Refine
Has Fulltext
- yes (15)
Is part of the Bibliography
- yes (15)
Year of publication
Document Type
- Journal article (11)
- Doctoral Thesis (3)
- Preprint (1)
Language
- English (15) (remove)
Keywords
- attention (15) (remove)
Institute
- Institut für Psychologie (15) (remove)
Visual saliency maps reflecting locations that stand out from the background in terms of their low-level physical features have proven to be very useful for empirical research on attentional exploration and reliably predict gaze behavior. In the present study we tested these predictions for socially relevant stimuli occurring in naturalistic scenes using eye tracking. We hypothesized that social features (i.e. human faces or bodies) would be processed preferentially over non-social features (i.e. objects, animals) regardless of their low-level saliency. To challenge this notion, we included three tasks that deliberately addressed non-social attributes. In agreement with our hypothesis, social information, especially heads, was preferentially attended compared to highly salient image regions across all tasks. Social information was never required to solve a task but was regarded nevertheless. More so, after completing the task requirements, viewing behavior reverted back to that of free-viewing with heavy prioritization of social features. Additionally, initial eye movements reflecting potentially automatic shifts of attention, were predominantly directed towards heads irrespective of top-down task demands. On these grounds, we suggest that social stimuli may provide exclusive access to the priority map, enabling social attention to override reflexive and controlled attentional processes. Furthermore, our results challenge the generalizability of saliency-based attention models.
Sensory input as well as cognitive factors can drive the modulation of blinking. Our aim was to dissociate sensory driven bottom-up from cognitive top-down influences on blinking behavior and compare these influences between the auditory and the visual domain.
Using an oddball paradigm, we found a significant pre-stimulus decrease in blink probability for visual input compared to auditory input. Sensory input further led to an early post-stimulus blink increase in both modalities if a task demanded attention to the input. Only visual input caused a pronounced early increase without a task. In case of a target or the omission of a stimulus (as compared to standard input), an additional late increase in blink rate was found in the auditory and visual domain. This suggests that blink modulation must be based on the interpretation of the input, but does not need any sensory input at all to occur.
Our results show a complex modulation of blinking based on top-down factors such as prediction and attention in addition to sensory-based influences. The magnitude of the modulation is mainly influenced by general attentional demands, while the latency of this modulation allows to dissociate general from specific top-down influences that are independent of the sensory domain.
The present study explored the origin of perceptual changes repeatedly observed in the context of actions. In Experiment 1, participants tried to hit a circular target with a stylus movement under restricted feedback conditions. We measured the perception of target size during action planning and observed larger estimates for larger movement distances. In Experiment 2, we then tested the hypothesis that this action specific influence on perception is due to changes in the allocation of spatial attention. For this purpose, we replaced the hitting task by conditions of focused and distributed attention and measured the perception of the former target stimulus. The results revealed changes in the perceived stimulus size very similar to those observed in Experiment 1. These results indicate that action's effects on perception root in changes of spatial attention.
Humans spontaneously blink several times a minute. These blinks are strongly modulated during various cognitive task. However, the precise function of blinking and the reason for their modulation has not been fully understood. In the present work, I investigated the function of spontaneous blinks through various perceptual and cognitive tasks. Previous research has revealed that blinks rates decrease during some tasks but increase during others. When trying to understand these seemingly contradictory results, I observed that blink reduction occurs when one engages with an external input. For instance, a decrease has been observed due to the onset of a stimulus, sensory input processing and attention towards sensory input. However, for activities that do not involve such an engagement, e.g. imagination, daydreaming or creativity, the blink rate has been shown to increase. To follow up on the proposed hypothesis, I distinguished tasks that involve the processing of an external stimulus and tasks that involve disengagement.
In the first part of the project, I explored blinking during stimulus engagement. If the probability of blinking is low when engaging with the stimulus, then one should find a reduction in blinks specifically during the time period of processing but not during sensory input per se. To this end, in study 1, I tested the influence of task-relevant information duration on blink timing and additionally manipulated the overall sensory input using a visual and an auditory temporal simultaneity judgement task. The results showed that blinks were suppressed longer for longer periods of relevant information or in other words, blinks occurred at the end of relevant information processing for both the visual and the auditory modality. Since relevance is mediated through top-down processes, I argue that the reduction in blinks is a top-down driven suppression. In studies 2 and 3, I again investigated stimulus processing, but in this case, processing was triggered internally and not based on specific changes in the external input. To this end, I used bistable stimuli, in which the actual physical stimulus remains constant but their perception switches between different interpretations. Studies on the involvement of attention in such bistable perceptual changes indicate that the sensory input is reprocessed before the perceptual switch. The results revealed a reduction in eye blink rates before the report of perceptual switches. Importantly, I was able to decipher that the decrease was not caused by the perceptual switch or the behavioral response but likely started before the internal switch. Additionally, periods between a blink and a switch were longer than interblink intervals, indicating that blinks were followed by a period of stable percept. To conclude, the first part of the project revealed that there is a top-down driven blink suppression during the processing of an external stimulus.
In the second part of the project, I extended the idea of blinks marking the disengagement from external processing and tested if blinking is associated with better performance during internally directed processes. Specifically, I investigated divergent thinking, an aspect of creativity, and the link between performance and blink rates as well as the effect of motor restriction. While I could show that motor restriction was the main factor influencing divergent thinking, the relationship between eye blink rates and creative output also depended on restriction. Results showed that higher blink rates were associated with better performance during free movement, but only between subjects. In other words, subjects who had overall higher blink rates scored better in the task, but when they were allowed to sit or walk freely. Within a single subject, trial with higher blink rates were not associated with better performance. Therefore, possibly, people who are able to disengage easily, as indicated by an overall high blink rate, perform better in divergent thinking tasks. However, the link between blink rate and internal tasks is not clear at this point. Indeed, a more complex measurement of blink behavior might be necessary to understand the relationship.
In the final part of the project, I aimed to further understand the function of blinks through their neural correlates. I extracted the blink-related neural activity in the primary visual cortex (V1) of existing recordings of three rhesus monkeys during different sensory processing states. I analyzed spike related multi-unit responses, frequency dependent power changes, local field potentials and laminar distribution of activity while the animal watched a movie compared to when it was shown a blank screen. The results showed a difference in blink-related neural activity dependent on the processing state. This difference suggests a state dependent function of blinks.
Taken altogether, the work presented in this thesis suggests that eye blinks have an important function during cognitive and perceptual processes. Blinks seem to facilitate a disengagement from the external world and are therefore suppressed during intended processing of external stimuli.
In the last years, it has become general consensus that actions change our time perception. Performing an action to elicit a specific event seems to lead to a systematic underestimation of the interval between action and effect, a phenomenon termed temporal (or previously intentional) binding. Temporal binding has been closely associated with sense of agency, our perceived control over our actions and our environment, and because of its robust behavioral effects has indeed been widely utilized as an implicit correlate of sense of agency. The most robust and clear temporal binding effects are typically found via Libet clock paradigms. In the present study, we investigate a crucial methodological confound in these paradigms that provides an alternative explanation for temporal binding effects: a redirection of attentional resources in two-event sequences (as in classical operant conditions) versus singular events (as in classical baseline conditions). Our results indicate that binding effects in Libet clock paradigms may be based to a large degree on such attentional processes, irrespective of intention or action-effect sequences. Thus, these findings challenge many of the previously drawn conclusions and interpretations with regard to actions and time perception.