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Are there emotional reactions towards social robots? Could you love a robot? Or, put the other way round: Could you mistreat a robot, tear it apart and sell it? Media reports people honoring military robots with funerals, mourning the “death” of a robotic dog, and granting the humanoid robot Sophia citizenship. But how profound are these reactions? Three experiments take a closer look on emotional reactions towards social robots by investigating the subjective experience of people as well as the motor expressive level. Contexts of varying degrees of Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) sketch a nuanced picture of emotions towards social robots that encompass conscious as well as unconscious reactions. The findings advance the understanding of affective experiences in HRI. It also turns the initial question into: Can emotional reactions towards social robots even be avoided?
Action planning can be construed as the temporary binding of features of perceptual action effects. While previous research demonstrated binding for task-relevant, body-related effect features, the role of task-irrelevant or environment-related effect features in action planning is less clear. Here, we studied whether task-relevance or body-relatedness determines feature binding in action planning. Participants planned an action A, but before executing it initiated an intermediate action B. Each action relied on a body-related effect feature (index vs. middle finger movement) and an environment-related effect feature (cursor movement towards vs. away from a reference object). In Experiments 1 and 2, both effects were task-relevant. Performance in action B suffered from partial feature overlap with action A compared to full feature repetition or alternation, which is in line with binding of both features while planning action A. Importantly, this cost disappeared when all features were available but only body-related features were task-relevant (Experiment 3). When only the environment-related effect of action A was known in advance, action B benefitted when it aimed at the same (vs. a different) environment-related effect (Experiment 4). Consequently, the present results support the idea that task relevance determines whether binding of body-related and environment-related effect features takes place while the pre-activation of environment-related features without binding them primes feature-overlapping actions.
Movements of a tool typically diverge from the movements of the hand manipulating that tool, such as when operating a pivotal lever where tool and hand move in opposite directions. Previous studies suggest that humans are often unaware of the position or movements of their effective body part (mostly the hand) in such situations. It has been suggested that this might be due to a "haptic neglect" of bodily sensations to decrease the interference of representations of body and tool movements. However, in principle this interference could also be decreased by neglecting sensations regarding the tool and focusing instead on body movements. While in most tool use situations the tool-related action effects are task-relevant and thus suppression of body-related rather than tool-related sensations is more beneficial for successful goal achievement, we manipulated this task-relevance in a controlled experiment. The results showed that visual, tool-related effect representations can be suppressed just as proprioceptive, body-related ones in situations where effect representations interfere, given that task-relevance of body-related effects is increased relative to tool-related ones.
It's costly punishment, not altruistic: Low midfrontal theta and state anger predict punishment
(2020)
Punishment in economic games has been interpreted as “altruistic.” However, it was shown that punishment is related to trait anger instead of trait altruism in a third‐party dictator game if compensation is also available. Here, we investigated the influence of state anger on punishment and compensation in the third‐party dictator game. Therefore, we used movie sequences for emotional priming, including the target states anger, happy, and neutral. We measured the Feedback‐Related Negativity (FRN) and midfrontal theta band activation, to investigate an electro‐cortical correlate of the processing of fair and unfair offers. Also, we assessed single‐trial FRN and midfrontal theta band activation as a predictor for punishment and compensation. We found that punishment was linked to state anger. Midfrontal theta band activation, which has previously been linked to altruistic acts and cognitive control, predicted less punishment. Additionally, trait anger led to enhanced FRN for unfair offers. This led to the interpretation that the FRN depicts the evaluation of fairness, while midfrontal theta band activation captures an aspect of cognitive control and altruistic motivation. We conclude that we need to redefine “altruistic punishment” into “costly punishment,” as no direct link of altruism and punishment is given. Additionally, midfrontal theta band activation complements the FRN and offers additional insights into complex responses and decision processes, especially as a single trial predictor.
We investigated the influence of social status on behavior in a modified dictator game (DG). Since the DG contains an inherent dominance gradient, we examined the relationship between dictator decisions and recipient status, which was operationalized by three social identities and an artificial intelligence (AI). Additionally, we examined the predictive value of social dominance orientation (SDO) on the behavior of dictators toward the different social and non-social hierarchical recipients. A multilevel model analysis showed that recipients with the same status as the dictator benefited the most and the artificial intelligence the least. Furthermore, SDO, regardless of social status, predicted behavior toward recipients in such a way that higher dominance was associated with lower dictator offers. In summary, participants treated other persons of higher and lower status equally, those of equal status better and, above all, an algorithm worst. The large proportion of female participants and the limited variance of SDO should be taken into account with regard to the results of individual differences in SDO.
Objective
Most patients with bipolar disorders (BD) exhibit prodromal symptoms before a first (hypo)manic episode. Patients with clinically significant symptoms fulfilling at‐risk criteria for serious mental illness (SMI) require effective and safe treatment. Cognitive‐behavioral psychotherapy (CBT) has shown promising results in early stages of BD and in patients at high risk for psychosis. We aimed to investigate whether group CBT can improve symptoms and functional deficits in young patients at risk for SMI presenting with subthreshold bipolar symptoms.
Method
In a multicenter, randomized, controlled trial, patients at clinical risk for SMI presenting with subthreshold bipolar symptoms aged 15‐30 years were randomized to 14 weeks of at‐risk for BD‐specific group CBT or unstructured group meetings. Primary efficacy endpoints were differences in affective symptomatology and psychosocial functioning at 14 weeks. At‐risk status was defined as a combination of subthreshold bipolar symptomatology, reduction of psychosocial functioning and a family history for (schizo)affective disorders. A prespecified interim analysis was conducted at 75% of the targeted sample.
Results
Of 128 screened participants, 75 were randomized to group CBT (n = 38, completers = 65.8%) vs unstructured group meetings (n = 37, completers = 78.4%). Affective symptomatology and psychosocial functioning improved significantly at week 14 (P < .001) and during 6 months (P < .001) in both groups, without significant between‐group differences. Findings are limited by the interim character of the analysis, the use of not fully validated early detection interviews, a newly adapted intervention manual, and the substantial drop‐outs.
Conclusions
Results suggest that young patients at‐risk for SMI presenting with subthreshold bipolar symptoms benefit from early group sessions. The degree of specificity and psychotherapeutic interaction needed requires clarification.
Purpose of Review
This article provides an overview of current findings on Theory of Mind (ToM) in human children and adults and highlights the relationship between task specifications and their outcome in socio-cognitive research.
Recent Findings
ToM, the capacity to reason about and infer others’ mental states, develops progressively throughout childhood—the exact time course is still a matter of debate. Neuroimaging studies indicate the involvement of a widespread neuronal network during mentalizing, suggesting that ToM is a multifaceted process. Accordingly, the tasks and trainings that currently exist to investigate and enhance ToM are heterogeneous, and the outcomes largely depend on the paradigm that was used.
Summary
We argue for the implementation of multiple-task batteries in the assessment of socio-cognitive abilities. Decisions for a particular paradigm need to be carefully considered and justified. We want to emphasize the importance of targeted research on the relationship between task specifications and outcomes.
Honest actions predominate human behavior. From time to time, this general preference must yield to dishonest actions, which require an effortful process of overcoming initial honest response activation. This thesis presents three experimental series to elucidate this tug-of-war between honest and dishonest response tendencies in overtly committed instances of lies, thereby joining recent efforts to move from a sheer phenomenological perspective on dishonest responding as being more difficult than honest responding to a precise description of the underlying cognitive processes. The consideration of cognitive theories, empirical evidence, and paradigms from different research fields – dishonesty, cognitive control and sensorimotor stage models of information processing – lay the groundwork for the research questions and methodological approach of this thesis.
The experiments pinpoint the underlying conflict of dishonest responding in the central, capacity-limited stage of information processing (Experiments 1 to 4), but they also demonstrate that cognitive control processes (Experiments 5 to 7) and the internalization of false alibis (Experiments 8 to 11) can reduce or even completely eliminate this conflict. The data reveals great flexibility at the cognitive basis of dishonest responding: On the one hand, dishonest responding appears to rely heavily on capacity-limited processes of response selection to overcome honest response tendencies alongside up- and downstream consequences of response activation and monitoring. On the other hand, agents have powerful tools to mitigate these effortful processes through control adaptation and false alibis. These results support and expand current theorizing of the cognitive underpinnings of dishonest responding. Furthermore, they are alerting from an applied perspective on the detection of lies, especially when considering the flexibility of even basic cognitive processes in the face of false alibis. A promising way to move forward from here would be a fine-grained discrimination of response activation, passive decay and active inhibition of honest representations in dishonest responding and the assessment of the adaptiveness of these processes.
The present dissertation aims to shed light on different mechanisms of socio-emotional feedback in social decision-making situations. The objective is to evaluate emotional facial expressions as feedback stimuli, i.e., responses of interaction partners to certain social decisions. In addition to human faces, artificial emojis are also examined due to their relevance for modern digital communication. Previous research on the influence of emotional feedback suggests that a person's behavior can be effectively reinforced by rewarding stimuli. In the context of this dissertation, the differences in the feedback processing of human photographs and emojis, but also the evaluation of socially expected versus socially unexpected feedback were examined in detail in four studies. In addition to behavioral data, we used the electroencephalogram (EEG) in all studies to investigate neural correlates of social decision-making and emotional feedback.
As the central paradigm, all studies were based on a modified ultimatum game. The game is structured as follows: there is a so-called proposer who holds a specific amount of money (e.g., 10 cents) and offers the responder a certain amount (e.g., 3 cents). The responder then decides whether to accept or reject the offer. In the version of the ultimatum game presented here, different types of proposers are introduced. After the participants have accepted or rejected in the role of the responder, the different proposers react to the participant’s decision with specific emotional facial expressions. Different feedback patterns are used for the individual experiments conducted in the course of this dissertation.
In the first study, we investigated the influence of emotional feedback on decision-making in the modified version of the ultimatum game. We were able to show that a proposer who responds to the acceptance of an offer with a smiling face achieves more accepted offers overall than a control proposer who responds to both accepted and rejected offers with a neutral facial expression. Consequently, the smile served as a positive reinforcement. Similarly, a sad expression in response to a rejected offer also resulted in higher acceptance rates as compared to the control identity, which could be considered an expression of compassion for that proposer. On a neuronal level, we could show that there are differences between simply looking at negative emotional stimuli (i.e., sad and angry faces) and their appearance as feedback stimuli after rejected offers in the modified ultimatum game. The so-called feedback-related negativity was reduced (i.e., more positive) when negative emotions appeared as feedback from the proposers. We argued that these findings might show that the participants wanted to punish the proposers by rejecting an offer for its unfairness and therefore the negative feedback met their expectations. The altered processing of negative emotional facial expressions in the ultimatum game could therefore indicate that the punishment is interpreted as successful. This includes the expectation that the interaction partner will change his behavior in the future and eventually make fairer offers.
In the second study we wanted to show that smiling and sad emojis as feedback stimuli in the modified ultimatum game can also lead to increased acceptance rates. Contrary to our assumptions, this effect could not be observed. At the neural level as well, the findings did not correspond to our assumptions and differed strongly from those of the first study. One finding, however, was that the neural P3 component showed how the use of emojis as feedback stimuli particularly characterizes certain types of proposers. This is supported by the fact that the P3 is increased for the proposer who rewards an acceptance with a smile as well as for the proposer who reacts to rejection with a sad emoji compared to the neutral control proposer.
The third study examined the discrepancy between the findings of the first and second study. Accordingly, both humans and emojis representing the different proposers were presented in the ultimatum game. In addition, emojis were selected that showed a higher similarity to known emojis from common messenger services compared to the second study. We were able to replicate that the proposers in the ultimatum game, who reward an acceptance of the offer with a smile, led to an increased acceptance rate compared to the neutral control proposers. This difference is independent of whether the proposers are represented by emojis or human faces. With regard to the neural correlates, we were able to demonstrate that emojis and human faces differ strongly in their neural processing. Emojis showed stronger activation than human faces in the face-processing N170 component, the feedback-related negativity and the P3 component. We concluded that the results of the N170 and feedback-related negativity could indicate a signal for missing social information of emojis compared to faces. The increased P3 amplitude for emojis might imply that emojis appear unexpectedly as reward stimuli in a social decision task compared to human faces.
The last study of this project dealt with socially unexpected feedback. In comparison to the first three studies, new proposer identities were implemented. In particular, the focus was on a proposer who reacted to the rejection of an offer unexpectedly with a smile and to the acceptance with a neutral facial expression. According to the results, participants approach this unexpected smile through increased rejection, although it is accompanied by financial loss. In addition, as reported in studies one and three, we were able to show that proposers who respond to the acceptance of an offer with a smiling face and thus meet the expectations of the participants have higher offer acceptance rates than the control proposer. At the neuronal level, especially the feedback from the socially unexpected proposer led to an increased P3 amplitude, which indicates that smiling after rejection is attributed a special subjective importance.
The experiments provide new insights into the social influence through emotional feedback and the processing of relevant social cues. Due to the conceptual similarity of the studies, it was possible to differentiate between stable findings and potentially stimulus-dependent deviations, thus creating a well-founded contribution to the current research. Therefore, the novel paradigm presented here, and the knowledge gained from it could also play an important role in the future for clinical questions dealing with limited social competencies.
Multitasking, defined as performing more than one task at a time, typically yields performance decrements, for instance, in processing speed and accuracy. These performance costs are often distributed asymmetrically among the involved tasks. Under suitable conditions, this can be interpreted as a marker for prioritization of one task – the one that suffers less – over the other. One source of such task prioritization is based on the use of different effector systems (e.g., oculomotor system, vocal tract, limbs) and their characteristics. The present work explores such effector system-based task prioritization by examining to which extent associated effector systems determine which task is processed with higher priority in multitasking situations. Thus, three different paradigms are used, namely the simultaneous (stimulus) onset paradigm, the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm, and the task switching paradigm. These paradigms invoke situations in which two (in the present studies basic spatial decision) tasks are a) initiated at exactly the same time, b) initiated with a short varying temporal distance (but still temporally overlapping), or c) in which tasks alternate randomly (without temporal overlap). The results allow for three major conclusions: 1. The assumption of effector system-based task prioritization according to an ordinal pattern (oculomotor > pedal > vocal > manual, indicating decreasing prioritization) is supported by the observed data in the simultaneous onset paradigm. This data pattern cannot be explained by a rigid “first come, first served” task scheduling principle. 2. The data from the PRP paradigm confirmed the assumption of vocal-over-manual prioritization and showed that classic PRP effects (as a marker for task order-based prioritization) can be modulated by effector system characteristics. 3. The mere cognitive representation of task sets (that must be held active to switch between them) differing in effector systems without an actual temporal overlap in task processing, however, is not sufficient to elicit the same effector system prioritization phenomena observed for overlapping tasks. In summary, the insights obtained by the present work support the assumptions of parallel central task processing and resource sharing among tasks, as opposed to exclusively serial processing of central processing stages. Moreover, they indicate that effector systems are a crucial factor in multitasking and suggest an integration of corresponding weighting parameters in existing dual-task control frameworks.