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Background: Panic disorder is common (5% prevalence) and females are twice as likely to be affected as males. The heritable component of panic disorder is estimated at 48%. Glutamic acid dehydrogenase GAD1, the key enzyme for the synthesis of the inhibitory and anxiolytic neurotransmitter GABA, is supposed to influence various mental disorders, including mood and anxiety disorders. In a recent association study in depression, which is highly comorbid with panic disorder, GAD1 risk allele associations were restricted to females. Methodology/Principal Findings: Nineteen single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) tagging the common variation in GAD1 were genotyped in two independent gender and age matched case-control samples (discovery sample n = 478; replication sample n = 584). Thirteen SNPs passed quality control and were examined for gender-specific enrichment of risk alleles associated with panic disorder by using logistic regression including a genotype6gender interaction term. The latter was found to be nominally significant for four SNPs (rs1978340, rs3762555, rs3749034, rs2241165) in the discovery sample; of note, the respective minor/risk alleles were associated with panic disorder only in females. These findings were not confirmed in the replication sample; however, the genotype6gender interaction of rs3749034 remained significant in the combined sample. Furthermore, this polymorphism showed a nominally significant association with the Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire sum score. Conclusions/Significance: The present study represents the first systematic evaluation of gender-specific enrichment of risk alleles of the common SNP variation in the panic disorder candidate gene GAD1. Our tentative results provide a possible explanation for the higher susceptibility of females to panic disorder.
The limbic system and especially the amygdala have been identified as key structures in emotion induction and regulation. Recently research has additionally focused on the influence of prefrontal areas on emotion processing in the limbic system and the amygdala. Results from fMRI studies indicate that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is involved not only in emotion induction but also in emotion regulation. However, studies using fNIRS only report prefrontal brain activation during emotion induction. So far it lacks the attempt to compare emotion induction and emotion regulation with regard to prefrontal activation measured with fNIRS, to exclude the possibility that the reported prefrontal brain activation in fNIRS studies are mainly caused by automatic emotion regulation processes. Therefore this work tried to distinguish emotion induction from regulation via fNIRS of the prefrontal cortex. 20 healthy women viewed neutral pictures as a baseline condition, fearful pictures as induction condition and reappraised fearful pictures as regulation condition in randomized order. As predicted, the view-fearful condition led to higher arousal ratings than the view-neutral condition with the reappraise-fearful condition in between. For the fNIRS results the induction condition showed an activation of the bilateral PFC compared to the baseline condition (viewing neutral). The regulation condition showed an activation only of the left PFC compared to the baseline condition, although the direct comparison between induction and regulation condition revealed no significant difference in brain activation. Therefore our study underscores the results of previous fNIRS studies showing prefrontal brain activation during emotion induction and rejects the hypothesis that this prefrontal brain activation might only be a result of automatic emotion regulation processes.
The limbic system and especially the amygdala have been identified as key structures in emotion induction and regulation. Recently research has additionally focused on the influence of prefrontal areas on emotion processing in the limbic system and the amygdala. Results from fMRI studies indicate that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is involved not only in emotion induction but also in emotion regulation. However, studies using fNIRS only report prefrontal brain activation during emotion induction. So far it lacks the attempt to compare emotion induction and emotion regulation with regard to prefrontal activation measured with fNIRS, to exclude the possibility that the reported prefrontal brain activation in fNIRS studies are mainly caused by automatic emotion regulation processes. Therefore this work tried to distinguish emotion induction from regulation via fNIRS of the prefrontal cortex. 20 healthy women viewed neutral pictures as a baseline condition, fearful pictures as induction condition and reappraised fearful pictures as regulation condition in randomized order. As predicted, the view-fearful condition led to higher arousal ratings than the view-neutral condition with the reappraise-fearful condition in between. For the fNIRS results the induction condition showed an activation of the bilateral PFC compared to the baseline condition (viewing neutral). The regulation condition showed an activation only of the left PFC compared to the baseline condition, although the direct comparison between induction and regulation condition revealed no significant difference in brain activation. Therefore our study underscores the results of previous fNIRS studies showing prefrontal brain activation during emotion induction and rejects the hypothesis that this prefrontal brain activation might only be a result of automatic emotion regulation processes.
Several studies have investigated the neural responses triggered by emotional pictures, but the specificity of the involved structures such as the amygdala or the ventral striatum is still under debate. Furthermore, only few studies examined the association of stimuli’s valence and arousal and the underlying brain responses. Therefore, we investigated brain responses with functional magnetic resonance imaging of 17 healthy participants to pleasant and unpleasant affective pictures and afterwards assessed ratings of valence and arousal. As expected, unpleasant pictures strongly activated the right and left amygdala, the right hippocampus, and the medial occipital lobe, whereas pleasant pictures elicited significant activations in left occipital regions, and in parts of the medial temporal lobe. The direct comparison of unpleasant and pleasant pictures, which were comparable in arousal clearly indicated stronger amygdala activation in response to the unpleasant pictures. Most important, correlational analyses revealed on the one hand that the arousal of unpleasant pictures was significantly associated with activations in the right amygdala and the left caudate body. On the other hand, valence of pleasant pictures was significantly correlated with activations in the right caudate head, extending to the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) and the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. These findings support the notion that the amygdala is primarily involved in processing of unpleasant stimuli, particularly to more arousing unpleasant stimuli. Reward-related structures like the caudate and NAcc primarily respond to pleasant stimuli, the stronger the more positive the valence of these stimuli is.
Brain potentials during mental arithmetic: effects of extensive practice and problem difficulty
(1994)
Recent behavioral investigations indicate that the processes underlying mental arithmetic change systematically with practice from deliberate, conscious calculation to automatic, direct retrieval of answers from memory [Bourne, L.E.Jr. and Rickard, T.C., Mental calculation: The development of a cognitive skill, Paper presented at the Interamerican Congress of Psychology, San Jose, Costa Rica, 1991; Psychol. Rev., 95 (1988) 492-527]. Results reviewed by Moscovitch and Winocur [In: The handbook of aging and cognition, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, 1992, pp. 315-372] suggest that consciously controlled processes are more dependent on frontal lobe function than are automatic processes. It is appropriate, therefore to determine whether transitions in the locus of primary brain activity occur with practice on mental calculation. In this experiment, we examine the relationship between characteristics of event-related brain potentials (ERPs) and mental arithmetic. Single-digit mental multiplication problems varying in difficulty (problem size) were used, and subjects were trained on these problems for four sessions. Problem-size and practice effects were reliably found in behavioral measures (RT). The ERP was characterized by a pronounced late positivity after task presentation followed by a slow wave, and a negativity during response indication. These components responded differentially to the practice and problem-size manipulations. Practice mainly affected topography of the amplitude of positivity and offset latency of slow wave, and problem-size mainly offset latency of slow wave and pre-response negativity. Fronto-central positivity diminished from session to session, and the focus of positivity centered finally at centro-parietal regions. This finding suggests that frontal lobe processing is necessary as long as task performance is not automatized, while automatized arithmetic processing requires parietal brain activity only. The pre-response negativity observed in the first session and during more difficult tasks is assumed to reflect excitatory preparatory processes, which could be associated with activation of calculation strategies.
The relation between hypochondriacal attitudes, thermal pain threshold, and attentional bias toward pain was examined in a non-clinical population (N = 28). Attentional bias was operationalized with a concentration-performance test, which subjects performed while connected to a pain stimulator. Subjects were informed that they would receive a painful stimulus during the second part of the test, while the first part was introduced as pain-free. The pain stimulus was never applied during the test phase. The expectancy of a forthcoming pain stimulus reduced the performance of high hypochondriacal subjects in both parts of the test. Low hypochondriacal subjects, on the other hand, displayed significantly better performance in the first, pain-free compared to the second, pain-related part of the test. Thermal pain thresholds were assessed at four measuring sites (thenar, neck, collar-bone, abdomen), but no relations with hypochondriasis sum scores and locus of pain stimulation were found. A stepwise multiple regression of pain threshold by individual Illness Attitude Scales (IAS) led to 66% of the variance being explained by the scales ‘concern about pain’, ‘worry about illness’, and ‘disease phobia’. Results are discussed in terms of amplifying somatic style, preoccupation with or attentional bias toward bodily symptoms, and experimental induction of a hypochondriacal state.
Effects of smoking on thermal pain threshold in deprived and minimally-deprived habitual smokers
(1993)
This study examined the antinociceptive effects of smoking in nine habitual smokers under deprived (12 h) and minimally-deprived (< 30min) conditions. Pain threshold for thermal stimuli, heart rate, blood pressure and ratings of mood, arousal, dominance and well-being were assessed before and after smoking a cigarette. Overall, smoking affected all measured variables in the expected direction, leading to increased physiological activity, elevated pain threshold and improved mood. However, most of these effects depended on the deprivation status of the subjects, such that smoking after deprivation increased pain threshold whereas smoking after minimal deprivation did not. Pain threshold before smoking was the same for both groups. Deprived subjects had lower pre-smoke diastolic blood pressure, heart rate, and arousal levels, which rose to equal minimally-deprived subjects scores after smoking.
A comparative study of diabetics with autonomic neuropathy (N = 13) as against nonneuropathic diabetics (N = 16) and healthy control persons (N = 20) was carried out with respect 10 heart rate both at rest and under stress, frequency of cardiac arrhythmias in a 24-h ECG and accuracy of heartbeat and arrhythmia perception. In the subjects with diabetic autonomic neuropathy, the spontaneaus variability and stress-induced reactivity of the heart rate as weil as the number of tachycardic episodes were reduced, whereas the frequency of ventricular extrasystoles was somewhat increased. Impaired heartbeat perception and a complete Ioss of perception of arrhythmias as a consequence of neuropathic deafferentation could be demonstrated. Cardiac perception disordersalso playavital roJe in other clinical problems, e.g. silent myocardial infarction and Iack of awareness of hypoglycaemia in diabetes mellitus.
In panic disorder bodily sensations appear to play an important role as a trigger for anxiety. In our psychophysiological model of panic attacks we postulate the following vicious circle: individuals with panic attacks perceive even quite small increases in heart rate and interpret these changes as being catastrophic. This elicits anxiety and a further increase in heart rate. To evaluate this model we conducted a field study of 28 subjects with panic attacks and 20 healthy controls. A 24 hr ambulatory ECG was recorded and the subjects were instructed to report any cardiac perceptions during this period and to rate the anxiety elicited by these perceptions. The incidence of cardiac perceptions was about the same in both groups, but only subjects with panic attacks reported anxiety associated with such perceptions. Analysis of the ECGs revealed that in both groups heart rate accelerations preceded cardiac perceptions. Following cardiac perceptions, the healthy controls showed a heart rate deceleration, whereas the subjects with panic attacks had a further acceleration. This heart rate increase after cardiac perceptions was positively related to the level of anxiety elicited by the perceptions. These results provide clear evidence in support of the vicious circle model of panic attacks.
No abstract available.