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In contrast to classical theories of cognitive control, recent evidence suggests that cognitive control and unconscious automatic processing influence each other. First, masked semantic priming, an index of unconscious automatic processing, depends on attention to semantics induced by a previously executed task. Second, cognitive control operations (e.g., implementation of task sets indicating how to process a particular stimulus) can be activated by masked task cues, presented outside awareness. In this study, we combined both lines of research. We investigated in three experiments whether induction tasks and presentation of visible or masked task cues, which signal subsequent semantic or perceptual tasks but do not require induction task execution, comparably modulate masked semantic priming. In line with previous research, priming was consistently larger following execution of a semantic rather than a perceptual induction task. However, we observed in experiment 1 (masked letter cues) a reversed priming pattern following task cues (larger priming following cues signaling perceptual tasks) compared to induction tasks. Experiment 2 (visible letter cues) and experiment 3 (visible color cues) showed that this reversed priming pattern depended only on apriori associations between task cues and task elements (task set dominance), but neither on awareness nor on the verbal or non-verbal format of the cues. These results indicate that task cues have the power to modulate subsequent masked semantic priming through attentional mechanisms. Task-set dominance conceivably affects the time course of task set activation and inhibition in response to task cues and thus the direction of their modulatory effects on priming.
In task-switching studies, performance is typically worse in task-switch trials than in task-repetition trials. These switch costs are often asymmetrical, a phenomenon that has been explained by referring to a dominance of one task over the other. Previous studies also indicated that response modalities associated with two tasks may be considered as integral components for defining a task set. However, a systematic assessment of the role of response modalities in task switching is still lacking: Are some response modalities harder to switch to than others? The present study systematically examined switch costs when combining tasks that differ only with respect to their associated effector systems. In Experiment 1, 16 participants switched (in unpredictable sequence) between oculomotor and vocal tasks. In Experiment 2, 72 participants switched (in pairwise combinations) between oculomotor, vocal, and manual tasks. We observed systematic performance costs when switching between response modalities under otherwise constant task features and could thereby replicate previous observations of response modality switch costs. However, we did not observe any substantial switch-cost asymmetries. As previous studies using temporally overlapping dual-task paradigms found substantial prioritization effects (in terms of asymmetric costs) especially for oculomotor tasks, the present results suggest different underlying processes in sequential task switching than in simultaneous multitasking. While more research is needed to further substantiate a lack of response modality switch-cost asymmetries in a broader range of task switching situations, we suggest that task-set representations related to specific response modalities may exhibit rapid decay.
Conflict Management
(2014)
Humans have a remarkable ability to plan ahead, set goals for the future and then to act accordingly. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. Everybody has experienced situations in which motivational urges like a tendency to drink another beer, or over-learned behavioral routines like driving on the right side of the road collide with ones´ goals. This tug of war between impulsive or habitual action tendencies and goal-directed actions is called a conflict.
Conflict is ubiquitous and comes in many different ways. Not surprisingly, the means to control conflict are diverse, too. Clearly, people can manage conflict in multiple ways: When expecting a conflict situation to occur in the future, one can recruit more effort to resolve the conflict, for instance by inhibiting unwanted urges or habits. Alternatively one can avoid the conflict situation and thereby circumvent possible failures to control habits and impulses. Furthermore, when currently facing a conflict, people can mobilize more effort to overcome the conflict. Alternatively they can withdraw from the conflict situation to minimize the risk of indulging in their impulses and habits.
To account for these different ways to master a conflict, the present thesis takes an initial step towards a characterization of the variability of control. To this aim, two dimensions of control will be identified that result from partially incompatible constraints on action control. These dimensions depict a trade-off between flexibility and stability and between anticipatory early selection and reactive late correction of control parameters. To describe how these control trade-offs interact and to explain how conflict is handled to ensure adaptation behavior, the conflict management framework is proposed. A corollary of this framework suggests that one strategy to control conflict comprises of a tendency to withdraw from a conflict situation.
The empirical part probed this behavioral response to conflict and tested whether participants withdraw from conflict situations. To approach this hypothesis, three series of experiments are presented that employ free choice paradigms, speeded response classification tasks and continuous movement tracking tasks to reveal withdrawal from conflict. Results show that conflict caused motivational avoidance tendencies (Experiment 1 &2), biased decision making away from conflict tasks (Experiment 3 & 5) and affected the execution of more complex courses of action (Experiment 6 & 7).
The results lend support for the proposed conflict management framework and provide the ground for a more thorough treatment of how the different conflict strategies can be integrated. As a first step, a connectionist model is presented that accounts for the simultaneous implementation of two conflict strategies observed in Experiments 3 – 5. The remainder of the present thesis analyses failures to integrate different conflict strategies. It is discussed how the conflict management framework can shed light on selected psychopathologies, inter-individual differences in control and break-downs of self-control.