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Human actions are generally not determined by external stimuli, but by internal goals and by the urge to evoke desired effects in the environment. To reach these effects, humans typically have to act. But at times, deciding not to act can be better suited or even the only way to reach a desired effect. What mental processes are involved when people decide not to act to reach certain effects? From the outside it may seem that nothing remarkable is happening, because no action can be observed. However, I present three studies which disclose the cognitive processes that control nonactions.
The present experiments address situations where people intentionally decide to omit certain actions in order to produce a predictable effect in the environment. These experiments are based on the ideomotor hypothesis, which suggests that bidirectional associations can be formed between actions and the resulting effects. Because of these associations, anticipating the effects can in turn activate the respective action. The results of the present experiments show that associations can be formed between nonactions (i.e., the intentional decision not to act) and the resulting effects. Due to these associations, perceiving the nonaction effects encourages not acting (Exp. 1–3). What is more, planning a nonaction seems to come with an activation of the effects that inevitably follow the nonaction (Exp. 4–5). These results suggest that the ideomotor hypothesis can be expanded to nonactions and that nonactions are cognitively represented in terms of their sensory effects. Furthermore, nonaction effects can elicit a sense of agency (Exp. 6–8). That is, even though people refrain from acting, the resulting nonaction effects are perceived as self-produced effects.
In a nutshell, these findings demonstrate that intentional nonactions include specific mechanisms and processes, which are involved, for instance, in effect anticipation and the sense of agency. This means that, while it may seem that nothing remarkable is happening when people decide not to act, complex processes run on the inside, which are also involved in intentional actions.
Honest actions predominate human behavior. From time to time, this general preference must yield to dishonest actions, which require an effortful process of overcoming initial honest response activation. This thesis presents three experimental series to elucidate this tug-of-war between honest and dishonest response tendencies in overtly committed instances of lies, thereby joining recent efforts to move from a sheer phenomenological perspective on dishonest responding as being more difficult than honest responding to a precise description of the underlying cognitive processes. The consideration of cognitive theories, empirical evidence, and paradigms from different research fields – dishonesty, cognitive control and sensorimotor stage models of information processing – lay the groundwork for the research questions and methodological approach of this thesis.
The experiments pinpoint the underlying conflict of dishonest responding in the central, capacity-limited stage of information processing (Experiments 1 to 4), but they also demonstrate that cognitive control processes (Experiments 5 to 7) and the internalization of false alibis (Experiments 8 to 11) can reduce or even completely eliminate this conflict. The data reveals great flexibility at the cognitive basis of dishonest responding: On the one hand, dishonest responding appears to rely heavily on capacity-limited processes of response selection to overcome honest response tendencies alongside up- and downstream consequences of response activation and monitoring. On the other hand, agents have powerful tools to mitigate these effortful processes through control adaptation and false alibis. These results support and expand current theorizing of the cognitive underpinnings of dishonest responding. Furthermore, they are alerting from an applied perspective on the detection of lies, especially when considering the flexibility of even basic cognitive processes in the face of false alibis. A promising way to move forward from here would be a fine-grained discrimination of response activation, passive decay and active inhibition of honest representations in dishonest responding and the assessment of the adaptiveness of these processes.
Hintergrund: Das Catechol-O-Methyltransferase-Gen (COMT) ist ein vielversprechendes Kandidatengen zur Untersuchung kognitiver und emotionaler Funktionen sowie deren pathologischer Veränderungen. Ein einzelner Basenaustausch in diesem Gen führt zu einer 3-4fach höheren COMT-Aktivität der Val Variante. Ein dadurch vermitteltes dopaminerges Defizit wird als relevanter Faktor für eine veränderte Hirnfunktion angenommen.
Mit dem kognitiven Stroop-Paradigma wurden kognitive Verarbeitungsprozesse bisher gut erforscht. Zur Erfassung emotionaler Verarbeitungsprozesse wurde eine emotionale Variante entwickelt, deren neurale Grundlagen bislang weniger gut bekannt sind. Ziel: Unsere imaging genetics-Arbeit untersucht den Einfluss genetischer Varianten auf die neurale Funktion. Ziel dieser experimentellen Arbeit war es, den Einfluss des COMT-Polymorphismus (COMT-PM) auf die Frontalkortex-Funktion in ausgewählten Regionen von Interesse (ROI) zu erfassen und der Frage nachzugehen, ob das Val-Allel als Risiko-Allel zur Pathogenese einer Angststörung (AS) beitragen könnte. Zudem sollte die Tauglichkeit des emotionalen Stroop- Paradigmas als angstsensibles Messinstrument zur Untersuchung dieser Fragestellung geprüft werden. Demgegenüber steht die Annahme, das emotionale Stroop-Paradigma könnte lediglich eine Arbeitsgedächtnis (AG)-Aufgabe darstellen. Methoden: Mittels funktioneller Nahinfrarotspektroskopie (fNIRS) und ereigniskorrelierter Potentiale untersuchten wir 121 gesunde nach dem COMT- Val158Met-PM stratifizierte Probanden während eines kombiniert emotional- kognitiven Stroop-Paradigmas. Als neurale Korrelate von Exekutivfunktionen und AG-Aufgaben waren die ROI dabei der laterale präfrontale und inferiore Kortex, die auch mit emotionaler Regulation in Verbindung gebracht werden. Als Parameter der Reaktion des autonomen Nervensystems (ANS) diente die Erfassung der elektrodermalen Aktivität sowie die kontinuierliche Messung von Blutdruck, Herzfrequenz und Herzratenvariabilität. Ergebnisse: Bei allen drei COMT Varianten zeigte sich ein kognitiver Stroop-Effekt mit verlängerter Reaktionszeit und erhöhter Fehleranzahl während der Präsentation inkongruenter Farbworte. Als Reaktion des ANS stellte sich eine erhöhte elektrodermale Aktivität bei inkongruenten Farbworten dar. Die funktionelle Bildgebung ließ in den analysierten Regionen eine erhöhte präfrontale Aktivierung während der Verarbeitung inkongruenter Farbworte nachweisen. Es fanden sich keine Gruppenunterschiede im kognitiven Stroop-Paradigma. Der einzige emotionale Stroop-Effekt zeigte sich in der P300. Der einzig nachweisbare Gruppeneffekt stellte sich im emotionalen Stroop-Paradigma als höhere Fehleranzahl bei Met-Homozygoten verglichen mit Heterozygoten dar. Schlussfolgerung: Genetische Information und funktionelle Bildgebung kombiniert sollten ermöglichen, neurale Mechanismen zu definieren, die mit genetischen Varianten verlinkt sind. Die Ergebnisse bezogen auf die analysierten Regionen liefern keinen Hinweis auf ein Val-Allel assoziiertes Risiko für die Entwicklung einer AS. Damit gelingt es nicht, bisher gewonnene Ergebnisse zum Einfluss des COMT-PM auf die präfrontale Funktion zu replizieren. Fraglich ist jedoch, ob sich das emotionale Stroop-Paradigma zur Untersuchung dieser Frage eignet, da weder in den fNIRS-, noch in den autonomen oder Verhaltensdaten ein emotionaler Stroop-Effekt nachgewiesen werden konnte.
In der vorliegenden Studie wurde untersucht, ob zerebrale Mikroblutungen (CMB) bereits im frühen Verlauf nach ischämischem Schlaganfall (IS) oder Transitorisch-Ischämischer Attacke (TIA) mit kognitivem Abbau assoziiert sind und ob spezifische kognitive Domänen besonders betroffen sind. Der Vergleich zweier Probandengruppen mit IS/TIA und CMB bzw. IS/TIA ohne CMB hinsichtlich ihrer Ergebnisse in der neuropsychologischen Testbatterie CERAD ergab, dass CMB bereits sechs Monate nach dem zerebrovaskulären Ereignis mit einem kognitiven Abbau assoziiert sind. Multilokuläre CMB zeigen eine stärkere Auswirkung auf die Kognition als solche CMB, die in einer einzigen Hirnregion gefunden wurden. Zudem wurde eine signifikante Korrelation zwischen dem Grad der kognitiven Einschränkung und der Anzahl der CMB errechnet. Die separate Betrachtung derjenigen Testungen, welche das episodische Gedächtnis erfassen, zeigte eine Beeinträchtigung der Testpersonen beim Wiedererkennen von zuvor gelernten Wörtern. Bei der Untersuchung des semantischen Gedächtnisses der ProbandInnen fiel eine signifikant eingeschränkte phonematische Wortflüssigkeit auf, die semantische Flüssigkeit und das Benennen jedoch waren weniger betroffen. Die Domäne „Visuokonstruktive Fähigkeiten“ wurde ebenfalls in drei Untertests beurteilt. Hierbei zeigten sich keine Defizite der Testgruppe beim Abzeichnen der dargebotenen Figuren, die Reproduktion hingegen war signifikant gestört. Es zeigte sich keine CMB-bedingte Einschränkung der exekutiven Funktionen.
Humans use their eyes not only as visual input devices to perceive the environment, but also as an action tool in order to generate intended effects in their environment. For instance, glances are used to direct someone else's attention to a place of interest, indicating that gaze control is an important part of social communication. Previous research on gaze control in a social context mainly focused on the gaze recipient by asking how humans respond to perceived gaze (gaze cueing). So far, this perspective has hardly considered the actor’s point of view by neglecting to investigate what mental processes are involved when actors decide to perform an eye movement to trigger a gaze response in another person. Furthermore, eye movements are also used to affect the non-social environment, for instance when unlocking the smartphone with the help of the eyes. This and other observations demonstrate the necessity to consider gaze control in contexts other than social communication whilst at the same time focusing on commonalities and differences inherent to the nature of a social (vs. non-social) action context. Thus, the present work explores the cognitive mechanisms that control such goal-oriented eye movements in both social and non-social contexts.
The experiments presented throughout this work are built on pre-established paradigms from both the oculomotor research domain and from basic cognitive psychology. These paradigms are based on the principle of ideomotor action control, which provides an explanatory framework for understanding how goal-oriented, intentional actions come into being. The ideomotor idea suggests that humans acquire associations between their actions and the resulting effects, which can be accessed in a bi-directional manner: Actions can trigger anticipations of their effects, but the anticipated resulting effects can also trigger the associated actions. According to ideomotor theory, action generation involves the mental anticipation of the intended effect (i.e., the action goal) to activate the associated motor pattern. The present experiments involve situations where participants control the gaze of a virtual face via their eye movements. The triggered gaze responses of the virtual face are consistent to the participant’s eye movements, representing visual action effects. Experimental situations are varied with respect to determinants of action-effect learning (e.g., contingency, contiguity, action mode during acquisition) in order to unravel the underlying dynamics of oculomotor control in these situations. In addition to faces, conditions involving changes in non-social objects were included to address the question of whether mechanisms underlying gaze control differ for social versus non-social context situations.
The results of the present work can be summarized into three major findings. 1. My data suggest that humans indeed acquire bi-directional associations between their eye movements and the subsequently perceived gaze response of another person, which in turn affect oculomotor action control via the anticipation of the intended effects. The observed results show for the first time that eye movements in a gaze-interaction scenario are represented in terms of their gaze response in others. This observation is in line with the ideomotor theory of action control. 2. The present series of experiments confirms and extends pioneering results of Huestegge and Kreutzfeldt (2012) with respect to the significant influence of action effects in gaze control. I have shown that the results of Huestegge and Kreutzfeldt (2012) can be replicated across different contexts with different stimulus material given that the perceived action effects were sufficiently salient. 3. Furthermore, I could show that mechanisms of gaze control in a social gaze-interaction context do not appear to be qualitatively different from those in a non-social context.
All in all, the results support recent theoretical claims emphasizing the role of anticipation-based action control in social interaction. Moreover, my results suggest that anticipation-based gaze control in a social context is based on the same general psychological mechanisms as ideomotor gaze control, and thus should be considered as an integral part rather than as a special form of ideomotor gaze control.
Cognitive control is what makes goal-directed actions possible. Whenever the environment or our impulses strongly suggests a response that is incompatible with our goals, conflict arises. Such conflicts are believed to cause negative affect. Aversive consequences of conflict may be registered in a conflict monitoring module, which subsequently initiates attentional changes and action tendencies to reduce negative affect. This association suggests that behavioral adaptation might be a reflection of emotion regulation. The theoretical cornerstone of current research on emotion regulation is the process model of emotion regulation, which postulates the regulation strategies situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation. Under the assumption that conflict adaptation and affect regulation share common mechanisms, I derived several predictions regarding cognitive control from the process model of emotion regulation and tested them in 11 experiments (N = 509). Participants engaged in situation selection towards conflict, but only when they were explicitly pointed to action-outcome contingencies (Experiments 1 to 3). I found support for a mechanism resembling situation modification, but no evidence for a role of affect (Experiments 4 to 10). Changing the evaluation of conflict had no impact on the extent of conflict adaptation (Experiment 11). Overall, there was evidence for an explicit aversiveness of cognitive conflict, but less evidence for implicit aversiveness, suggesting that conflict may trigger affect regulation processes, particularly when people explicitly have affect regulation goals in mind.
In der vorliegenden prospektiven Pilotstudie wurden die Hypothesen überprüft, dass es durch die nicht-invasive aurikuläre Vagusnervstimulation, jedoch nicht durch eine Kontrollstimulation am Ohrläppchen, zu einer Steigerung der Befindlichkeit, einer Verbesserung der Kognition und einem positiven Effekt auf die Herzratenvariabilität kommt.
Zusammenfassend konnten dabei in dieser Studie geringe Effekte der t-VNS auf einen kognitiven Parameter (F%-Wert des d2-Tests) sowie einen einzelnen HRV-Parameter (pNN50) gezeigt werden, wobei es Hinweise auf eine Intensitätsabhängigkeit der einzelnen Effekte gab. Auf die übrigen erfassten kognitiven Parameter und die weiteren gemessenen HRV-Parameter sowie die Befindlichkeit konnte kein Einfluss der t-VNS nachgewiesen werden. Bestätigt werden konnte das gute Sicherheitsprofil und die gute Tolerabilität der t-VNS.
During natural behavior, cognitive processes constantly coincide with body movements such as head or eye movements or blinks. However, during experimental investigations of cognitive processes, movements are often highly restricted which is rather unnatural. In order to improve our understanding of natural behavior, this thesis investigates the interaction between cognition and movements by focusing on spontaneous blinks, which naturally interact with other body movements.
Spontaneous blinks are inevitably connected to vision as they shut out incoming visual information. Both sensory-based and cognitive factors, for example, stimulus occurrence and evaluation, were reported to influence blink behavior. Our first study investigated if such influences are comparable for visual and non-visual input. The chosen experimental design allowed dissociating sensory-driven and cognitive influences, which then could be compared between the visual and auditory domain. Our results show that blinks are more strongly modulated during passive observation of visual input compared to auditory input. This modulation is however enhanced for both input modalities by an increased attentional demand. In addition, the cognitively defined meaning of a stimulus changes blink latency independent of the sensory domain. Overall, our findings show that spontaneous blinks and cognitive processes are linked beyond vision. Moreover, the underlying cognitive processes that influence blinks are largely the same across different sensory input indicating that blinks are profoundly integrated into our system.
When investigating natural behavior, it is important to consider that movements rarely occur in isolation, but are executed side by side. As these movements interact and have a link to cognitive processes, the complexity of our system increases. In order to take this complexity into account, the second part of the experimental research focused on movement interactions, more specifically on the interactions between blinks, pupil size and speaking. Our results reveal that speech-related motor activity increases blink rate and pupil size as well as modulates blink timing. This is in line with previous research that described a relation between different body and eye movements. Importantly, each bodily-induced change in eye movements affects visual information intake. Therefore, different movements can be tightly linked to perceptual processes through complex interactions.
Altogether, the work of this thesis provides rich evidence that movements and cognitive processes are deeply intertwined. Therefore, movements should be seen as an integral part of our system. Taking the relevance of movements and their interactions into account during experimental investigations is necessary in order to reveal a more realistic and complete picture of human natural behavior.
One of the features that defines humans as extraordinarily social beings is their striking susceptibility to the gaze of others. The research reported in this dissertation was undertaken to advance our understanding of the role of gaze cues in low-level attentional and higher-order cognitive processes. In particular, effects of gaze were examined with regard to three aspects of human cognition: (1) social attention, (2) social interaction and (3) social understanding. Chapter 1 consists of three manuscripts that investigate the boundary conditions of attention capture by direct gaze and how gaze direction is integrated with facial context information. Manuscript 1 and 2 suggest two necessary requirements for attention capture by direct gaze: a meaningful holistic facial context and sharp foveal vision, respectively. Manuscript 3 shows approach/avoidance-congruency effects between gaze direction and emotion expression on attention. Chapter 2 of this dissertation explores the role of gaze in more naturalistic social scenarios. Manuscript 4 demonstrates that gaze behavior during a conversation shapes our perception of another person. Manuscript 5 builds on these findings by showing that these perceptions define our willingness to act in a prosocial way towards our interaction partner. Finally, chapter 3 adopts a broader perspective on social cognition research with a special focus on methodological aspects. Manuscript 6 is a review highlighting the significance of methodological aspects in social cognition research and stressing the importance of sophisticated decisions on task and stimulus materials. Manuscript 7 introduces a new instrument for the assessment of social understanding in adolescents. Initial application in a young sample group indicates that an understanding of another person’s mental states is a capacity that is still developing throughout adolescence. Both manuscripts of this final chapter include eye tracking data that suggest a relationship between gaze behavior and social understanding, a finding that further emphasizes the complex and multifaceted nature of social cognition. I conclude from the findings of this dissertation that research can benefit from adopting a broad view in terms of methodological as well as temporal aspects in order to capture human social cognition in its entirety.
Im Rahmen dieser Dissertation wurde geprüft, welchen Verlauf die kognitiven Leistungen von Patienten nach der operativen Resektion eines intrakraniellen Meningeoms nahmen und ob hierbei Unterschiede zwischen den Personen bestanden, die eine anschließende Rehabilitation absolvierten, sowie jenen, die keine weiteren Maßnahmen erhielten.
Mit der ersten Hypothese wurde angenommen, dass Patienten ohne Rehabilitation drei Monate nach der Operation ihre kognitiven Fähigkeiten im Vergleich zu einer Woche nach dem Eingriff verbessern. Dies konnte nicht eindeutig bestätigt werden, da eine Steigerung der Leistungen in dieser Patientengruppe nur in fünf der sechzehn Teilgebiete erreicht wurde. Die zweite Hypothese basierte auf der Annahme, dass Patienten mit einer Rehabilitationsmaßnahme Leistungssteigerungen in den getesteten Gebieten zeigten. Der Vergleich fand eine Woche nach dem operativen Eingriff und drei Monate nach der Operation statt. Diese Hypothese kann durch die vorliegenden Ergebnisse im Rahmen der Konzentrationsleistung zumindest eingeschränkt bejaht werden. Es ließen sich zwei signifikante Unterschiede der Ergebnisse der Patienten mit anschließender Rehabilitation beobachten. Hier konnte im ergänzend zur ANOVA berechneten t-Test ein signifikanter Unterschied bei der Leistungssteigerung der Patienten mit anschließender Rehabilitation nachgewiesen werden. Des Weiteren kam es in dieser Patientengruppe zu gesteigerten Leistungen in vierzehn von sechzehn Teilgebieten. Im Falle der dritten Hypothese sollte exploriert werden, ob die Patientengruppe mit anschließender Rehabilitationsmaßnahme im Vergleich zur Patientengruppe ohne weitere Maßnahmen eine größere Leistungssteigerung erfuhr. Dabei konnte eine leichte Tendenz beobachtet werden. Es wurden Verbesserungen der Patientengruppe mit Rehabilitation gegenüber den Patienten ohne weitere Maßnahmen in neun von sechzehn Kategorien beobachtet. Somit lässt sich die Annahme stützen, dass eine postoperative Rehabilitationsmaßnahme sich positiv auf die kognitiven Leistungen bei Meningeom-Patienten auswirkt.