlung) as a volitional process (willentlicher Vorgang). Then, after clarifying what it means for a process to have a character of volitionality (Willentlichkeit), I illustrate the various types of actions, which Husserl distinguishes as ‘straightforward’ (schlicht) or ‘deciding’ (entscheidend), ‘primary’ (primär) or ‘secondary’ (sekundär), ‘inner’ (innere) or ‘outer’ (äußere), ‘immediate’ (unmittelbar) or mediate (mittelbar), ‘simple’ (einfach) or ‘compound’ (zusammengesetzt). Finally, I consider Husserl’s discussion of the direction and foundation of action.
How are fictions given? Conjoining the ‘artifactual theory’ and the ‘imaginary-object theory’
(2021)
According to the so-called ‘artifactual theory’ of fiction, fictional objects are to be considered as abstract artifacts. Within this framework, fictional objects are defined on the basis of their complex dependence on literary works, authors, and readership. This theory is explicitly distinguished from other approaches to fictions, notably from the imaginary-object theory. In this article, I argue that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive but can and should be integrated. In particular, the ontology of fiction can be fruitfully supplemented by a phenomenological analysis, which allows us to clarify the defining modes of givenness of fictional objects. Likewise, based on the results of the artifactual theory, some assumptions in the imaginary-object theory, which are liable to be interpreted as laying the ground to phenomenalism, can be corrected.
Whether, and in what sense, research in phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology has—in addition to its descriptive and hermeneutic value—explanatory power is somewhat controversial. This paper shows why it is legitimate to recognize such explanatory power. To this end, the paper analyzes two central concerns underlying the debate about explanation in phenomenology: (a) the warning against reductionism, which is implicit in a conception of causal explanation exclusively based on models of natural/physical causation; and (b) the warning against top-down generalizations, which neglect the specificity of the individual. While acknowledging that these two caveats express serious concerns regarding the debate on explanatory models, I show that phenomenology has the resources to respond to them. These can be found in analyses of different types of causation relating to different regions of reality and in the structure of explanatory models based on exemplarity. On the basis of these analyses, I defend a pluralist account vis-à-vis explanatory models.
Den Mittelpunkt des folgenden Diskurses bildet ein Projekt des Neukantianers Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), das dieser unter dem Titel „Das Prinzip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte“ 1883 präsentiert hat. Sein Vorhaben, die Fruchtbarkeit der infinitesimalen Größe in der Mathematik und den Naturwissenschaften auch für die Philosophie, vor allem die Kantische Transzendentalphilosophie, nutzbar zu machen, erwies sich zu damaliger Zeit als wenig populär. Infolge von Schwierigkeiten mit der Interpretation seiner komplizierten Schrift und heftiger Kritik führender Mathematiker blieb sein Werk weitgehend unbeachtet.
Anhand eines Blickes auf den Gang der Wissenschaft der Infinitesimal-Mathematik soll diese Kritik im Folgenden entkräftet und neu bewertet werden. Es zeigt sich hierbei, dass, anders als zu Lebzeiten Cohens, heute gezielt versucht wird, die infinitesimale Größe in die mathematische Lehre zu integrieren – auch wenn dies mit erheblichen, vor allem philosophischen Schwierigkeiten verbunden ist. Hierbei soll auch das wieder erstarkte Interesse an den Infinitesimalien in der Nonstandard-Analysis als Anreiz dienen, die Philosophie Cohens am heutigen Forschungsdiskurs teilhaben zu lassen. In jüngerer Zeit spielt zudem auch in der Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis die Position des Intuitionismus wieder eine Rolle, welche der um Hermann Cohen und Paul Natorp entstandenen „Marburger Schule“ nahesteht.
Auf den folgenden Seiten soll anhand Cohens „Logik der reinen Erkenntnis“ (1902) eine Lesart für eine „Infinitesimal-Logik“ Cohens präsentiert werden, die die Gedanken Cohens zur Infinitesimal-Methode in ein philosophisches System eingliedert. Wie schon in Cohens "`Prinzip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte"' soll es auch hier als "`unmittelbar nützlich"' erscheinen, "`zugleich mit der Durchführung eines systematisch entscheidenden Gedankens seine geschichtliche Entwicklung zu verfolgen."' [Cohen 1883, Vorwort] Dieser Rückblick auf die bewegte Historie des Infinitesimal-Begriffs soll grob die Entwicklungen hin zur Schaffenszeit Cohens umreißen und sodann als Prüfstein für dessen Ideen gelten.
Die Rückkehr des Realen
(2020)
We are witnessing a return of the real which philosophy seems illequipped to handle. I argue (1) that this return of the real must be read as a rejection of those philosophical tendencies which were prevalent in the past decades and which I call philosophies of mediation: They supplanted all references to something real by the sole reference to those processes in which reality was supposed to be given or shaped (in interpretations, linguistic structures, historical or social conditions, media…). The current urgency of the question of the real indicates that those philosophies have lost credibility. On the other hand (2), the contemporary attempts to resuscitate philosophical realism cannot be considered satisfactory either. It is curiously the real itself they fail to fully appreciate. All in all (3), the return of the real has to be interpreted as the effect of an event that has little to do with philosophy, namely the return of politics.