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Previous research has shown that the simultaneous execution of two actions (instead of only one) is not necessarily more difficult but can actually be easier (less error-prone), in particular when executing one action requires the simultaneous inhibition of another action. Corresponding inhibitory demands are particularly challenging when the to-be-inhibited action is highly prepotent (i.e., characterized by a strong urge to be executed). Here, we study a range of important potential sources of such prepotency. Building on a previously established paradigm to elicit dual-action benefits, participants responded to stimuli with single actions (either manual button press or saccade) or dual actions (button press and saccade). Crucially, we compared blocks in which these response demands were randomly intermixed (mixed blocks) with pure blocks involving only one type of response demand. The results highlight the impact of global (action-inherent) sources of action prepotency, as reflected in more pronounced inhibitory failures in saccade vs. manual control, but also more local (transient) sources of influence, as reflected in a greater probability of inhibition failures following trials that required the to-be-inhibited type of action. In addition, sequential analyses revealed that inhibitory control (including its failure) is exerted at the level of response modality representations, not at the level of fully specified response representations. In sum, the study highlights important preconditions and mechanisms underlying the observation of dual-action benefits.
The question of how behavior is represented in the mind lies at the core of psychology as the science of mind and behavior. While a long-standing research tradition has established two opposing fundamental views of perceptual representation, Structuralism and Gestalt psychology, we test both accounts with respect to action representation: Are multiple actions (characterizing human behavior in general) represented as the sum of their component actions (Structuralist view) or holistically (Gestalt view)? Using a single-/dual-response switch paradigm, we analyzed switches between dual ([A + B]) and single ([A], [B]) responses across different effector systems and revealed comparable performance in partial repetitions and full switches of behavioral requirements (e.g., in [A + B] → [A] vs. [B] → [A], or [A] → [A + B] vs. [B] → [A + B]), but only when the presence of dimensional overlap between responses allows for Gestalt formation. This evidence for a Gestalt view of behavior in our paradigm challenges some fundamental assumptions in current (tacitly Structuralist) action control theories (in particular the idea that all actions are represented compositionally with reference to their components), provides a novel explanatory angle for understanding complex, highly synchronized human behavior (e.g., dance), and delimitates the degree to which complex behavior can be analyzed in terms of its basic components.