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This paper examines the potential reinforcement of motivated beliefs when individuals with identical biases communicate. We propose a controlled online experiment that allows to manipulate belief biases and the communication environment. We find that communication, even among like-minded individuals, diminishes motivated beliefs if it takes place in an environment without previously declared external opinions. In the presence of external plural opinions, however, communication does not reduce but rather aggravates motivated beliefs. Our results indicate a potential drawback of the plurality of opinions - it may create communication environments wherein motivated beliefs not only persist but also become contagious within social networks.
The Macroeconomic Dimensions of Credit: A Comprehensive Analysis of Finance, Inequality and Growth
(2024)
Schumpeter's monetary growth theory is particularly influential for the modern understanding of the macroeconomic role of banks and credit. Based on this theory, this dissertation examines the macroeconomic role of the financial system, especially credit, in (1) generating economic growth, (2) directing economic resources and (3) distributing wealth.
Chapter 3 first shows empirically that 1) there is a positive correlation between the growth of credit and economic growth, even for developed countries, 2) no empirical correlation between household saving and economic growth can be established, and 3) there are both positive, negative and insignificant effects of credit on economic growth at country-specific level. Thus, there is broad empirical support for Schumpeter's monetary hypotheses.
A particularly interesting application of Schumpeter's growth theory can be seen in China. The results of the empirical study suggest that there is generally a positive correlation between credit and economic growth in China, that is, however, not linear in terms of regions, time and size of the financial system. Furthermore, the results in Chapter 4 suggest that credit-financed industrial policy in China may have contributed to more investment and GDP growth, although there are non-linearities between individual industries and types of companies.
Finally, Chapter 5 raises the question of the role of the financial system in the distribution of wealth. While credit to households and companies, together with indicators of working and saving behavior and the age structure of the population, are the most important determinants of wealth inequality, there are also various non-linearities in the relationship between credit and wealth inequality, including in relation to the level of development of financial systems and home ownership ratios.
Expanding on a general equilibrium model of offshoring, we analyze the effects of a unilateral emissions tax increase on the environment, income, and inequality. Heterogeneous firms allocate labor across production tasks and emissions abatement, while only the most productive can benefit from lower labor and/or emissions costs abroad and offshore. We find a non-monotonic effect on global emissions, which decline if the initial difference in emissions taxes is small. For a sufficiently large difference, global emissions rise, implying emissions leakage of more than 100%. The underlying driver is a global technique effect: While the emissions intensity of incumbent non-offshoring firms declines, the cleanest firms start offshoring. Moreover, offshoring firms become dirtier, induced by a reduction in the foreign effective emissions tax in general equilibrium. Implementing a BCA prevents emissions leakage, reduces income inequality in the reforming country, but raises inequality across countries.
A lot of countries have recently published updated hydrogen strategies, often including more ambitious targets for hydrogen production. In parallel, accompanying ramp-up mechanisms are increasingly coming into focus with the first ones already being released. However, these proposals usually translate mechanisms from renewable energy (RE) policy without considering the specific uncertainties, spillovers, and externalities of integrating hydrogen electrolysis into electricity grids. This article details how different aspects of a policy can address the specific issues, namely funding, risk-mitigation, and the complex relation with electricity markets. It shows that, compared to RE policy, subsidies need to emphasize the input side more strongly as price risks and intermittency from electricity markets are more prominent than from hydrogen markets. Also, it proposes a targeted mechanism to capture the positive externality of mitigating excess electricity in the grid while keeping investment security high. Economic policy should consider such approaches before massively scaling support and avoid the design shortcomings experienced with early RE policy.
We study nominal exchange rate dynamics in the aftermath of U.S. monetary policy announcements. Using high-frequency interest rate and stock price movements around FOMC announcements, we distinguish between pure monetary policy shocks and information shocks, which are associated with new information contained in the announcements. Contractionary pure policy shocks give rise to a strong, but transitory, appreciation on impact. Information shocks also appreciate the exchange rate, but the effect builds up only slowly over time and is highly persistent. Thus, we conclude that although the short-run effects on the exchange rate are primarily due to pure policy shocks, the medium-run response is driven by information effects.
We propose that false beliefs about own current economic status are an important factor for explaining populist attitudes. Eliciting subjects’ receptiveness to rightwing populism and their perceived relative income positions in a representative survey of German households, we find that people with pessimistic beliefs about their income position are more attuned to populist statements. Key to understanding the misperception-populism relationship are strong gender differences in the mechanism: men are much more likely to channel their discontent into affection for populist ideas. A simple information provision does neither sustainably reduce misperception nor curb populism.
The necessary adjustments to prominent measures of the neutral rate of interest following the COVID pandemic sparked a wide-ranging debate on the measurement and usefulness of r-star. Due to high uncertainty about relevant determinants, trend patterns and the correct estimation method, we propose in this paper a simple alternative approach derived from a standard macro model. Starting from a loss function, neutral periods can be determined in which a neutral real interest rate is observable. Using these values, a medium-term trend for a neutral interest rate can be determined. An application to the USA shows that our simple calculation of a neutral interest rate delivers comparable results to existing studies. A Taylor rule based on our neutral interest rate also does a fairly good job of explaining US monetary policy over the past 60 years.
This study describes the Chinese growth model over the past 40 years. We show that China's growth model, with its dominant role of the banking system and "the banker", is a perfect illustration of the necessity and power of Schumpeter's "monetary analysis". This approach has allowed us to elaborate theoretically and empirically the uniqueness of the Chinese model. In our empirical analysis, we use a new dataset of Chinese provincial data to analyze the impact of the financial system, especially banks, on Chinese economic development. We also empirically assess the role of the financial system in Chinese industrial policy and provide case studies of the effects of industrial policy in specific sectors. Finally, we also discuss macroeconomic dimensions of the Chinese growth process and lessons that can be drawn from the Chinese experience for other countries.
International trade is highly imbalanced both in terms of values and in terms of embodied carbon emissions. We show that the persistent current value trade imbalance patterns contribute to a higher level of global emissions compared to a world of balanced international trade. Specifically, we build a Ricardian quantitative trade model including sectoral input-output linkages, trade imbalances, fossil fuel extraction, and carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion and use this framework to simulate counterfactual changes to countries' trade balances. For individual countries, the emission effects of removing their trade imbalances depend on the carbon intensities of their production and consumption patterns, as well as on their fossil resource abundance. Eliminating the Russian trade surplus and the US trade deficit would lead to the largest environmental benefits in terms of lower global emissions. Globally, the simultaneous removal of all trade imbalances would lower world carbon emissions by 0.9 percent or 295 million tons of carbon dioxide.
Salience bias and overwork
(2022)
In this study, we enrich a standard principal–agent model with hidden action by introducing salience-biased perception on the agent's side. The agent's misguided focus on salient payoffs, which leads the agent's and the principal's probability assessments to diverge, has two effects: First, the agent focuses too much on obtaining a bonus, which facilitates incentive provision. Second, the principal may exploit the diverging probability assessments to relax participation. We show that salience bias can reverse the nature of the inefficiency arising from moral hazard; i.e., the principal does not necessarily provide insufficient incentives that result in inefficiently low effort but instead may well provide excessive incentives that result in inefficiently high effort.