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4-6-year-old children's understanding of cognitive cuing was studied in 2 experiments using a strategic interaction paradigm. Ghildren could fool a competitor by hiding targets in locations that were labeled with semantically weakly associated cues and help a cooperative partner by hiding them in semantically highly associated locations. Very few 4-year-olds, half the 5-year-olds, and almost all 6-year-olds appropriately chose semantically highly vs. weakly associated hiding places to make the targets easy vs. difficult to find. The second experiment showed that 4-year-olds did not strategically manipulate cues as sources of information, although they themselves proficiently used them as such in a search task. These findings are discussed with regard to research on children's developing understanding of origins of knowledge and belief and with regard to recent claims that young preschoolers possess a metacognitive understanding of cognitive cuing.
A MODEL of good information processing is sketched, describing how metacognitive knowledge influences strategy selection and use. Three factors pose particular problems for learning disabled students as they attempt to acquire metacognitive knowledge and to use study strategies productively: neurological impairments; deficiencies in general world knowledge; and negative beliefs, attitudes, and styles that limit self-efficacy. Creating an educational atmosphere that explicitly builds conceptual (domain-specific) knowledge and teaches positive beliefs about learning potential is essential in promoting metacognitively-oriented instruction.
In a short-term longitudinal study, we investigated how domain-specific knowledge in soccer influences the amount of text recall and comprehension in elementary school and junior high school children of high and low overall aptitudes. Both level of soccer knowledge and overall aptitude were varied in a factorial design. Third, fifth, and seventh grade children were given several measures of text recall and comprehension and were retested on these measures about 1 year later. Performance was more a function of soccer knowledge than of aptitude level.
This study explored the differential effects of strategy training on German and American elementaryschool children and assessed the role of parents in the development of their children's strategic behavior and metacognition. 184 German and 161 American children were pretested on memory and metamemory tasks. Children were then assigned to either an organizational strategy training condition or a control condition. All children were tested on the maintenance and far-transfer of the strategy and task-related metamemory 1 week following training. Parents completed questionnaires about strategy instruction in the home. Strategy maintenance and metacognition were reassessed 6 months following training. German children were more strategic than American children. Instructed children performed better than control children. German parents reported more instruction of strategies in the home. These data suggest that formal education is responsible for aspects of cognitive development that have sometimes been viewed as a function of age.
It has been proposed that different features of a face provide a source of information for separate perceptual and cognitive processes. Properties of a face that remain rather stable over time, so called invariant facial features, yield information about a face’s identity, and changeable aspects of faces transmit information underlying social communication such as emotional expressions and speech movements. While processing of these different face properties was initially claimed to be independent, a growing body of evidence suggests that these sources of information can interact when people recognize faces with whom they are familiar. This is the case because the way a face moves can contain patterns that are characteristic for that specific person, so called idiosyncratic movements. As a face becomes familiar these idiosyncratic movements are learned and hence also provide information serving face identification. While an abundance of experiments has addressed the independence of invariant and variable facial features in face recognition, little is known about the exact nature of the impact idiosyncratic facial movements have on face recognition. Gaining knowledge about the way facial motion contributes to face recognition is, however, important for a deeper understanding of the way the brain processes and recognizes faces. In the following dissertation three experiments are reported that investigate the impact familiarity of changeable facial features has on processes of face recognition. Temporal aspects of the processing of familiar idiosyncratic facial motion were addressed in the first experiment via EEG by investigating the influence familiar facial movement exerts on event-related potentials associated to face processing and face recognition. After being familiarized with a face and its idiosyncratic movement, participants viewed familiar or unfamiliar faces with familiar or unfamiliar facial movement while their brain potentials were recorded. Results showed that familiarity of facial motion influenced later event-related potentials linked to memory processes involved in face recognition. The second experiment used fMRI to investigate the brain areas involved in processing familiar facial movement. Participants’ BOLD-signal was registered while they viewed familiar and unfamiliar faces with familiar or unfamiliar idiosyncratic movement. It was found that activity of brain regions, such as the fusiform gyrus, that underlie the processing of face identity, was modulated by familiar facial movement. Together these two experiments provide valuable information about the nature of the involvement of idiosyncratic facial movement in face recognition and have important implications for cognitive and neural models of face perception and recognition. The third experiment addressed the question whether idiosyncratic facial movement could increase individuation in perceiving faces from a different ethnic group and hence reduce impaired recognition of these other-race faces compared to own-race faces, a phenomenon named the own-race bias. European participants viewed European and African faces that were each animated with an idiosyncratic smile while their attention was either directed to the form or the motion of the face. Subsequently recognition memory for these faces was tested. Results showed that the own-race bias was equally present in both attention conditions indicating that idiosyncratic facial movement was not able to reduce or diminish the own-race bias. In combination the here presented experiments provide further insight into the involvement of idiosyncratic facial motion in face recognition. It is necessary to consider the dynamic component of faces when investigating face recognition because static facial images are not able to provide the full range of information that leads to recognition of a face. In order to reflect the full process of face recognition, cognitive and neural models of face perception and recognition need to integrate dynamic facial features as a source of information which contributes to the recognition of a face.
The present work reviews the experimental literature on the acute effects of alcohol on human behaviour related to driving performance. A meta-analysis was conducted which includes studies published between 1954 and 2007 in order to provide a comprehensive knowledge of the substance alcohol. 450 studies reporting 5,300 findings were selected from over 12,000 references after applying certain in- and exclusion criteria. Thus, the present meta-analysis comprises far more studies than reviews on alcohol up to now. In the selected studies, different performance tests were conducted which were relevant for driving. The classification system used in this work assigns these tests to eight categories. The main categories consist of several sub categories classifying the tasks more precisely. The main categories were: (1) visual functions, (2) attention (including vigilance), (3) divided attention, (4) en-/decoding (including information processing and memory), (5) reaction time (including simple reaction time and choice reaction time), (6) psychomotor skills, (7) tracking and (8) driving. In addition to the performance aspect, the classification system takes into account mood and social behaviour variables related to driving safety like tiredness or aggression. Following the evaluation method of vote-counting, the number of significant findings and the number of non-significant findings were summarised per blood alcohol concentration (BAC) group. Thereby, a quantitative estimation of the effects of alcohol depending on the BAC was established, the so-called impairment function, which shows the percentage of significantly impaired findings. In order to provide a general overview of alcohol effects on driving-related performance, a global impairment function was established by aggregating all performance findings. The function is nearly linear with about 30% significant findings at a BAC of 0.05% and 50% significant findings at a BAC of 0.08%. In addition, more specific impairment functions considering only the findings of the single behavioural categories were calculated. The results revealed that impairment depends not only on the BAC, but also clearly differs between most of the performance categories. Tracking and driving performance were most affected by alcohol with impairment beginning at very low BACs of 0.02%. Also psychomotor skills were considerably affected by rather low BACs. Impairment of visual functions and information processing occurred at BACs of 0.04% and increased substantially with higher BACs. Impairment in memory tests could be found with very low BACs of 0.02%, but varied depending on the kind of memory. Performance decrements in divided attention tests could also be found with very low BACs in some studies. Attention started to be impaired at 0.04% BAC, but – as in vigilance tasks – considerable impairment only occurred at higher BACs. Choice reaction time was affected at lower BACs than simple reaction time, which was – together with the critical flicker fusion frequency – the least sensitive parameter to the effects of alcohol. To conclude, most skills which are relevant for the safe operation of a vehicle are clearly impaired by BACs of 0.05%, with motor functions being more affected than cognitive functions and complex tasks more than simple tasks. Generally, the results provided no evidence of a threshold effect for alcohol. There was no driving-related performance category for which a sudden transition from unimpaired to impaired occurred at a particular BAC level. In addition, a comparison was made between the present meta-analysis and two reviews of Moskowitz (Moskowitz & Fiorentino, 2000; Moskowitz & Robinson, 1988). Moskowitz reported much lower BACs at which performance was impaired. The reasons for this discrepancy lies in a different way to review scientific findings. On the one hand, Moskowitz focused on significant findings when selecting studies and findings for his reviews. On the other hand, the evaluation method used by Moskowitz ignored non-significant findings and counted each study once at the lowest BAC for which impairment was found. Those non-significant findings are as important as the significant ones in order to determine thresholds of impairment. Therefore, in contrast to Moskowitz, the present work describes the effects of alcohol with functions considering also the non-significant findings. The significance of the non-significant is emphasized with respect to the selection procedure as well as to the evaluation method.
The present study investigated the relationshtp between developmental shifts in the organization of materials and developmental changes in deliberate strategy use. Second and fourth grade children were presented with clusterable sort/recall lists representing the factorial combinations of high and low interitem association, and high and low category relatedness. Strategy use in the task was rated by the experimenter and also assessed via self reports. General and task-related strategy knowledge tmetamemoryt was also examined. Second graders displayed more category clustering during recall for highly associated items than for weakly associated items. whereas older children’s recall organization (but not recall) was unaffected by this organizational dimension. Correlations among measures of metamemory and organizational behavior indicated that second graders in general were unaware of the importance of categorization strategies for facilitation of recall. On the other hand. sorting during study and task-related metamemory were the most important predictors of fourth graders’ recall performance, thus indicating that most fourth graders used categorization strategies deliberately.
Thirty-two 4-year-olds and thirty-two 6-year-olds were tested for free and cued recall following either play-and-remember or sort-and-remember instructions and assessed for their metamemory of the efficacy of conceptual and perceptual sorting strategies. The younger children recalled significantly more items under sort-and-remember than under play-and-remember instructions, whereas no significant recall differences between instructional conditions were found for the older children. However, 6-year-olds showed higher levels of recall than 4-year-olds in both instructional conditions. Category cues were much more effective than color cues, regardless of age. In addition, clustering scores indicated that conceptual organization at both encoding and retrieval increased with age and with instruction. These results show that from 4 to 6 years of age children are learning to spontaneously employ memory strategies. In addition, they highlight the increasing importance of conceptual organization to retention of young children. Finally, the metamemory data suggest that there may be a lag between children’s articulated declarative knowledge about the usefulness of conceptual organization and their procedural use of it.
Nine hierarchical and four nonhierarchical clustering algorithms were compared on their ability to resolve 200 multivariate normal mixtures. The effects of coverage, similarity measures, and cluster overlap were studied by including different levels of coverage for the hierarchical algorithms, Euclidean distances and Pearson correlation coefficients, and truncated multivariate normal mixtures in the analysis. The results confirmed the findings of previous Monte Carlo studies on clustering procedures in that accuracy was inversely related to coverage, and that algorithms using correlation as the similarity measure were significantly more accurate than those using Euclidean distances. No evidence was found for the assumption that the positive effects of the use of correlation coefficients are confined to unconstrained mixture models.
This study addresses three themes that recur in the research on student achievement: (a) developmental modeling ofintraindividual changes in achievement over time; (b) examination of the differences among subgroups within a classroom in the determinants of achievement; (c) description of the interactions among instructional variables in determining achievement differences. Eight classrooms were preselected on the basis of their widely differing slopes obtained in a regression analysis of pre- and posttest achievement scores. Mathematics achievement differences among sixth graders were analyzed in a four-wave design and explained by aptitude and instructional variables in a structural equation framework provided by LISREL. The results demonstrate the local nature of achievement models in that neither their measurement nor structural components proved generalizable across both groups of classrooms. Mention is also made, however, of technical problems and analytical ambiguities in the interpretation of these results.
The scope of the present work encompasses the influence of experience (i.e. expertise) for feature processing in unconscious information processing. In the introduction, I describe the subliminal priming paradigm, a method to examine how stimuli, we are not aware of, nonetheless influence our actions. The activation of semantic response categories, the impact of learned stimulus-response links, and the action triggering through programmed stimulus-response links are the main three hypotheses to explain unconscious response activation. Besides, the congruence of perceptual features can also influence subliminal priming. On the basis of the features location and form, I look at evidence that exists so far for perceptual priming. The second part of the introduction reviews the literature showing perceptual superiority of experts. This is illustrated exemplarily with three domains of expertise – playing action video games, which constitutes a general form of perceptual expertise, radiology, a more natural form of expertise, and expertise in the game of chess, which is seen as the Drosophila of psychology. In the empirical section, I report nine experiments that applied a subliminal check detection task. Experiment 1 shows subliminal response priming for chess experts but not for chess novices. Thus, chess experts are able to judge unconsciously presented chess configurations as checking or nonchecking. The results of Experiment 2 suggest that acquired perceptual chunks, and not the ability to integrate perceptual features unconsciously, was responsible for unconscious check detection, because experts’ priming does not occur for simpler chess configurations which afforded an unfamiliar classification. With a more complex chess detection task, Experiment 3 indicates that chess experts are not able to process perceptual features in parallel or alternatively, that chess experts are not able to form specific expectations which are obviously necessary to elicit priming if many chess displays are applied. The aim of Experiment 4-9 was to further elaborate on unconscious processing of the single features location and form in novices. In Experiment 4 and 5, perceptual priming according the congruence of the single features location and form outperformed semantically-based response priming. Experiment 6 and 7 show that (in contrast to form priming) the observed location priming effect is rather robust and is also evident for an unexpected form or colour. In Experiment 8, location and form priming, which was additionally related to response priming, were directly compared to each other. Location priming was again stronger than form priming. Finally, Experiment 9 demonstrates that with the subliminal check detection task it is possible to induce response priming in novices when the confounding influences of location and form are absent. In the General discussion, I first summarized the findings. Second, I discuss possible underlying mechanisms of different subliminal perception in experts and novices. Third, I focus on subliminal perceptual priming in novices, especially on the impact of the features location and form. And finally, I discuss a framework, the action trigger account that integrates the different results of the present work.
Humans have the tendency to react with congruent facial expressions when looking at an emotional face. Interestingly, recent studies revealed that several situational moderators can modulate strength and direction of these reactions. In current literature, congruent facial reactions to emotional facial expressions are usually described in terms of “facial mimicry” and interpreted as imitative behavior. Thereby, facial mimicry is understood as a process of pure motor resonance resulting from overlapping representations for the perception and the execution of a certain behavior. Motor mimicry, however, is not the only mechanism by which congruent facial reactions can occur. Numerous studies have shown that facial muscles also indicate valence evaluations. Furthermore, facial reactions are also determined by our current emotional state. These thoughts suggest that the modulation of congruent facial reactions to emotional expressions can be based on both motor and affective processes. However, a separation of motor and affective processes in facial reactions is hard to make. None of the published studies that tried that could show a clear involvement of one or the other process so far. Therefore, the aim of the present line of experiments is to shed light on the involvement of motor and affective processes in the modulation of congruent and incongruent facial reactions. Specifically, the experiments are designed to test the assumptions of a working model on mechanisms underlying the modulation of facial reactions and to examine the neuronal correlates involved in such modulations with a broad range of methods. Experiments 1 and 2 experimentally manipulate motor and affective mechanisms by using specific contexts. In the chose settings, motor process models and affective models of valence evaluations make competing predictions about resulting facial reactions. The results of Experiment 1 did not support the involvement of valence evaluations in the modulation of congruent and incongruent facial reactions to facial expressions. The results of Experiments 2a and 2b suggest that emotional reactions are the predominant determinant of facial reactions. Experiment 3 aimed at identifying the psychological mediators that indicate motor and affective mechanisms. Motor mechanisms are assessed via the psychological mediator empathy. Additionally, as a psychological mediator for clarifying the role of affective mechanisms subjective measures of the participants’ current emotional state in response to the presented facial expressions were taken. Mediational analyses show that the modulation of congruent facial reactions can be explained by a decrease of state cognitive empathy. This suggests that motor processes mediate the effects of the context on congruent facial reactions. However, such a mechanism could not be observed for incongruent reactions. Instead, it was found that affective processes in terms of emotional reactions are involved in incongruent facial reactions. Additionally, the involvement of a third class of processes, namely strategic processes, was observed. Experiment 4 aimed at investigating whether a change in the strength of perception can explain the contextual modulation of facial reactions to facial expressions. According to motor process models the strength of perception is directly related to the strength of the spread of activation from perception to the execution of an action and thereby to the strength of the resulting mimicry behavior. The results suggest that motor mechanisms were involved in the modulation of congruent facial reactions by attitudes. Such an involvement of motor mechanisms could, however, not be observed for the modulation of incongruent reactions. In Experiment 5 the investigation of neuronal correlates shall be extended to the observation of involved brain areas via fMRI. The proposed brain areas depicting motor areas were prominent parts of the mirror neuron system. The regions of interest depicting areas involved in the affective processing were amygdala, insula, striatum. Furthermore, it could be shown that changes in the activity of parts of the MNS are related to the modulation of congruent facial reactions. Further on, results revealed the involvement of affective processes in the modulation of incongruent facial reactions. In sum, these results lead to a revised working model on the mechanisms underlying the modulation of facial reactions to emotional facial expressions. The results of the five experiments provide strong support for the involvement of motor mechanisms in congruent facial reactions. No evidence was found for the involvement of motor mechanisms in the occurrence or modulation of incongruent facial reactions. Furthermore, no evidence was found for the involvement of valence evaluations in the modulation of facial reactions. Instead, emotional reactions were found to be involved in the modulation of mainly incongruent facial reactions.
This article gives an overview of possibilities for the assessment offacial behavior. With regard to validity, results from a longitudinal study of 36 depressed patients and nine controls as weil as often schizophrenic patients and their relatives will be referred to. These results are used to illustrate the following principles which have to be taken into account when studying facial behavior: a) communication strongly facilitates facial expression, b) activation of facial behavior follows the "principle of least effort", and c) the principle of individual specificity applies to the association of nonverbal behavior and mood states. Making allowance for these principles has, among others, consequences a) for situations or conditions under which to asses behavior (specifically conditions of communication), b) for data analysis (e.g., dealing with frequent and rare events), and c) for empirical or experimental strategies (e.g., aggregation of single-case longitudinal comparisons). From the results on facial behavior during depression it can be concluded that the nonverbal reaction tendencies of endogenous and neurotic depressed patients differ. Moreover, the differential behavioral pattems observed cast doubt on the assumption of a homogeneity of affects in depression. Taking into account the conditions which govern it, facial behavior has proved to be a valid and, especially, a differential indicator for pathoIogic affective states and their changes. Given the fact that a psychiatric illness generally incorporates emotional problems it is more than surprising that little attention has been paid to the systematic study of emotional behavior. Some of the reasons for this will be clarified in the following.
In order to survive, organisms avoid threats and seek rewards. Classical conditioning is a simple model to explain how animals and humans learn associations between events that allow them to predict threats and rewards efficiently. In the classical conditioning paradigm, a neutral stimulus is paired with a biologically significant event (the unconditioned stimulus – US). In virtue of this association, the neutral stimulus acquires affective motivational properties, and becomes a conditioned stimulus (CS+). Defensive responses emerge for pairings with an aversive US (e.g., pain), and appetitive responses emerge for pairing with an appetitive event (e.g., reward). It has been observed that animals avoid a CS+ when it precedes an aversive US during a training phase (CS+ US; forward conditioning); whereas they approach a CS+ when it follows an aversive US during the training phase (US CS+; backward conditioning). These findings indicate that the CS+ acquires aversive properties after a forward conditioning, whereas acquires appetitive properties after a backward conditioning. It is thus of interest whether event timing also modulates conditioned responses in such an opponent fashion in humans, who are capable of explicit cognition about the associations. For this purpose, four experiments were conducted in which a discriminative conditioning was applied in groups of participants that only differed in the temporal sequence between CS+ onset and US onset (i.e., the interstimulus interval – ISI). During the acquisition phase (conditioning), two simple geometrical shapes were presented as conditioned stimuli. One shape (CS+) was always associated with a mild painful electric shock (i.e., the aversive US) and the other one (CS-) was never associated with the shock. In a between-subjects design, participants underwent either forward or backward conditioning. During the test phase (extinction), emotional responses to CS+ and CS- were tested and the US was never presented. Additionally, a novel neutral shape (NEW) was presented as control stimulus. To assess cognitive components, participants had to rate both the valence (the degree of unpleasantness or pleasantness) and the arousal (the degree of calmness or excitation) associated with the shapes before and after conditioning. In the first study, startle responses, an ancestral defensive reflex consisting of a fast twitch of facial and body muscles evoked by sudden and intense stimuli, was measured as an index of stimulus implicit valence. Startle amplitude was potentiated in the presence of the forward CS+ whilst attenuated in the presence of the backward CS+. Respectively, the former response indicates an implicit negative valence of the CS+ and an activation of the defensive system; the latter indicated an implicit positive valence of the CS+ and an activation of the appetitive system. In the second study, the blood-oxygen level dependent (BOLD) response was measured by means of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate neural responses after event learning. Stronger amygdala activation in response to forward CS+ and stronger striatum activation in response to backward CS+ were found in comparison to CS-. These results support the notion that the defensive motivational system is activated after forward conditioning since the amygdala plays a crucial role in fear acquisition and expression. Whilst the appetitive motivational system is activated after backward conditioning since the striatum plays a crucial role in reward processing. In the third study, attentional processes underlying event learning were observed by means of steady-state visual evoked potentials (ssVEPs). This study showed that both forward and backward CS+ caught attentional resources. More specifically, ssVEP amplitude was higher during the last seconds of forward CS+ that is just before the US, but during the first seconds of backward CS+ that is just after the US. Supposedly, attentional processes were located at the most informative part of CS+ in respect to the US. Participants of all three studies rated both forward and backward CS+ more negative and arousing compared to the CS-. This indicated that event timing did not influence verbal reports similarly as the neural and behavioral responses indicating a dissociation between the explicit and implicit responses. Accordingly, dual process theories propose that human behavior is determined by the output of two systems: (1) an impulsive implicit system that works on associative principles, and (2) a reflective explicit system that functions on the basis of knowledge about facts and values. Most importantly, these two systems can operate in a synergic or antagonistic fashion. Hence, the three studies of this thesis congruently suggest that the impulsive and the reflective systems act after backward association in an antagonistic fashion. In sum, event timing may turn punishment into reward in humans even though they subjectively rate the stimulus associated with aversive events as being aversive. This dissociation might contribute to understand psychiatric disorders, like anxiety disorders or drug addiction.
The thesis deals with the question which motivation direction—approach or avoidance—is connected to the emotion relief—a positive, low-arousal emotion, which is caused by an expected or nonexpected, motive-consistent change for the better, thus caused by the absence of an aversive stimulus. Based on the idea of postulating different levels of approach avoidance motivation, the Reflective-Impulsive Model of Behavior (RIM, Strack & Deutsch, 2004) is applied to relief and approach avoidance. The RIM differentiates between an impulsive and a reflective system of information processing, with both systems working in relative independence from each other. Two central variables moderate the relation between relief and approach avoidance. The first is the psychological system in which approach avoidance is processed and assessed. Two levels of approach avoidance are distinguished: an impulsive distance orientation (distance change in relation to specific stimuli) and a reflective goal orientation (attainment of positive versus avoidance of negative end states). The second is the psychological system in which relief developed: In the impulsive system, relief develops as the affect that is conditioned to the absence of negative states; in the reflective system, relief develops as a result of goal-oriented behaviour of controlling or preventing of negative stimulation. The thesis looks at both moderators (level of approach avoidance and psychological system of development of relief) at once. The central prediction for the impulsive distance orientation is: Relief leads to an approach distance orientation (distance reduction), independent from the system in which relief develops. The central prediction for the reflective goal orientation is: Relief leads to an avoidance goal orientation (control of negative end states). This latter prediction is only made for the case when relief was caused by (develops in) the reflective system, that is by one’s own, goal-directed behaviour; it is further necessary for an avoidance goal orientation that the relief state cannot certainly reached, instead there always has to uncertainty in the control of negative states. The methodology in the thesis is based on studies of aversive conditioning. In most studies, a differentiation paradigm is applied. The impulsive relief is operationalized via a classically conditioned relief (aversive CS-), whereas the reflective relief is operationalized via an active avoidance paradigm which ensures the methodological comparability of “reflective relief” to “impulsive relief”. The predictions are as follows: Prediction A: Relief will elicit positive affective valence and an approach distance orientation. This should be true for both relief that is caused by the impulsive system and for relief that is caused by the reflective system (Experiments 2-3). Prediction B: More positive valence of relief—caused by a larger change of affective states—will elicit a stronger approach distance orientation (Experiment 4). Prediction C: Relief caused by the impulsive system will not elicit a specific goal orientation (Experiment 5). Prediction D: Uncertain self-induced relief—caused by the reflective system—will elicit an avoidance goal orientation (Experiments 6-7). In addition, Experiment 1 validated the conditioning paradigm used for the elicitation of relief. The experiments in the thesis support all predictions made in the theoretical part. The work has implications for the assumptions made in the RIM (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). In the impulsive system, the affective valence determines approach avoidance orientation (e.g., R. Neumann & Strack, 2000), the reflective goal not playing an important role. Relief elicits an approach orientation in the impulsive system. In the reflective system, the active goal is decisive for the approach avoidance orientation. Uncertain self-caused relief elicits an avoidance goal orientation in the reflective system. The studies of the thesis thus support and validate the assumptions made in the RIM (Strack & Deutsch, 2004) in the specific field of motivational direction.
Neuroplasticity is a term indicating structural and functional changes in the brain through the lifespan. In the present study, differences in the functional cortical activations between the musical talents and non-talents were investigated after a short-term practice of the visuomotor and auditory tasks. Visuomotor task consisted of the finger tapping sequences, while auditory task consisted of passive listening to the classical music excerpts. Non-talents were divided in two groups: trained non-talents who practiced the task prior to scanning and untrained non-talents who did not practice the task. Functional activations were obtained by the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in a 1.5T Scanner. It was hypothesized that talents would exhibit different functional activations from non-talents in both tasks as a result of the long-term music practice, which would account for the brain plasticity. Decreased activation of the same areas in talents in respect to the non-talents as well as the activation of different areas between the talents and non-talents was hypothesized. In addition due to a plethora of previous studies showing increased activations in the primary motor cortex (M1) in musicians, as well as left inferior frontal gyrus (lIFG), increased activation of the M1 and lIFG in talents were hypothesized. Behavioral results did not reveal differences in performance among the three groups of subjects (talents, non-talents who practiced the task, and non-talents who did not practice the task). The main findings from imaging results of the visuomotor task confirmed the hypothesis of the increased activation in the M1 in talents. Region of interest analyses of the lIFG revealed the highest activation in the untrained non-talents, lower activation in talents, and least activation in the trained non-talents. Posthoc imaging analyses revealed higher activations in the cerebella of subjects who practiced the visuomotor task. For the auditory task, the effect of auditory practice was observed in the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG). These results should be interpreted with caution due to the absence of behavioral differences among the groups.
The aim of this project was to investigate whether reflex-like innate facial reactions to tastes and odors are altered in patients with eating disorders. Qualitatively different tastes and odors have been found to elicit specific facial expressions in newborns. This specificity in newborns is characterized by positive facial reactions in response to pleasant stimuli and by negative facial reactions in response to unpleasant stimuli. It is, however, unclear, whether these specific facial displays remain stable during ontogeny (1). Despite the fact that several studies had shown that taste-and odor-elicited facial reactions remain quite stable across a human’s life-span, the specificity of research questions, as well as different research methods, allow only limited comparisons between studies. Moreover, the gustofacial response patterns might be altered in pathological eating behavior (2). To date, however, the question of whether dysfunctional eating behavior might alter facial activity in response to tastes and odors has not been addressed. Furthermore, changes in facial activity might be linked to deficient inhibitory facial control (3). To investigate these three research questions, facial reactions in response to tastes and odors were assessed. Facial reactions were analyzed using the Facial Action Coding System (FACS, Ekman & Friesen, 1978; Ekman, Friesen, & Hager, 2002) and electromyography.
The aim of the present thesis was to explore how food deprivation and reward expectancy versus frustrative nonreward change implicit and explicit food-liking and food-wanting. As a result, Experiment 1-3 were successful in revealing that liking- and wanting-related associations toward food stimuli dissociate as a function of food deprivation, given that participants were not rewarded with real food during the experiment. More specifically, whereas food-deprived participants showed more wanting-related associations toward food stimuli than satiated participants, the liking-related associations did not differ across both conditions of hunger. Overall, this effect could be replicated in 3 experiments using different manipulations of nonreward versus reward expectancy. However, neither food deprivation nor nonreward were found to influence participants’ self-reported mood and frustration. Moreover, participants of Experiment 2 anticipating food consumption showed the same liking- and wanting-related responses due to food deprivation than participants in the nonreward condition. But providing participants with individual control over food consumption abolished the dissociation of liking- and wanting-related associations. In this condition, however, participants’ liking- and wanting-related associations were not moderated by need state, maybe due to the (partial) consumption of snack food before the implicit attitude assessment. This, in turn, may have reduced participants’ disposition to respond with more liking- and wanting-related associations when being hungry. Finally, Experiment 4 revealed that the presentation of need-relevant vs. need-irrelevant stimuli prompted different liking-related associations depending on the time participants had fasted before the experiment. Specifically, it could be demonstrated that whereas moderately-hungry compared to satiated participants responded with more positive associations toward need-relevant stimuli, 15 hours food-deprived participants responded with more negative associations compared to moderately-hungry and satiated participants. Respectively, a significant curvilinear function of need state was obtained. In addition, participants were found to immediately respond more negatively to need-irrelevant stimuli as soon as they became moderately hungry, evidencing devaluation effects (see Brendl, Markman, & Messner, 2003) to also occur on an implicit level of responding. Contrary to the implicit liking- and wanting-related evaluations, self-reported explicit food-liking and food-wanting did not dissociate as a function of food deprivation and nonreward, revealing that participants’ explicit self-reports of food-liking and food-wanting did not mirror their implicit responses. As the most important result, it could be demonstrated that explicit food-liking and food-wanting varied positively as a function of need state. The results were discussed on the background of different theoretical assumptions on the malleability of implicit and explicit need-relevant attitudes (e.g. motivational theories, frustrative nonreward).
Children's information processing of risky choice alternatives was investigated in two studies without using verbal reports. In Study 1, the ability to integrate the probabilities and the payoffs of simple bets was examined using the rating scale methodology. Children's choices among three of those simple bets were recorded also. By cross-classifying the children's choice and rating behavior it was shown that a three-stage developmental hypothesis of decision making is not sufficient. A four-stage hypothesis is proposed. In Study 2, the influence of enlarging the presented number of alternatives from two to three and the influence of the similarity of the alternatives on children's choice probabilities was examined with those bets. Children's choice behavior was probabilistic and was influenced only by enlarging the presented number of alternatives. These results suggest that a Bayesian approach, based on two probabilistic choice models, should not be applied in order to analyze children's choice behavior. The functional measurement approach is, as was demonstrated in Study 1, a powerful implement to further the understanding of the development of decision making.
The methodological implications of a differential psychopharmacology are discussed. It is shown that the technique of stratifying subjects with personality scores depends on one basic assumption: the personality score is not affected by the other experimental factors. Two experiments are reported in which pre- and posttest (after the experiment) scores were measured. The pre-post-differences showed themselves to be affected by the medication. It is argued that in psychopharmacological experimentation an additional step must be included. All non-treatment factors must be examined for their stability in the course of the experiment. If they are stable, usual evaluation may take place. If changes are attributable to the treatment, personality scores must be regarded as dependent variables. They have to be evaluated together with the other observables with a multivariate model. Additionally, a procedure like this yields as "experimental differential psychology" a self-reliant contribution to the problems of differential psychology.
In an experimental analog of verbal examinations, the call-up situation, the effects of two dosages of a tranquillizing agent (lopirazepam) are compared to placebo treatment. 72 male and female, healthy, young volunteers have been randomly assigned to 12 groups of 6 subjects each. Pulse frequency and performance were registered. The results indicated differential drug effects which were interpreted according to the hypotheses of "differential effects of social stressors". If a situation was highly challenging for a subject, the application of a tranquillizer in an adequately high dosage enabled him to perform well in spite of or because of strong increases in pulse frequency.
Stability and Variability in Interactive Behavior as Measured by Methods of "Speech Chronemics"
(1988)
Dyadic interaction is modelled os an adaptive process between personality of the partners involved and the characteristics of the theme. The theme structure and the principles which control the adaptation process are referred to as "syntality". The material of the studies reported are the speech signals of the verbal interaction reduced to an on-off pattern. In a first study individual speech behavior was found to remain stable in dyads even if partners changed. The second study showed the stability of the speech patterns for different interaction themes even if dyads changed. These apparently contradictory results are reconciled by introducing the concept of "adaptive stability". Individual speech behavior does not happen at a stable activity level, but is characterized by a constant relationship (" less" or "more") to the respective activity of the other partner.
Mediators of Social Anxiety - External Social Threat-Cues vs. Self-Related Negative Cognitions
(2009)
Based on a review of models and empirical findings a working model is proposed, suggesting that self-related negative cognitions and biased processing of external social threat-cues are mediators of social anxiety. Hypotheses derived from this model were tested in three experiments. The first experiment examined whether levels of trait social anxiousness predicted fearful responding to external social threat-cues (angry vs. neutral and happy facial expressions) during social evaluation. Higher trait social anxiousness predisposes to an inward focus on one’s fear reaction to social threat. Using this strategy was expected to enhance fearful responding to angry facial expressions. A strategy of identifying with angry faces was expected to counteract fearful responding, but was expected to fail more often with increasing levels of trait social anxiousness. To examine these hypotheses, affective modulation of the startle eye-blink was assessed in forty-four undergraduate students. This measure served as a probe into the activation of brain structures involved in the automatic evaluation of environmental threat-cues. Trait and state anxiety as well as explicit emotional responding to the stimuli were assessed with questionnaires and ratings. Processing angry faces potentiated startle amplitudes as expected. Low arousal induced by the stimuli was a probable reason, why startle potentiation to happy faces emerged instead of attenuation. Trait social anxiousness and the cognitive strategies did not influence these effects. Yet, increased trait social anxiousness predicted decreased startle latency, indicating motor hyper-responsivity, which is part of the clinical representation of social anxiety disorder (SAD). Processing facial expressions and identifying with them disrupted this association. Previous studies support that similar strategies may enhance treatment of SAD. Individuals with SAD were expected to respond with increased arousal to external social threat-cues. Therefore, the second experiment examined whether nine individuals with SAD showed attentional (prepulse inhibition, PPI) or affective startle modulation to angry as compared to neutral and happy facial expressions. Corrugator supercilii activity was assessed as a behavioral indicator for effects of facial expressions. The remaining setup resembled the first experiment. Facial expressions did not modulate the startle reflex, but corrugator supercilii activity was sensitive to facial valence. However, the effects were not related to trait social anxiousness. Apparently, angry facial expressions do not act as phobic stimuli for individuals with SAD. The third experiment examined whether focusing on self-related negative cognitions or biased processing of external social threat-cues mediates relationships between trait social anxiety and anxious responding in a socially challenging situation. Inducing self-related negative cognitions vs. relaxation was expected to reveal a functional dependency on the supposed mediation in a multivariate assessment of criteria of the working model. Within this design, the impact of external social threat-cues (facial expressions and emotional words) was compared to control stimuli and context effects, using the startle paradigm. The findings provide first evidence for full statistical mediation of the associations between trait social anxiety and self-reported anxiety as well as parasympathetic withdrawal by self-related negative cognitions, when thirty-six undergraduate students anticipated public speaking. Apprehensive arousal, as indicated by increased skin conductance levels and heart rate, was present in all participants. Observer ratings of behavior during public speaking matched the self-rated quality of the performance. None of these measures were correlated with trait social anxiousness. Startle amplitude correlated with state and trait social anxiety, but was no mediator. Finally, there was no affective modulation of the startle amplitude by external social threat-cues. These studies advance both our current understanding of the factors that mediate social anxiety responses to situations and our knowledge of the physiological and anatomical mechanisms involved in social anxiety. Based on these findings a revised version of the working model on mediators of social anxiety is proposed in the hope it may aid further research for the ultimate goal of developing an empirically validated functional anatomical model of social anxiety.
The aim of the current work was to enhance the understanding of the relationship between goals and the self. More specifically, I wanted to achieve three things. First, I developed an implicit measure of self-activation (SA) based on response latencies to avoid the problems of traditional measures of self-activation (i.e., demand effects, self-presentation concerns). Therefore, two studies were conducted in which increased self-activation, induced by classic self-manipulations, was measured with a newly developed picture task. Thereby it was assumed that individuals would react faster to photographs of themselves when the self was activated than when it was not. Second, I aimed to demonstrate that there exists a close connection between personal goals and the self. Despite being inherent in several theories, this assumption has never been tested directly before. It was hypothesized that thinking about personal goals should activate the self, resulting in faster reactions in the newly developed measure of SA, i.e., quicker responses to the self-pictures. Third, it was investigated whether goals and the self are linked in a bidirectional fashion; according to the reported findings, it seems to be functional for individuals’ self-regulation and goal pursuit to develop such a link. To provide evidence for the bidirectionality of the relationship, it was hypothesized that in conditions of high SA, it should be more likely personal evaluations to be construed as goals; this goal activation should result in higher accessibility of goal-related knowledge, stronger approach motivational tendencies towards goal-related targets, and more goal-directed behavior. The obtained results endorse the applicability of the picture task as implicit method to measure increased SA and also corroborate the core hypothesis, namely that personal goals and the self are inherently connected and that they are linked in a bidirectional fashion.
This article describes a 2-systems model that explains social behavior as a joint function of reflective and impulsive processes. In particular, it is assumed that social behavior is controlled by 2 interacting systems that follow different operating principles. The reflective system generates behavioral decisions that are based on knowledge about facts and values, whereas the impulsive system elicits behavior through associative links and motivational orientations. The proposed model describes how the 2 systems interact at various stages of processing, and how their outputs may determine behavior in a synergistic or antagonistic fashion. It extends previous models by integrating motivational components that allow more precise predictions of behavior. The implications of this reflective–impulsive model are applied to various phenomena from social psychology and beyond. Extending previous dual-process accounts, this model is not limited to specific domains of mental functioning and attempts to integrate cognitive, motivational, and behavioral mechanisms.
The present approach highlights a procedural account of intuitive judgments. In intuitions of hidden semantic coherence, people can intuitively detect whether a word triad has a common remote associate (coherent) or not (incoherent) before, and independently from actually retrieving the common associate. The present fluency-affect intuition model (FAIM) maintains that semantic coherence increases the processing fluency for coherent compared to incoherent triads, and that this increased fluency triggers brief and subtle positive affect, which is the experiential basis of these intuitions. Published work concerning 25 experiments is reviewed that gathered empirical support for this model. Furthermore, the impact of fluency and affect was also generalized to intuitions of visual coherence, and intuitions of grammaticality in an artificial grammar learning paradigm.
Humans and other animals share choice preference for smaller-but-sooner over later-but-larger rewards, indicating that the subjective value of a reward is discounted as a function of time. This phenomenon referred to as delay discounting (DD), represents one facet of impulsivity which is inherently connected with reward processing and, within a certain range, adaptive. Maladaptive levels, however, can lead to suboptimal decision-making and represent important characteristics of psychopathologies such as attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). In line with a proposed influence of dysregulated dopamine (DA) levels on impulsivity, neural structures involved in DD (the ventral-striatum [VS]; orbitofrontal cortex [OFC]) are highly innervated by dopaminergic neurons. However, studies explicitly testing the triadic interplay of dopaminergic neurotransmission, impulsivity and brain activation during intertemporal choice are missing. Therefore, the first study of the thesis examined the effect of different DA-bioavailability levels, indicated by a genetic polymorphism (Val158Met) in the gene of the catechol-O-methyltransferase, on the association of delay discounting and OFC activation. OFC response to monetary rewards that varied by delay-to-delivery was recorded with functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) in a sample of 49 healthy human subjects. The results suggest a DA-related enhancement in OFC function from low (low DA level) to partial (intermediate DA level) and full (high DA level) reward delay sensitivity. Furthermore, DA-bioavailability was shown to moderate the association of neural reward delay sensitivity and impulsivity: OFC reward delay sensitivity was strongly correlated with impulsivity at intermediate DA-levels, but not at low or high DA-levels where impulsivity was related to delay-independent OFC amplitudes. It is concluded that DA-level should be considered as a crucial factor whenever impulsivity-related brain activation, in particular to reward delay, is examined in healthy subjects. Dysfunctional reward processing, accompanied by a limited ability to tolerate reward delays (delay aversion), has been proposed as an important feature in ADHD putatively caused by striatal hypo-dopaminergia. Therefore, the aim of the second study of this thesis was to examine subcortical processing of reward delays and to test for neural indicators of a negative emotional response to delay periods. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), brain activation in adult patients with ADHD (n=14) and healthy control subjects (n=12) was recorded during the processing of immediate and delayed rewards. Compared with healthy control subjects, hyporesponsiveness of the VS reward system was evident in patients with ADHD for both immediate and delayed rewards. In contrast, delayed rewards evoked hyperactivation in the dorsal caudate nucleus and the amygdala of ADHD patients, corroborating the central predictions of the delay aversion hypothesis. In combination both studies support the conception of a close link between delay discounting, brain activation and dopaminergic neurotransmission. The results implicate that studies on neural correlates of DD have to account for the DA-bioavailability level and for a negative emotional response to reward delays.
The main goals of the present thesis were to investigate how food deprivation influences food related disgust and to identify mental mechanisms that might underlie alterations in food related disgust. For this purpose, 9 studies were conducted that employed direct and indirect measures of attitudes, biological measures of affect as well as measures of real eating behavior and food choice, and compared responses of deprived and non deprived subjects on each of these measures. Spontaneous facial reactions were assessed via EMG and revealed that food deprived subjects showed weaker disgust reactions than satiated participants when being confronted with photographs of disgusting foods. Interestingly, deprived and non deprived subjects evaluated disgusting foods equally negative on a conscious level of information processing, indicating that food deprivation has the potential to attenuate food related disgust irrespective of conscious evaluations. Furthermore, it was found that food deprived participants readily consumed disgust related foods (“genetically modified foods”), while satiated participants rejected those foods. Again, no difference emerged between deprived and non deprived subjects in respect to their conscious evaluations of genetically modified foods (that were negative in both experimental groups). The dissociation between conscious evaluations and actual eating behavior that was observed amongst food deprived participants resembles the dissociation between conscious evaluations and facial reactions, thereby corroborating the assumption that alterations in food related disgust might directly influence eating behavior without changing conscious evaluations of foods. The assumption that a shift in automatic attitudes towards disgusting foods might be responsible for these effects received only partial support. That is, there was only a non significant tendency for food deprived subjects to evaluate disgusting foods more positive than satiated subjects on an automatic level of information processing. Instead, the results of the present thesis suggest that food deprived subjects exhibit a stronger motivation than satiated subjects to approach disgusting foods immediately. More precisely, food deprived participants exhibited strong approach motivational tendencies towards both, palatable and disgusting foods in an “Approach- Avoidance Task” whereas satiated participants only approached palatable (but not disgusting) foods on an automatic level of information processing. Moreover, food deprivation seems to change the subjective weighting of hedonic and functional food attributes in the context of more elaborated decisions about which foods to pick for consumption and which foods to reject. It was found that individual taste preferences were of minor importance for food deprived subjects but very important for satiated subjects when actually choosing between several food alternatives. In contrast, functional food attributes (e.g., immediate availability of a given food, large portion size) were more important selection criteria for food deprived subjects than for satiated subjects. Thus, food deprived participants were less picky than satiated participants, but showed a clear preference for those food alternatives that were functional in ending a state of food deprivation quickly – even if this meant choosing a food that was not considered tasty. Taken together, the present thesis shows that physiological need states (e.g., food deprivation) are tightly linked to the affective and motivational processing of need relevant cues. This link is so strong that food deprivation even modulates affective and motivational reactions as well as eating behavior and choice behavior towards disgusting (but need relevant) foods.
Cognitive views of the psychopathology of anxiety propose that attentional biases toward threatening information play a substantial role in the disorders’ etiology and maintenance. For healthy subjects, converging evidence show that threatening stimuli attract attention and lead to enhanced activation in visual processing areas. It is assumed that this preferential processing of threat occurs at a preattentive level and is followed by fast attentional engagement. High-anxious individuals show augmented tendencies to selectively attend toward fear-relevant cues (Mathews, 1990) and exhibit elevated neural processing of threatening cues compared to non-anxious individuals (Dilger et al., 2003). Regarding attentional biases in high-anxious subjects, it remains unanswered up to now whether initial engagement of attention toward threat or difficulties to disengage from threat is an underlying mechanism. Furthermore, little is known whether the preferential (attentive) processing of threatening cues does influence perceptional outcomes of anxious subjects. In order to directly study separate components of attentional bias the first study of this dissertation was a combined reaction time and eye-tracking experiment. Twenty one spider phobic patients and 21 control participants were instructed to search for a neutral target while ignoring task-irrelevant abrupt-onset distractor circles which contained either a small picture of a spider (phobic), a flower (non-phobic, but similar to spiders in shape), a mushroom (non-phobic, and not similar to spiders in shape), or small circles with no picture. As expected, patients’ reaction times to targets were longer on trials with spider distractors. However, analyses of eye movements revealed that this was not due to attentional capture by spider distractors; patients more often fixated on all distractors with pictures. Instead, reaction times were delayed by longer fixation durations on spider distractors. This result does not support automatic capture of attention by phobic cues but suggests that phobic patients fail to disengage attention from spiders. To assess whether preferential processing of phobic cues differentially affects visual perception in phobic patients compared to healthy controls, the second study of this dissertation used a binocular rivalry paradigm, where two incompatible pictures were presented to each eye. These pictures cannot be merged to a meaningful percept and temporarily, one picture predominates in conscious perception whereas the other is suppressed. 23 spider phobic patients and 20 non-anxious control participants were shown standardized pictures of spiders or flowers, each paired with a neutral pattern under conditions of binocular rivalry. Their task was to continuously indicate the predominant percept by key presses. Analyses show that spider phobic patients perceived the spider picture more often and longer as dominant compared to non-anxious control participants. Thus, predominance of phobic cues in binocular rivalry provides evidence that preferential processing of fear-relevant cues in the visual system actually leads to superior perception. In combination both studies support the notion that phobic patients process phobic cues preferentially within the visual system resulting in enhanced attention and perception. At early stages of visual processing, this is mainly reflected by delayed attentional disengagement and across time, preferential processing leads to improved perception of threat cues.
One of the major drawbacks in the implementation of intelligent tutoring systems is the limited capacity to process natural language and to automatically deal with unexpected or unknown vocabulary. Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) is a statistical technique of automatic language processing, which can attenuate the “language barrier” between humans and tutoring systems. LSA-based intelligent tutoring systems address the goals of modelling human tutoring dialogues (AutoTutor), enhancing text comprehension and summarisation skills (State-The-Essence, Summary Street®, conText, Apex), training of comprehension strategies (iStart, a French system in development) and improving story and essay writing (Write To Learn, Select-a-Kibitzer, StoryStation). The systems are reviewed concerning their efficacy in modelling skilled human tutors and regarding their effects on the learner.
Frustration has been investigated since the early beginnings of psychological research. Yet, it is still unclear how frustration influences the two main parameters of motivation, i.e., orientation (approach-avoidance) and intensity. Some theories propose that controllable frustration increases approach motivation, thereby maintaining motivational intensity. In contrast, other theories propose that the perception of obstacles immediately elicits an avoidance orientation because of the negative valence of the perceptual input. Yet, the latter theories can not explain how motivational intensity is maintained upon encountering obstacles. The aim of the present thesis is to integrate previous contradicting assumptions by describing the influence of frustration on motivational orientation and motivational intensity on the basis of a two-system model of behavior. The definition of frustration as an unexpected obstacle blocking the attainment of an anticipated gratification implies that the obstacle is immediately perceived, whereas the goal is only represented in working memory. According to two-system models, these two types of representations influence different levels of behavior regulation. Whereas spontaneous approach-avoidance tendencies are mainly determined by the valence of the perceptual input, decisions to engage effort to reach the goal are based on knowledge about goals and appraisals of controllability of obstacles. Supporting this theorizing, six experiments demonstrated that frustration immediately activates avoidance tendencies. This was true for frustration of approach goals as well as for frustration of avoidance goals. Furthermore, this effect did not depend on the type of frustration feedback, and was found when approach-avoidance tendencies were measured after completion of goal pursuit as well as while overcoming frustration. In addition, approaching obstacles impaired performance in a subsequent task, suggesting that approaching obstacles consumed cognitive resources. This further supports the assumption that obstacles immediately activate avoidance tendencies. Furthermore, dispositional action-state orientation, which has been previously shown to moderate automatic affective reactions, influenced approach-avoidance tendencies, indicating that affect mediates the impact of frustration on behavioral tendencies. Finally, manipulations of controllability of frustration did not influence spontaneous approach-avoidance tendencies, but measures of motivational intensity such as decisions to engage more effort as well as activation of goal-relevant behavioral schemata. In sum, these findings support the assumptions that immediately elicited motivational orientations are mainly a function of the valence of perceptual input, whereas behavior to reach the goal (i.e. motivational intensity) is regulated by working memory representations such as appraisals of goal expectancy. Motivational orientations may serve to prepare organisms for quick reactions to sudden, unexpected occurrences, whereas behavior regulation based on goal appraisals may provide stability and flexibility in long-term goal pursuit.
Assessment of emotional detachment in psychopathy via self-report and an emotion detection task
(2008)
The personality construct of psychopathy is subject of growing research, but data on psychopathy in female incarcerated and in non-institutionalized samples are rare. In this thesis emotional detachment as one factor of psychopathy is investigated in general population, in patients and in incarcerated samples. After verifying the validity of the Psychopathy Personality Inventory Revised (PPI-R) measuring emotional detachment, the sensitivity of the questionnaire concerning emotional detachment has been proven. Additionally it has been shown that symptoms of attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder can be distinguished from psychopathic traits by emotional detachment. In addition, these results confirm the core role of the feature emotional detachment for psychopathy. Furthermore, two emotion recognition tasks have been conducted in a criminal female inpatients sample. Compared to the low psychopathic patients, the high psychopathic patients showed deficits in categorization only in shortly presented sad facial expressions, but rated emotional facial expressions as less arousing. These results point to emotional detachment as a core characteristic of psychopathy, and is specific even in non-incarcerated and female incarcerated samples. It can be measured with the PPI-R as well as with emotion detection tasks.
Encoding Redundancy for Task-dependent Optimal Control : A Neural Network Model of Human Reaching
(2008)
The human motor system is adaptive in two senses. It adapts to the properties of the body to enable effective control. It also adapts to different situational requirements and constraints. This thesis proposes a new neural network model of both kinds of adaptivity for the motor cortical control of human reaching movements, called SURE_REACH (sensorimotor unsupervised learning redundancy resolving control architecture). In this neural network approach, the kinematic and sensorimotor redundancy of a three-joint planar arm is encoded in task-independent internal models by an unsupervised learning scheme. Before a movement is executed, the neural networks prepare a movement plan from the task-independent internal models, which flexibly incorporates external, task-specific constraints. The movement plan is then implemented by proprioceptive or visual closed-loop control. This structure enables SURE_REACH to reach hand targets while incorporating task-specific contraints, for example adhering to kinematic constraints, anticipating the demands of subsequent movements, avoiding obstacles, or reducing the motion of impaired joints. Besides this functionality, the model accounts for temporal aspects of human reaching movements or for data from priming experiments. Additionally, the neural network structure reflects properties of motor cortical networks like interdependent population encoded body space representations, recurrent connectivity, or associative learning schemes. This thesis introduces and describes the new model, relates it to current computational models, evaluates its functionality, relates it to human behavior and neurophysiology, and finally discusses potential extensions as well as the validity of the model. In conclusion, the proposed model grounds highly flexible task-dependent behavior in a neural network framework and unsupervised sensorimotor learning.
One primary source for self-knowledge is social comparison. Often objective criteria for self-evaluations are not available or useful and therefore comparisons with other people play a crucial role in self-evaluations. But the question is whether social comparisons could indeed provide information about the self without consuming too much cognitive resources or time. Therefore, in this research I wanted to look at practice effects in social comparison and the particular significance of routine standards. Whereas traditional research on standard selection mostly focused on goal-oriented and strategic standard selection processes, this research sets out to integrate social cognitive knowledge, ideas, and methods. Researchers from many different fields agree that people’s behavior and thinking is not fully determined by rational choices or normative considerations. Quite the contrary, factors like knowledge accessibility, habits, procedural practice, stereotyping, categorization, and many more cognitive processes play an important role. The same may be true in social comparison and standard selection. In my research I demonstrate that efficiency concerns play an important role in social comparison. Since people may not be able to engage in a strategic standard selection whenever they engage in social comparison processes, there has to be a more efficient alternative. Using routine standards would be such an alternative. The efficiency advantage of routine standards may thereby be founded not only in the abandonment of a strategic but arduous standard selection process, but also in a higher efficiency of the comparison process itself. I therefore set out to show how the use of routine standards facilitates the social comparison processes. This was done in three steps. First, I replicated and improved our former research (Mussweiler & Rüter, 2003, JPSP) indicating that people really do use their best friends as routine standards to evaluate themselves. Second, I demonstrated that it is more efficient to compare with a routine standard than with another standard. In Studies 2 and 3 I therefore show that comparisons between the self and a routine standard (either a natural routine standard like the best friend or a experimentally induced routine standard based on practice) are faster and more efficient than comparisons with other standards. Finally, I looked at the underlying mechanism of the efficiency advantage of routine standards. The results of Studies 4 and 5 point out, that both general as well as specific practice effects occur with repeated comparisons. Whereas a specific practice effect implies the repeated processing of the same content (i.e., knowledge about the routine standard), general practice effects indicate that the pure process (i.e., comparing the self with a routine standard) becomes more efficient regardless whether new content (i.e., comparison relevant knowledge) has to be processed. Taken together, the efficiency advantage of routine standards during self-evaluation is based not only on the lack of necessity for an arduous standard selection, but is additionally supported by the facilitation of the comparison process itself. The efficiency of routine standards may provide an explanation as to why people base self-evaluations on comparisons with these standards and dispense with strategic considerations to select the most suitable standard.