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This dissertation explores the development and assessment of inhibitory control – a crucial component of executive functions – in young children. Inhibitory control, defined as the ability to suppress inappropriate responses (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008), is essential for adaptable and goal-oriented behavior. The rapid and non-linear development of this cognitive function in early childhood presents unique challenges for accurate assessment. As children age, they often exhibit a ceiling effect in terms of response accuracy (Petersen et al., 2016), underscoring the need to consider response latency as well. Ideally, combining response latency with accuracy could yield a more precise measure of inhibitory control (e.g., Magnus et al., 2019), facilitating a detailed tracking of developmental changes in inhibitory control across a wider age spectrum. The three studies of this dissertation collectively aim to clarify the relationship between response accuracy, response latency, and inhibitory control across different stages of child development. Each study utilizes a computerized Pointing Stroop Task (Berger et al., 2000) to measure inhibitory control, examining the task's validity and the integration of dual metrics for a more comprehensive evaluation.
The first study focuses on establishing the validity of using both response accuracy and latency as indicators of inhibitory control. Utilizing the framework of explanatory item-response modeling (De Boeck & Wilson, 2004), the study revealed how the task characteristics congruency and item position influence both the difficulty level and timing aspects in young children’s responses in the computerized Pointing Stroop task. Further, this study found that integrating response accuracy with latency, even in a basic manner, provides additional insights. Building upon these findings, the second study investigates the nuances of integrating response accuracy and latency, examining whether this approach can account for age-related differences in inhibitory control. It also explores whether response latencies may contain different information depending on the age and proficiency of the children. The study leverages novel and established methodological perspectives to integrate response accuracy and latency into a single metric, showing the potential applicability of different approaches for assessing inhibitory control development. The third study extends the investigation to a longitudinal perspective, exploring the dynamic relationship between response accuracy, latency, and inhibitory control over time. It assesses whether children who achieve high accuracy at an earlier age show faster improvement in response latency, suggesting a non-linear maturation pathway of inhibitory control. The study also examines if the predictive value of early response latency for later fluid intelligence is dependent on the response accuracy level.
Together, these empirical studies contribute to a more robust understanding of the complex interaction between inhibitory control, response accuracy, and response latency, facilitating valid evaluations of cognitive capabilities in children. Moreover, the findings may have practical implications for designing educational strategies and clinical interventions that address the developmental trajectory of inhibitory control. The nuanced approach advocated in this dissertation suggests prioritizing accuracy in assessment and interventions during the early stages of children's cognitive development, gradually shifting the focus to response latency as children mature and secure their inhibitory control abilities.
Humans actively interact with the world through a wide range of body movements. To understand human cognition in its natural state, we need to incorporate ecologically relevant body movement into our account. One fundamental body movement during daily life is natural walking. Despite its ubiquity, the impact of natural walking on brain activity and cognition has remained a realm underexplored.
In electrophysiology, previous studies have shown a robust reduction of ongoing alpha power in the parieto-occipital cortex during body movements. However, what causes the reduction of ongoing alpha, namely whether this is due to body movement or prevalent sensory input changes, was unknown. To clarify this, study 1 was performed to test if the alpha reduction is dependent on visual input. I compared the resting state alpha power during natural walking and standing, in both light and darkness. The results showed that natural walking led to decreased alpha activity over the occipital cortex compared to standing, regardless of the lighting condition. This suggests that the movement-induced modulation of occipital alpha activity is not driven by visual input changes during walking. I argue that the observed alpha power reduction reflects a change in the state of the subject based on disinhibition induced by walking. Accordingly, natural walking might enhance visual processing and other cognitive processes that involve occipital cortical activity.
I first tested this hypothesis in vision. Study 2 was performed to examine the possible effects of natural walking across visual processing stages by assessing various neural markers during different movement states. The findings revealed an amplified early visual response, while a later visual response remain unaffected. A follow-up study 3 replicated the walking-induced enhancement of the early visual evoked potential and showed that the enhancement was dependent on specific stimulus-related parameters (eccentricity, laterality, distractor presence). Importantly, the results provided evidence that the enhanced early visual responses are indeed linked to the modulation of ongoing occipital alpha power. Walking also modulated the stimulus-induced alpha power. Specifically, it showed that when the target appeared in the fovea area without a distractor, walking exhibited a significantly reduced modulation of alpha power, and showed the largest difference to standing condition. This effect of eccentricity indicates that during later visual processing stages, the visual input in the fovea area is less processed than in peripheral areas while walking.
The two visual studies showed that walking leads to an enhancement in temporally early visual processes which can be predicted by the walking-induced change in ongoing alpha oscillation likely marking disinhibition. However, while walking affects neural markers of early sensory processes, it does not necessarily lead to a change in the behavioural outcome of a sensory task. The two visual studies suggested that the behavioural outcome seems to be mainly based on later processing stages.
To test the effects of walking outside the visual domain, I turned to audition in study 4. I investigated the influence of walking in a particular path vs. simply stepping on auditory processing. Specifically, the study tested whether enhanced processing due to natural walking can be found in primary auditory brain activity and whether the processing preferences are dependent on the walking path. In addition, I tested whether the changed spatial processing that was reported in previous visual studies can be seen in the auditory domain. The results showed enhanced sensory processing due to walking in the auditory domain, which was again linked to the modulation of occipital alpha oscillation. The auditory processing was further dependent on the walking path. Additionally, enhanced peripheral sensory processing, as found in vision, was also present in audition.
The findings outside vision supported the idea of natural walking affecting cognition in a rather general way. Therefore in my study 5, I examined the effect of natural walking on higher cognitive processing, namely divergent thinking, and its correlation with the modulation of ongoing alpha oscillation. I analyzed alpha oscillations and behavioural performance during restricted and unrestricted movement conditions while subjects completed a Guilford's alternate uses test. The results showed that natural walking, as well as missing body restriction, reduces the occipital alpha ongoing power independent of the task phase which goes along with higher test scores. The occipital alpha power reduction can therefore be an indicator of a changed state that allows improved higher cognitive processes.
In summary, the research presented in this thesis highlights that natural walking can change different processes in the visual and auditory domain as well as higher cognitive processes. The effect can be attributed to the movement of natural walking itself rather than to changes in sensory input during walking. The results further indicate that the walking-induced modulation of ongoing occipital alpha oscillations drives the cognitive effects. We therefore suggest that walking changes the inhibitory state which can influence awareness and attention. Such a mechanism could facilitate an adaptive enhancement in cognitive processes and thereby optimize movement-related behaviour such as navigation.
Humans spontaneously blink several times a minute. These blinks are strongly modulated during various cognitive task. However, the precise function of blinking and the reason for their modulation has not been fully understood. In the present work, I investigated the function of spontaneous blinks through various perceptual and cognitive tasks. Previous research has revealed that blinks rates decrease during some tasks but increase during others. When trying to understand these seemingly contradictory results, I observed that blink reduction occurs when one engages with an external input. For instance, a decrease has been observed due to the onset of a stimulus, sensory input processing and attention towards sensory input. However, for activities that do not involve such an engagement, e.g. imagination, daydreaming or creativity, the blink rate has been shown to increase. To follow up on the proposed hypothesis, I distinguished tasks that involve the processing of an external stimulus and tasks that involve disengagement.
In the first part of the project, I explored blinking during stimulus engagement. If the probability of blinking is low when engaging with the stimulus, then one should find a reduction in blinks specifically during the time period of processing but not during sensory input per se. To this end, in study 1, I tested the influence of task-relevant information duration on blink timing and additionally manipulated the overall sensory input using a visual and an auditory temporal simultaneity judgement task. The results showed that blinks were suppressed longer for longer periods of relevant information or in other words, blinks occurred at the end of relevant information processing for both the visual and the auditory modality. Since relevance is mediated through top-down processes, I argue that the reduction in blinks is a top-down driven suppression. In studies 2 and 3, I again investigated stimulus processing, but in this case, processing was triggered internally and not based on specific changes in the external input. To this end, I used bistable stimuli, in which the actual physical stimulus remains constant but their perception switches between different interpretations. Studies on the involvement of attention in such bistable perceptual changes indicate that the sensory input is reprocessed before the perceptual switch. The results revealed a reduction in eye blink rates before the report of perceptual switches. Importantly, I was able to decipher that the decrease was not caused by the perceptual switch or the behavioral response but likely started before the internal switch. Additionally, periods between a blink and a switch were longer than interblink intervals, indicating that blinks were followed by a period of stable percept. To conclude, the first part of the project revealed that there is a top-down driven blink suppression during the processing of an external stimulus.
In the second part of the project, I extended the idea of blinks marking the disengagement from external processing and tested if blinking is associated with better performance during internally directed processes. Specifically, I investigated divergent thinking, an aspect of creativity, and the link between performance and blink rates as well as the effect of motor restriction. While I could show that motor restriction was the main factor influencing divergent thinking, the relationship between eye blink rates and creative output also depended on restriction. Results showed that higher blink rates were associated with better performance during free movement, but only between subjects. In other words, subjects who had overall higher blink rates scored better in the task, but when they were allowed to sit or walk freely. Within a single subject, trial with higher blink rates were not associated with better performance. Therefore, possibly, people who are able to disengage easily, as indicated by an overall high blink rate, perform better in divergent thinking tasks. However, the link between blink rate and internal tasks is not clear at this point. Indeed, a more complex measurement of blink behavior might be necessary to understand the relationship.
In the final part of the project, I aimed to further understand the function of blinks through their neural correlates. I extracted the blink-related neural activity in the primary visual cortex (V1) of existing recordings of three rhesus monkeys during different sensory processing states. I analyzed spike related multi-unit responses, frequency dependent power changes, local field potentials and laminar distribution of activity while the animal watched a movie compared to when it was shown a blank screen. The results showed a difference in blink-related neural activity dependent on the processing state. This difference suggests a state dependent function of blinks.
Taken altogether, the work presented in this thesis suggests that eye blinks have an important function during cognitive and perceptual processes. Blinks seem to facilitate a disengagement from the external world and are therefore suppressed during intended processing of external stimuli.
One of the features that defines humans as extraordinarily social beings is their striking susceptibility to the gaze of others. The research reported in this dissertation was undertaken to advance our understanding of the role of gaze cues in low-level attentional and higher-order cognitive processes. In particular, effects of gaze were examined with regard to three aspects of human cognition: (1) social attention, (2) social interaction and (3) social understanding. Chapter 1 consists of three manuscripts that investigate the boundary conditions of attention capture by direct gaze and how gaze direction is integrated with facial context information. Manuscript 1 and 2 suggest two necessary requirements for attention capture by direct gaze: a meaningful holistic facial context and sharp foveal vision, respectively. Manuscript 3 shows approach/avoidance-congruency effects between gaze direction and emotion expression on attention. Chapter 2 of this dissertation explores the role of gaze in more naturalistic social scenarios. Manuscript 4 demonstrates that gaze behavior during a conversation shapes our perception of another person. Manuscript 5 builds on these findings by showing that these perceptions define our willingness to act in a prosocial way towards our interaction partner. Finally, chapter 3 adopts a broader perspective on social cognition research with a special focus on methodological aspects. Manuscript 6 is a review highlighting the significance of methodological aspects in social cognition research and stressing the importance of sophisticated decisions on task and stimulus materials. Manuscript 7 introduces a new instrument for the assessment of social understanding in adolescents. Initial application in a young sample group indicates that an understanding of another person’s mental states is a capacity that is still developing throughout adolescence. Both manuscripts of this final chapter include eye tracking data that suggest a relationship between gaze behavior and social understanding, a finding that further emphasizes the complex and multifaceted nature of social cognition. I conclude from the findings of this dissertation that research can benefit from adopting a broad view in terms of methodological as well as temporal aspects in order to capture human social cognition in its entirety.
During natural behavior, cognitive processes constantly coincide with body movements such as head or eye movements or blinks. However, during experimental investigations of cognitive processes, movements are often highly restricted which is rather unnatural. In order to improve our understanding of natural behavior, this thesis investigates the interaction between cognition and movements by focusing on spontaneous blinks, which naturally interact with other body movements.
Spontaneous blinks are inevitably connected to vision as they shut out incoming visual information. Both sensory-based and cognitive factors, for example, stimulus occurrence and evaluation, were reported to influence blink behavior. Our first study investigated if such influences are comparable for visual and non-visual input. The chosen experimental design allowed dissociating sensory-driven and cognitive influences, which then could be compared between the visual and auditory domain. Our results show that blinks are more strongly modulated during passive observation of visual input compared to auditory input. This modulation is however enhanced for both input modalities by an increased attentional demand. In addition, the cognitively defined meaning of a stimulus changes blink latency independent of the sensory domain. Overall, our findings show that spontaneous blinks and cognitive processes are linked beyond vision. Moreover, the underlying cognitive processes that influence blinks are largely the same across different sensory input indicating that blinks are profoundly integrated into our system.
When investigating natural behavior, it is important to consider that movements rarely occur in isolation, but are executed side by side. As these movements interact and have a link to cognitive processes, the complexity of our system increases. In order to take this complexity into account, the second part of the experimental research focused on movement interactions, more specifically on the interactions between blinks, pupil size and speaking. Our results reveal that speech-related motor activity increases blink rate and pupil size as well as modulates blink timing. This is in line with previous research that described a relation between different body and eye movements. Importantly, each bodily-induced change in eye movements affects visual information intake. Therefore, different movements can be tightly linked to perceptual processes through complex interactions.
Altogether, the work of this thesis provides rich evidence that movements and cognitive processes are deeply intertwined. Therefore, movements should be seen as an integral part of our system. Taking the relevance of movements and their interactions into account during experimental investigations is necessary in order to reveal a more realistic and complete picture of human natural behavior.
Humans use their eyes not only as visual input devices to perceive the environment, but also as an action tool in order to generate intended effects in their environment. For instance, glances are used to direct someone else's attention to a place of interest, indicating that gaze control is an important part of social communication. Previous research on gaze control in a social context mainly focused on the gaze recipient by asking how humans respond to perceived gaze (gaze cueing). So far, this perspective has hardly considered the actor’s point of view by neglecting to investigate what mental processes are involved when actors decide to perform an eye movement to trigger a gaze response in another person. Furthermore, eye movements are also used to affect the non-social environment, for instance when unlocking the smartphone with the help of the eyes. This and other observations demonstrate the necessity to consider gaze control in contexts other than social communication whilst at the same time focusing on commonalities and differences inherent to the nature of a social (vs. non-social) action context. Thus, the present work explores the cognitive mechanisms that control such goal-oriented eye movements in both social and non-social contexts.
The experiments presented throughout this work are built on pre-established paradigms from both the oculomotor research domain and from basic cognitive psychology. These paradigms are based on the principle of ideomotor action control, which provides an explanatory framework for understanding how goal-oriented, intentional actions come into being. The ideomotor idea suggests that humans acquire associations between their actions and the resulting effects, which can be accessed in a bi-directional manner: Actions can trigger anticipations of their effects, but the anticipated resulting effects can also trigger the associated actions. According to ideomotor theory, action generation involves the mental anticipation of the intended effect (i.e., the action goal) to activate the associated motor pattern. The present experiments involve situations where participants control the gaze of a virtual face via their eye movements. The triggered gaze responses of the virtual face are consistent to the participant’s eye movements, representing visual action effects. Experimental situations are varied with respect to determinants of action-effect learning (e.g., contingency, contiguity, action mode during acquisition) in order to unravel the underlying dynamics of oculomotor control in these situations. In addition to faces, conditions involving changes in non-social objects were included to address the question of whether mechanisms underlying gaze control differ for social versus non-social context situations.
The results of the present work can be summarized into three major findings. 1. My data suggest that humans indeed acquire bi-directional associations between their eye movements and the subsequently perceived gaze response of another person, which in turn affect oculomotor action control via the anticipation of the intended effects. The observed results show for the first time that eye movements in a gaze-interaction scenario are represented in terms of their gaze response in others. This observation is in line with the ideomotor theory of action control. 2. The present series of experiments confirms and extends pioneering results of Huestegge and Kreutzfeldt (2012) with respect to the significant influence of action effects in gaze control. I have shown that the results of Huestegge and Kreutzfeldt (2012) can be replicated across different contexts with different stimulus material given that the perceived action effects were sufficiently salient. 3. Furthermore, I could show that mechanisms of gaze control in a social gaze-interaction context do not appear to be qualitatively different from those in a non-social context.
All in all, the results support recent theoretical claims emphasizing the role of anticipation-based action control in social interaction. Moreover, my results suggest that anticipation-based gaze control in a social context is based on the same general psychological mechanisms as ideomotor gaze control, and thus should be considered as an integral part rather than as a special form of ideomotor gaze control.
Cognitive control is what makes goal-directed actions possible. Whenever the environment or our impulses strongly suggests a response that is incompatible with our goals, conflict arises. Such conflicts are believed to cause negative affect. Aversive consequences of conflict may be registered in a conflict monitoring module, which subsequently initiates attentional changes and action tendencies to reduce negative affect. This association suggests that behavioral adaptation might be a reflection of emotion regulation. The theoretical cornerstone of current research on emotion regulation is the process model of emotion regulation, which postulates the regulation strategies situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation. Under the assumption that conflict adaptation and affect regulation share common mechanisms, I derived several predictions regarding cognitive control from the process model of emotion regulation and tested them in 11 experiments (N = 509). Participants engaged in situation selection towards conflict, but only when they were explicitly pointed to action-outcome contingencies (Experiments 1 to 3). I found support for a mechanism resembling situation modification, but no evidence for a role of affect (Experiments 4 to 10). Changing the evaluation of conflict had no impact on the extent of conflict adaptation (Experiment 11). Overall, there was evidence for an explicit aversiveness of cognitive conflict, but less evidence for implicit aversiveness, suggesting that conflict may trigger affect regulation processes, particularly when people explicitly have affect regulation goals in mind.
Honest actions predominate human behavior. From time to time, this general preference must yield to dishonest actions, which require an effortful process of overcoming initial honest response activation. This thesis presents three experimental series to elucidate this tug-of-war between honest and dishonest response tendencies in overtly committed instances of lies, thereby joining recent efforts to move from a sheer phenomenological perspective on dishonest responding as being more difficult than honest responding to a precise description of the underlying cognitive processes. The consideration of cognitive theories, empirical evidence, and paradigms from different research fields – dishonesty, cognitive control and sensorimotor stage models of information processing – lay the groundwork for the research questions and methodological approach of this thesis.
The experiments pinpoint the underlying conflict of dishonest responding in the central, capacity-limited stage of information processing (Experiments 1 to 4), but they also demonstrate that cognitive control processes (Experiments 5 to 7) and the internalization of false alibis (Experiments 8 to 11) can reduce or even completely eliminate this conflict. The data reveals great flexibility at the cognitive basis of dishonest responding: On the one hand, dishonest responding appears to rely heavily on capacity-limited processes of response selection to overcome honest response tendencies alongside up- and downstream consequences of response activation and monitoring. On the other hand, agents have powerful tools to mitigate these effortful processes through control adaptation and false alibis. These results support and expand current theorizing of the cognitive underpinnings of dishonest responding. Furthermore, they are alerting from an applied perspective on the detection of lies, especially when considering the flexibility of even basic cognitive processes in the face of false alibis. A promising way to move forward from here would be a fine-grained discrimination of response activation, passive decay and active inhibition of honest representations in dishonest responding and the assessment of the adaptiveness of these processes.
The present thesis addresses cognitive processing of voice information. Based on general theoretical concepts regarding mental processes it will differentiate between modular, abstract information processing approaches to cognition and interactive, embodied ideas of mental processing. These general concepts will then be transferred to the context of processing voice-related information in the context of parallel face-related processing streams. One central issue here is whether and to what extent cognitive voice processing can occur independently, that is, encapsulated from the simultaneous processing of visual person-related information (and vice versa). In Study 1 (Huestegge & Raettig, in press), participants are presented with audio-visual stimuli displaying faces uttering digits.
Audiovisual gender congruency was manipulated: There were male and female faces, each uttering digits with either a male or female voice (all stimuli were AV- synchronized). Participants were asked to categorize the gender of either the face or the voice by pressing one of two keys in each trial. A central result was that audio-visual gender congruency affected performance: Incongruent stimuli were categorized slower and more error-prone, suggesting a strong cross-modal interaction of the underlying visual and auditory processing routes. Additionally, the effect of incongruent visual information on auditory classification was stronger than the effect of incongruent auditory information on visual categorization, suggesting visual dominance over auditory processing in the context of gender classification. A gender congruency effect was also present under high cognitive load. Study 2 (Huestegge, Raettig, & Huestegge, in press) utilized the same (gender-congruent and -incongruent) stimuli, but different tasks for the participants, namely categorizing the spoken digits (into odd/even or smaller/larger than 5). This should effectively direct attention away from gender information, which was no longer task-relevant. Nevertheless, congruency effects were still observed in this study. This suggests a relatively automatic processing of cross-modal gender information, which
eventually affects basic speech-based information processing. Study 3 (Huestegge, subm.) focused on the ability of participants to match unfamiliar voices to (either static or dynamic) faces. One result was that participants were indeed able to match voices to faces. Moreover, there was no evidence for any performance increase when dynamic (vs. mere static) faces had to be matched to concurrent voices. The results support the idea that common person-related source information affects both vocal and facial features, and implicit corresponding knowledge appears to be used by participants to successfully complete face-voice matching. Taken together, the three studies (Huestegge, subm.; Huestegge & Raettig, in press; Huestegge et al., in press) provided information to further develop current theories of voice processing (in the context of face processing). On a general level, the results of all three studies are not in line with an abstract, modular view of cognition, but rather lend further support to interactive, embodied accounts of mental processing.
Human actions are generally not determined by external stimuli, but by internal goals and by the urge to evoke desired effects in the environment. To reach these effects, humans typically have to act. But at times, deciding not to act can be better suited or even the only way to reach a desired effect. What mental processes are involved when people decide not to act to reach certain effects? From the outside it may seem that nothing remarkable is happening, because no action can be observed. However, I present three studies which disclose the cognitive processes that control nonactions.
The present experiments address situations where people intentionally decide to omit certain actions in order to produce a predictable effect in the environment. These experiments are based on the ideomotor hypothesis, which suggests that bidirectional associations can be formed between actions and the resulting effects. Because of these associations, anticipating the effects can in turn activate the respective action. The results of the present experiments show that associations can be formed between nonactions (i.e., the intentional decision not to act) and the resulting effects. Due to these associations, perceiving the nonaction effects encourages not acting (Exp. 1–3). What is more, planning a nonaction seems to come with an activation of the effects that inevitably follow the nonaction (Exp. 4–5). These results suggest that the ideomotor hypothesis can be expanded to nonactions and that nonactions are cognitively represented in terms of their sensory effects. Furthermore, nonaction effects can elicit a sense of agency (Exp. 6–8). That is, even though people refrain from acting, the resulting nonaction effects are perceived as self-produced effects.
In a nutshell, these findings demonstrate that intentional nonactions include specific mechanisms and processes, which are involved, for instance, in effect anticipation and the sense of agency. This means that, while it may seem that nothing remarkable is happening when people decide not to act, complex processes run on the inside, which are also involved in intentional actions.
Cross-Modal Action Control
(2016)
Nowadays, multitasking is ubiquitously discussed within many different scientific disciplines. The present work addressed multitasking from the perspective of cognitive behavioural sciences by investigating the role of conflict resolution processes that arise during the requirements of multiple-action control. More specifically, the present work focuses on cognitive mechanisms in the case of cross-modal action control, which involves the performance of two actions in different effector systems. One aim was to broaden the scope of action modalities typically considered in the literature by studying oculomotor responses (i.e. saccades) – an action modality that has been largely neglected in previous research – in combination with responses in other effector systems (i.e. manual and vocal responses). A further aim was to specify the mechanisms of crosstalk as an explanatory concept referring to the action content, which is particularly relevant since cross-modal actions usually differ regarding their response characteristics. The present work comprises four studies (each involving two or three experiments).
In Study A, cross-modal response compounds based on a single stimulus were studied with respect to the interplay of the presence of response alternatives and between-response compatibility (i.e. crosstalk potential). In three experiments, this study showed that crosstalk can be dissociated into a component that determines the amount of current conflict (i.e. online crosstalk) and a memory-based component that originates either from residual activation of previous action demands (retrospective crosstalk) or from preparation for future demands (prospective crosstalk).
Study B provided first evidence that oculomotor responses are subject to interference based on both structural and content-based origins. In three experiments, an overlapping tasks paradigm was employed in which the onsets between two stimuli that triggered oculomotor and manual responses were varied. Evidence for both serial and parallel processing of the two tasks was found. The results further indicated that based on the between-task compatibility participants shifted between these processing modes, i.e. to more parallel processing during compatible task demands and to more serial processing during incompatible task demands.
Study C examined processing priorities among effector systems and demonstrated in two experiments that the previously reported prioritisation scheme, in which the oculomotor system is prioritised over the vocal and manual effector system, can be replicated, but is also adjusted in its strength by the presence of response conflict. Specifically, processing priorities were shifted towards the response that already is involved in conflict resolution (in terms of stimulus-response compatibility), suggesting that processing priorities can be flexibly adapted to particular task demands.
Study D addressed response order control in dual tasks, an issue that has been widely neglected in previous research. In a comprehensive study of three experiments including several factors that are known to be relevant for dual-task interference mechanisms, it was shown that the final response order in a given trial is the result of a continuous adjustment process based on the interplay of several top-down factors, such as the anticipation of response characteristics, and bottom-up factors, such as stimulus order and between-task compatibility.
In summary, the present work advances the theoretical understanding of complex action control by providing a cross-modal action perspective, by proposing mechanisms for effector-system prioritisation and response order control, and by proposing a novel taxonomy of crosstalk as an overarching framework for interference mechanisms in multiple-response control.
Mediators of Social Anxiety - External Social Threat-Cues vs. Self-Related Negative Cognitions
(2009)
Based on a review of models and empirical findings a working model is proposed, suggesting that self-related negative cognitions and biased processing of external social threat-cues are mediators of social anxiety. Hypotheses derived from this model were tested in three experiments. The first experiment examined whether levels of trait social anxiousness predicted fearful responding to external social threat-cues (angry vs. neutral and happy facial expressions) during social evaluation. Higher trait social anxiousness predisposes to an inward focus on one’s fear reaction to social threat. Using this strategy was expected to enhance fearful responding to angry facial expressions. A strategy of identifying with angry faces was expected to counteract fearful responding, but was expected to fail more often with increasing levels of trait social anxiousness. To examine these hypotheses, affective modulation of the startle eye-blink was assessed in forty-four undergraduate students. This measure served as a probe into the activation of brain structures involved in the automatic evaluation of environmental threat-cues. Trait and state anxiety as well as explicit emotional responding to the stimuli were assessed with questionnaires and ratings. Processing angry faces potentiated startle amplitudes as expected. Low arousal induced by the stimuli was a probable reason, why startle potentiation to happy faces emerged instead of attenuation. Trait social anxiousness and the cognitive strategies did not influence these effects. Yet, increased trait social anxiousness predicted decreased startle latency, indicating motor hyper-responsivity, which is part of the clinical representation of social anxiety disorder (SAD). Processing facial expressions and identifying with them disrupted this association. Previous studies support that similar strategies may enhance treatment of SAD. Individuals with SAD were expected to respond with increased arousal to external social threat-cues. Therefore, the second experiment examined whether nine individuals with SAD showed attentional (prepulse inhibition, PPI) or affective startle modulation to angry as compared to neutral and happy facial expressions. Corrugator supercilii activity was assessed as a behavioral indicator for effects of facial expressions. The remaining setup resembled the first experiment. Facial expressions did not modulate the startle reflex, but corrugator supercilii activity was sensitive to facial valence. However, the effects were not related to trait social anxiousness. Apparently, angry facial expressions do not act as phobic stimuli for individuals with SAD. The third experiment examined whether focusing on self-related negative cognitions or biased processing of external social threat-cues mediates relationships between trait social anxiety and anxious responding in a socially challenging situation. Inducing self-related negative cognitions vs. relaxation was expected to reveal a functional dependency on the supposed mediation in a multivariate assessment of criteria of the working model. Within this design, the impact of external social threat-cues (facial expressions and emotional words) was compared to control stimuli and context effects, using the startle paradigm. The findings provide first evidence for full statistical mediation of the associations between trait social anxiety and self-reported anxiety as well as parasympathetic withdrawal by self-related negative cognitions, when thirty-six undergraduate students anticipated public speaking. Apprehensive arousal, as indicated by increased skin conductance levels and heart rate, was present in all participants. Observer ratings of behavior during public speaking matched the self-rated quality of the performance. None of these measures were correlated with trait social anxiousness. Startle amplitude correlated with state and trait social anxiety, but was no mediator. Finally, there was no affective modulation of the startle amplitude by external social threat-cues. These studies advance both our current understanding of the factors that mediate social anxiety responses to situations and our knowledge of the physiological and anatomical mechanisms involved in social anxiety. Based on these findings a revised version of the working model on mediators of social anxiety is proposed in the hope it may aid further research for the ultimate goal of developing an empirically validated functional anatomical model of social anxiety.