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Subject of the present study is the agent-based computer simulation of Agent Island. Agent Island is a macroeconomic model, which belongs to the field of monetary theory. Agent-based modeling is an innovative tool that made much progress in other scientific fields like medicine or logistics. In economics this tool is quite new, and in monetary theory to this date virtual no agent-based simulation model has been developed. It is therefore the topic of this study to close this gap to some extend. Hence, the model integrates in a straightforward way next to the common private sectors (i.e. households, consumer goods firms and capital goods firms) and as an innovation a banking system, a central bank and a monetary circuit. Thereby, the central bank controls the business cycle via an interest rate policy; the according mechanism builds on the seminal idea of Knut Wicksell (natural rate of interest vs. money rate of interest). In addition, the model contains also many Keynesian features and a flow-of-funds accounting system in the tradition of Wolfgang Stützel. Importantly, one objective of the study is the validation of Agent Island, which means that the individual agents (i.e. their rules, variables and parameters) are adjusted in such a way that on the aggregate level certain phenomena emerge. The crucial aspect of the modeling and the validation is therefore the relation between the micro and macro level: Every phenomenon on the aggregate level (e.g. some stylized facts of the business cycle, the monetary transmission mechanism, the Phillips curve relationship, the Keynesian paradox of thrift or the course of the business cycle) emerges out of individual actions and interactions of the many thousand agents on Agent Island. In contrast to models comprising a representative agent, we do not apply a modeling on the aggregate level; and in contrast to orthodox GE models, true interaction between heterogeneous agents takes place (e.g. by face-to-face-trading).
Dezentrale, wettbewerblich organisierte föderale Ordnungen, bei denen zentrale Kompetenzen auf niedrigen institutionellen Ebenen liegen und in denen Gebietskörperschaften eine vergleichsweise geringe Größe aufweisen, sind mit beträchtlichen Vorteilen verbunden. So ist es besser möglich, den Präferenzen der Bürger gerecht zu werden. Außerdem wird ein höheres Wirtschaftswachstum angeregt. Die in der Theorie genannten Nachteile (unausgeschöpfte Größenvorteile, negative Auswirkungen externer Effekte, race to the bottom bei öffentlichen Leistungen und Sozialstaat) finden hingegen nur geringe empirische Bestätigung. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist der kooperative Föderalismus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland kritisch zu bewerten. Insbesondere der Länderfinanzausgleich als Kernelement der bundesstaatlichen Ordnung in Deutschland ist ineffizient und bremst das Wirtschaftswachstum. Um von den Vorteilen dezentraler, wettbewerblicher föderaler Ordnungen profitieren zu können, sollte den Bundesländern insbesondere substanzielle Finanzautonomie eingeräumt werden. Die Heterogenität politischer Präferenzen abhängig von gewählter staatlicher Ebene, Größe von Gebietskörperschaften und simulierten Länderneugliederungen wurde anhand von Bundestagswahlergebnissen untersucht. Die entsprechende Analyse befindet sich als Anhang an dieser Stelle, während die Dissertation in gedruckter Form erschienen ist.
This thesis deals with the economics of innovation. In a general introduction we illustrate how several aspects of competition policy are linked to firms' innovation incentives. In three individual essays we analyze more specific issues. The first essay deals with interdependencies of mergers and innovation incentives. This is particularly relevant as both topics are central elements of a firm's competitive strategy. The essay focuses on the impact of mergers on innovative activity and competition in the product market. Possible inefficiencies due to organizational problems of mergers are accounted for. We show that optimal investment strategies depend on the resulting market structure and differ significantly from insider to outsider. In our linear model mergers turn out to increase social surplus. The second essay analyzes the different competitive advantages of large and small firms in innovation competition. While large firms typically have a better access to product markets, small firms often have a superior research efficiency. These distinct advantages immediately lead to the question of cooperations between firms. In our model we allow large firms to acquire small firms. In a pre-contest acquisition game large firms bid sequentially for small firms in order to combine respective advantages. Innovation competition is modeled as a patent contest. Sequential bidding allows the first large firms to bid strategically to induce a reaction of its competitor. For high efficiencies large firms prefer to acquire immediately, leading to a symmetric market structure. For low efficiencies strategic waiting of the first large firm leads to an asymmetric market structure even though the initial situation is symmetric. Furthermore, acquisitions increase the chances for successful innovation. The third essay deals with government subsidies to innovation. Government subsidies for research and development are intended to promote projects with high returns to society but too little private returns to be beneficial for private investors. Apart from the direct funding of these projects, government grants may serve as a signal of good investments for private investors. We use a simple signaling model to capture this phenomenon and allow for two types of risk classes. The agency has a preference for high risk projects as they promise high expected social returns, whereas banks prefer low risk projects with high private returns. In a setup where the subsidy can only be used to distinguish between high and low risk projects, government agency's signal is not very helpful for banks' investment decision. However, if the subsidy is accompanied by a quality signal, it may lead to increased or better selected private investments. The last chapter summarizes the main findings and presents some concluding remarks on the results of the essays.
Die grundlegende Idee dieser Abhandlung liegt in der Vorstellung begründet, dass sich Wettbewerbspolitik nicht auf den Wettkampf konzentrieren sollte. Die traditionelle Vorgehensweise analysiert Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen auf einzelnen Märkten und fordert gegebenenfalls ein wettbewerbspolitisches Eingreifen. Zumeist wird dabei die Existenz des 'spirit of competition' und damit ein aktiver Wettkampf gefordert. Diese Sichtweise ist jedoch symptomatisch auf den einzelnen Markt gerichtet. Stattdessen sollten die grundlegenden Rahmenbedingungen analysiert werden. Wettbewerbspolitik würde sich somit auf die Schaffung von Wettbewerbschancen konzentrieren. Gerade die Umsetzung einer derart gestalteten Wettbewerbspolitik dürfte schwierig sein und erfordert insbesondere ein politökonomisches Fundament. Daher wird hier ein konkreter Vorschlag konkretisiert, der Elemente der direkte Demokratie, der Gewaltenteilung und eine verstärkte politische Meinungsbildung beinhaltet. Die herkömmliche Wettbewerbspolitik unterliegt folglich drei grundlegenden Mängel: Zunächst ist sie durch eine mangelnde Zielorientierung und zahlreiche Zielkonflikte gekennzeichnet. Weiterhin ist sie symptomatisch auf Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen auf einzelnen Märkten konzentriert und vernachlässigt die jeweils relevanten Rahmenbedingungen. Schließlich wird die Wahl angemessener wettbewerbspolitischer Träger häufig vernachlässigt. Die Ziele dieser Arbeit sind darauf basierend die Begründung der Notwendigkeit einer Neuausrichtung, die Ausarbeitung der Grundzüge eines alternativen wettbewerbspolitischen Ansatzes und eine Abgrenzung dieses von geläufigen wettbewerbspolitischen Konzeptionen. Zur Analyse dient die Ableitung eines Referenzschemas auf fünf Ebenen der Wettbewerbspolitik. Dabei werden sieben Fallstudien in die Abhandlung integriert.
A comprehensive approach for currency crises theories stressing the role of the anchor country
(2008)
The approach is based on the finding that new generations of currency crises theories always had developed ex post after popular currency crises. Discussing the main theories of currency crises shows their disparity: The First Generation of currency crises models argues based on the assumption of a chronic budget deficit that is being monetized by the domestic central bank. The result is a trade-off between an expansionary monetary policy that is focused on the internal economic balance and a fixed exchange rate which is depending on the rules of interest parity and purchasing power parity. This imbalance inevitably results in a currency crisis. Altogether, this theory argues with a disrupted external balance on the foreign exchange market. Second Generation currency crises models on the other side focus on the internal macroeconomic balance. The stability of a fixed exchange rate is depending on the economic benefit of the exchange rate system in relation to the social costs of maintaining it. As soon as social costs are increasing and showing up in deteriorating fundamentals, this leads to a speculative attack on the fixed exchange rate system. The term Third Generation of currency crises finally summarizes a variety of currency crises theories. These are also arguing psychologically to explain phenomena as contagion and spill-over effects to rationalize crises detached from the fundamental situation. Apart from the apparent inconsistency of the main theories of currency crises, a further observation is that these explanations focus on the crisis country only while international monetary transmission effects are left out of consideration. These however are a central parameter for the stability of fixed exchange rate systems, in exchange rate theory as well as in empirical observations. Altogether, these findings provide the motivation for developing a theoretical approach which integrates the main elements of the different generations of currency crises theories and which integrates international monetary transmission. Therefore a macroeconomic approach is chosen applying the concept of the Monetary Conditions Index (MCI), a linear combination of the real interest rate and the real exchange rate. This index firstly is extended for international monetary influences and called MCIfix. MCIfix illustrates the monetary conditions required for the stability of a fixed exchange rate system. The central assumption of this concept is that the uncovered interest parity is maintained. The main conclusion is that the MCIfix only depends on exogenous parameters. In a second step, the analysis integrates the monetary policy requirements for achieving an internal macroeconomic stability. By minimizing a loss function of social welfare, a MCI is derived which pictures the economically optimal monetary policy MCIopt. Instability in a fixed exchange rate system occurs as soon as the monetary conditions for an internal and external balance are deviating. For discussing macroeconomic imbalances, the central parameters determining the MCIfix (and therefore the relation of MCIfix to MCIopt) are discussed: the real interest rate of the anchor country, the real effective exchange rate and a risk premium. Applying this theory framework, four constellations are discussed where MCIfix and MCIopt fall apart in order to show the central bank’s possibilities for reacting and the consequences of that behaviour. The discussion shows that the integrative approach manages to incorporate the central elements of traditional currency crises theories and that it includes international monetary transmission instead of reducing the discussion on an inconsistent domestic monetary policy. The theory framework for fixed exchange rates is finally applied in four case studies: the currency crises in Argentina, the crisis in the Czech Republic, the Asian currency crisis and the crisis of the European Monetary System. The case studies show that the developed monetary framework achieves integration of different generations of crises theories and that the monetary policy of the anchor country plays a decisive role in destabilising fixed exchange rate systems.