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In general, humans preferentially look at conspecifics in naturalistic images. However, such group-based effects might conceal systematic individual differences concerning the preference for social information. Here, we investigated to what degree fixations on social features occur consistently within observers and whether this preference generalizes to other measures of social prioritization in the laboratory as well as the real world. Participants carried out a free viewing task, a relevance taps task that required them to actively select image regions that are crucial for understanding a given scene, and they were asked to freely take photographs outside the laboratory that were later classified regarding their social content. We observed stable individual differences in the fixation and active selection of human heads and faces that were correlated across tasks and partly predicted the social content of self-taken photographs. Such relationship was not observed for human bodies indicating that different social elements need to be dissociated. These findings suggest that idiosyncrasies in the visual exploration and interpretation of social features exist and predict real-world behavior. Future studies should further characterize these preferences and elucidate how they shape perception and interpretation of social contexts in healthy participants and patients with mental disorders that affect social functioning.
In this study, we aimed to understand how restaurants can contribute to climate change mitigation via menu design. We investigated two types of interventions: changing the configuration of menu entries with variable side dishes so that the most climate-friendly option is set as the default and indicating the greenhouse gas emission of each dish via carbon labels. In an online simulation experiment, 265 participants were shown the menus of nine different restaurants and had to choose exactly one dish per menu. In six menus, the main dishes were presented with different default options: the side dish was associated either with the highest or with the lowest greenhouse gas emissions. The other three menus consisted of unitary dishes for which the default rules did not apply. All menus were presented either with or without carbon labels for each dish option. The results indicated that more climate-friendly dish choices resulting in lower greenhouse gas emissions were made with the low-emission than the high-emission default condition, and when carbon labels were present rather than absent. The effects of both interventions interacted, which indicates that the interventions partly overlap with regard to cognitive predecessors of choice behavior, such as attentional focus and social norms. The results suggest that the design of restaurant menus has a considerable effect on the carbon footprint of dining.
Sustained anxiety is considered as a chronic and future-oriented state of apprehension that does not belong to a specific object. It is discussed as an important characteristic of anxiety disorders including panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Experimentally, sustained anxiety can be induced by contextual fear conditioning in which aversive events are unpredictably presented and therefore the whole context becomes associated with the threat. This thesis aimed at investigating important mechanisms in the development and maintenance of sustained anxiety: (1) facilitated acquisition and resistant extinction of contextual anxiety due to genetic risk factors (Study 1), and (2) the return of contextual anxiety after successful extinction using a new reinstatement paradigm (Study 2). To this end, two contextual fear conditioning studies were conducted in virtual reality (VR). During acquisition one virtual office was paired with unpredictable mildly painful electric stimuli (unconditioned stimulus, US), thus becoming the anxiety context (CXT+). Another virtual office was never paired with any US, thus becoming the safety context (CXT-). Extinction was conducted 24 h later, i.e. no US was presented, and extinction recall was tested another 24 h later on Day 3. In both studies context-evoked anxiety was measured on three different response levels: behavioral (anxiety-potentiated startle reflex), physiological (skin conductance level), and verbal (explicit ratings). In Study 1, participants were stratified for 5-HTTLPR (S+ risk allele vs. LL no risk allele) and NPSR1 rs324981 (T+ risk allele vs. AA no risk allele) polymorphisms, resulting in four combined genotype groups with 20 participants each: S+/T+, S+/LL, LL/T+, and LL/AA. Results showed that acquisition of anxiety-potentiated startle was influenced by a gene × gene interaction: only carriers of both risk alleles (S+ carriers of the 5-HTTLPR and T+ carriers of the NPSR1 polymorphism) exhibited significantly higher startle magnitudes in CXT+ compared to CXT-. However, extinction recall as measured with anxiety-potentiated startle was not affected by any genotype. Interestingly, the explicit anxiety level, i.e. valence and anxiety ratings, was only influenced by the NPSR1 genotype, in a way that no risk allele carriers (AA) reported higher anxiety and more negative valence in response to CXT+ compared to CXT-, whereas risk allele carriers (T+) did not. Study 2 adopted nearly the same paradigm with the modification that one group (reinstatement group) received one unsignaled US at the beginning of the experimental session on Day 3 before seeing CXT+ and CXT-. The second group served as a control group and received no US, but was immediately exposed to CXT+ and CXT-. Results showed a return of anxiety on the implicit and explicit level (higher startle responses and anxiety ratings in response to CXT+ compared to CXT-) in the reinstatement group only. Most important, the return of contextual anxiety in the reinstatement group was associated with a change of state anxiety and mood from extinction to test, that is the more anxiety and negative mood participants experienced before the reinstatement procedure, the higher their return of anxiety was. In sum, results of Study 1 showed that facilitated contextual fear conditioning on an implicit behavioral level (startle response) could be regarded as an endophenotype for anxiety disorders, which can contribute to our understanding of the etiology of anxiety disorders. Results of Study 2 imply that anxiety and negative mood after extinction could be an important facilitator for the return of anxiety. Furthermore, the present VR-based contextual fear conditioning paradigm seems to be an ideal tool to experimentally study mechanisms underlying the acquisition and the return of anxiety. Future studies could investigate clinical samples and extend the VR paradigm to evolutionary-relevant contexts (e.g., heights, darkness, open spaces).
One’s own name constitutes a unique part of conscious awareness – but does this also hold true for unconscious processing? The present study shows that the own name has the power to bias a person’s actions unconsciously even in conditions that render any other name ineffective. Participants judged whether a letter string on the screen was a name or a non-word while this target stimulus was preceded by a masked prime stimulus. Crucially, the participant’s own name was among these prime stimuli and facilitated reactions to following name targets whereas the name of another, yoked participant did not. Signal detection results confirmed that participants were not aware of any of the prime stimuli, including their own name. These results extend traditional findings on ‘‘breakthrough’’ phenomena of personally relevant stimuli to the domain of unconscious processing. Thus, the brain seems to possess adroit mechanisms to identify and process such stimuli even in the absence of conscious awareness.
The Influence of Anticipation and Warnings on Collision Avoidance Behavior of Attentive Drivers
(2012)
This thesis deals with collision avoidance. Focus is on the question of under which conditions collision avoidance works well for humans and if drivers can be supported by a Forward Collision Warning (FCW) System when they do not react appropriately. Forward Collision Warning systems work in a way that tries to focus the driver's attention in the direction of the hazard and evoke an avoidance reaction by some sort of alert (e.g., tone or light). Research on these warning systems generally focuses on inattention and distraction as the cause for crashes. If the driver is inattentive, the results of a crash are thought to be worse as the driver‘s reaction is belated or might not mitigate the crash at all. To ensure effectiveness in the worst case, most of the experiments studying FCW systems have been conducted with visually distracted drivers. Research on the cause and possible countermeasures for crashes of attentive drivers are hardly available, although crash databases and field operational test data show that 40-60% of the drivers look at the forward scene shortly before they crash. Hence, only a few studies elaborated on ideas about the reasons for crashes with attentive drivers. On the basis of the literature, it is worked out that one reason for delayed avoidance behavior can be an incorrect allocation of attention. It is further elaborated that high level attention processes are strongly influenced by interpretation of the situation and the anticipation of future status. Therefore, it is hypothesized that alert drivers react later when they can not foresee a potential threat or even when they misinterpret the situation. If the lack of threat anticipation or incorrect anticipation is a reason for crashes, a FCW system could be a great help, when the FCW is easily comprehensible. It is hypothesized that a FCW can compensate for missing threat anticipation in the driver. The results of the experiments show that the level of threat anticipation has the largest influence on driver behavior in an imminent crash situation. The results further suggest that FCW systems - especially warnings of audible or haptic modality - can help attentive drivers who do not anticipate a threat or misinterpret a situation. The negative influence of missing or mislead threat anticipation on objective measures was small when the threat appeared suddenly. This is thought to be due to the visual appearance of the introduced threat. It is assumed that this type of stimulus triggers a lower level attentional process, as opposed to a top-down attention process controlled by an anticipatory process. In the other scenario types such a lower level process may not be triggered. An important result of the second study is that (Forward) Collision Warnings have to be learned. Participants with warnings reacted slower than participants without any FCW in the first critical event. Participants with a visual warning reacted particularly slow. Later in the experiment, the probands with warnings were constantly faster than their counterparts without them. Hence, the results of this study suggest that a haptic or audible modality should be used as a primary warning to the driver. The characteristic of visual warnings to draw the visual attention is both a blessing and a curse. It is suggested to use the visual warning component for only a short period of time to attract the driver's attention to the forward scene, but then end the display to not further distract him. Car manufacturers try to avoid as many unnecessary alarms as possible. If driver monitoring would be available, it is often planned to suppress warnings when the driver is looking through the windshield. The results suggest not to do so. If a driver reaches a critical situation represented by a low Time-to-collision (TTC) or a high need to decelerate, he should always get a warning, unless he is already braking or steering. The most important arguments for this are: - Looking at the street does not mean that the driver has the correct situational awareness. - The driver has to learn the meaning of the warning. - The driver will not be annoyed by a warning when the situation is considered critical.
A series of experiments was conducted in order to investigate motor contributions to learning highly skilled action sequences in contrast to sensory contributions. Experiments 1–4 made use of a bimanual-bisequential variant of the serial reaction time task: Presentation of imperative stimuli was arranged such that participants’ left-hand and right-hand responses followed different sequences independently of one another, thus establishing a compound sequence spanning both hands. At least partly independent learning of the two concurrently implemented hand-related sequences was demonstrated after extensive practice under condi-tions of both simultaneous (Experiments 1 & 2) and alternating (Experiments 3 & 4) stimulus presentation and responding. It persisted when there was only one imperative stimulus for presenting both hand-related sequences (Experiments 2–4) instead of two separate imperative stimuli (Experiments 1 & 2), one for each sequence, even when the hand-related sequences were correlated and massive integrated learning of the compound sequence occurred (Ex-periment 4). As for the nature of the independently acquired sequence representations, trans-ferable sequence knowledge was acquired only when there was a separate imperative stimulus for each sequence (Experiments 1 & 2) but not otherwise (Experiments 2–4). The most likely stimulus-based representations which allow for intermanual transfer can be regarded as sen-sory components of highly skilled action sequences, whereas motor components can be con-sidered as being reflected in effector-specific, non-transferable sequence knowledge. The same decomposition logic applies to transferable and non-transferable sequence knowledge observed under conditions of unimanual practice of a single sequence (Experiments 6 & 7). The advantage of practicing a key press sequence with fingers of one hand as opposed to practicing it with fingers of both hands (Experiment 5) also implicates a motor component as the two assignments were equivalent in all other respects. Moreover, Experiments 6 and 7 showed that hand-specific sequence knowledge can develop after relatively little practice (as little as approximately 120 sequence repetitions). Presumably, this occurs especially in tasks with particularly pronounced requirements for coarticulation between consecutive finger movements. In sum, the present series of experiments provides compelling evidence for an effector-specific component of sequence learning. Albeit relatively small in size, it emerged consistently under various conditions. By contributing to the refinement of sequential action execution it can play a role in attaining high levels of performance.
This volume brings together several authors from different areas of psychology and the neighbouring social sciences. Each one contributes their own perspective on the growing interest topic of subjective well-being. The aim of the volume is to present these divergent perspectives and to foster communication between the different areas. Split into three parts, this volume initially discusses the general perspectives of subjective well-being and addresses fundamental questions, secondly it discusses the dynamics of subjective well-being and more specific research issues to give a better understanding of the general phenomenon, and thirdly the book emphasizes the social context in which people experience and report their happiness and satisfaction. The book will be of great interest to social and clinical psychologists, students of psychology and sociology and health professionals.
The present research is concerned with the topic of socially induced affect. In previous research the focus was mainly on affective convergence. A prominent topic in that context was “emotional contagion” (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994). Affective divergence has been also been found. However, its influence on the theoretical debate remained weak. Besides research on emotions also social comparison research attended to the topic. In order to explain affective divergence and convergence an integrative model based on social comparison processes is proposed here. Based on the selective accessibility model (Mussweiler, 2003) it is assumed that affective convergence can be seen as assimilation to a comparison standard (the observed model). Therefore, the basic assumption is that a comparison between an observer and the model takes place. Affective divergence corresponds to an affective contrast from that standard. Which of these two phenomena occurs depends on the type of comparison processes that took place. Six experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1 it was shown that comparisons intensify the social induction of affect. The influence of the comparison focus was studied in Experiments 2 and 3. If the perceiver searches for similarities between the self and the model, affective convergence occurs. If differences are searched for, affective divergence is found. The latter is mainly found under special circumstances, e.g. if the model belongs to another social group (Experiment 3). In Experiment 1-3 it was shown comparisons influence the social induction of affect. In Experiment 4-6 the underlying processes were explored. The selective accessibility model (Mussweiler, 2003) attributes a central role to the selective activation of self-knowledge in order to explain judgmental assimilation and contrast. In Experiments 4 and 5 the role of the self was explored more thoroughly. Evidence for socially induced affect (affective convergence) has only been found when the self has been previously activated. When the self was not activated no such effect was found. The assumption that the activation of specific self-knowledge is the basis for socially induced affect was tested in Experiment 5. Results supported the assumption. The present experiments give rise to the assumption that social comparisons are a key element in the social induction of affect. Affective convergence and divergence are explained and processes for the affect induction are defined. The findings also have implications for research on automatic behaviour and especially to explain automatic contrast. In addition implications for social comparison research can be derived.
The maximum of the brain electrical field after NoGo stimuli is located more anteriorly than that after stimuli that tells participants to respond. The difference in topography was called NoGo-Anteriorization (NGA). Recently, there was a debate, whether the NGA is related to a central inhibitory process or not. However, experiments showed that the NGA is not the result of motor potentials during Go trials, the NGA does not represent higher response conflict and or higher mental effort in NoGo trials, and the NGA is not based on less cognitive response selection in NoGo trials. Therefore, the experiments support the assumption that the NGA is connected to an inhibitory mechanism in NoGo conditions.
Participants trained aiming movements of the right hand to several targets with a prism-like virtual displacement of the location of one of the targets, receiving either terminal or continuous visual feedback. After training, the same targets were to be reached with the untrained left hand under manipulated feedback conditions. The right hand movements continuously adapted to the unnoticed visual displacement, significantly less with continuous than with terminal feedback. Under terminal but not under continuous feedback the adaptation to the manipulated target generalized to targets in the same horizontal direction but not to targets in the opposite direction. Finally, the movements of the untrained left hand showed the same qualitative changes to the targets as the movements of the trained right hand. The data are in line with the notion that the adaptation of the right hand movements is mainly based on a re-interpretation of target locations on which movement control of both hands draws.