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Action binding refers to the observation that the perceived time of an action (e.g., a keypress) is shifted towards the distal sensory feedback (usually a sound) triggered by that action. Surprisingly, the role of somatosensory feedback for this phe-nomenon has been largely ignored. We fill this gap by showing that the somatosensory feedback, indexed by keypress peak force, is functional in judging keypress time. Specifically, the strength of somatosensory feedback is positively correlated with reported keypress time when the keypress is not associated with an auditory feedback and negatively correlated when the keypress triggers an auditory feedback. The result is consistent with the view that the reported keypress time is shaped by sensory information from different modalities. Moreover, individual differences in action binding can be explained by a sensory information weighting between somatosensory and auditory feedback. At the group level, increasing the strength of somatosensory feedback can decrease action binding to a level not being detected statistically. Therefore, a multisensory information integration account (between somatosensory and auditory inputs) explains action binding at both a group level and an individual level.
A commentary on: Feeling the Conflict: The Crucial Role of Conflict Experience in Adaptationby Desender, K., Van Opstal, F., and Van den Bussche, E. (2014). Psychol. Sci. 25, 675–683. doi:10.1177/0956797613511468
Conflict adaptation in masked priming has recently been proposed to rely not on successful conflictresolution but rather on conflict experience (Desender et al., 2014). We re-assessed this proposal ina direct replication and also tested a potential confound due toconflict strength. The data supported this alternative view, but also failed to replicate basic conflict adaptation effects of the original studydespite considerable power.
When telling a lie, humans might engage in stronger monitoring of their behavior than when telling the truth. Initial evidence has indeed pointed towards a stronger recruitment of capacity-limited monitoring processes in dishonest than honest responding, conceivably resulting from the necessity to overcome automatic tendencies to respond honestly. Previous results suggested monitoring to be confined to response execution, however, whereas the current study goes beyond these findings by specifically probing for post-execution monitoring. Participants responded (dis)honestly to simple yes/no questions in a first task and switched to an unrelated second task after a response–stimulus interval of 0 ms or 1000 ms. Dishonest responses did not only prolong response times in Task 1, but also in Task 2 with a short response–stimulus interval. These findings support the assumption that increased monitoring for dishonest responses extends beyond mere response execution, a mechanism that is possibly tuned to assess the successful completion of a dishonest act.
Little is known about the cognitive background of unconscious visuomotor control of complex sports movements. Therefore, we investigated the extent to which novices and skilled high-jump athletes are able to identify visually presented body postures of the high jump unconsciously. We also asked whether or not the manner of processing differs (qualitatively or quantitatively) between these groups as a function of their motor expertise. A priming experiment with not consciously perceivable stimuli was designed to determine whether subliminal priming of movement phases (same vs. different movement phases) or temporal order (i.e. natural vs. reversed movement order) affects target processing. Participants had to decide which phase of the high jump (approach vs. flight phase) a target photograph was taken from. We found a main effect of temporal order for skilled athletes, that is, faster reaction times for prime-target pairs that reflected the natural movement order as opposed to the reversed movement order. This result indicates that temporal-order information pertaining to the domain of expertise plays a critical role in athletes’ perceptual capacities. For novices, data analyses revealed an interaction between temporal order and movement phases. That is, only the reversed movement order of flight-approach pictures increased processing time. Taken together, the results suggest that the structure of cognitive movement representation modulates unconscious processing of movement pictures and points to a functional role of motor representations in visual perception.
Pointing is a ubiquitous means of communication. Nevertheless, observers systematically misinterpret the location indicated by pointers. We examined whether these misunderstandings result from the typically different viewpoints of pointers and observers. Participants either pointed themselves or interpreted points while assuming the pointer’s or a typical observer perspective in a virtual reality environment. The perspective had a strong effect on the relationship between pointing gestures and referents, whereas the task had only a minor influence. This suggests that misunderstandings between pointers and observers primarily result from their typically different viewpoints.
Models of eye-movement control distinguish between different control levels, ranging from automatic (bottom-up, stimulus-driven selection) and automatized (based on well-learned routines) to voluntary (top-down, goal-driven selection, e.g., based on instructions). However, one type of voluntary control has yet only been examined in the manual and not in the oculomotor domain, namely free-choice selection among arbitrary targets, that is, targets that are of equal interest from both a bottom-up and top-down processing perspective. Here, we ask which features of targets (identity- or location-related) are used to determine such oculomotor free-choice behavior. In two experiments, participants executed a saccade to one of four peripheral targets in three different choice conditions: unconstrained free choice, constrained free choice based on target identity (color), and constrained free choice based on target location. The analysis of choice frequencies revealed that unconstrained free-choice selection closely resembled constrained choice based on target location. The results suggest that free-choice oculomotor control is mainly guided by spatial (location-based) target characteristics. We explain these results by assuming that participants tend to avoid less parsimonious recoding of target-identity representations into spatial codes, the latter being a necessary prerequisite to configure oculomotor commands.
We examined whether movement costs as defined by movement magnitude have an impact on distance perception in near space. In Experiment 1, participants were given a numerical cue regarding the amplitude of a hand movement to be carried out. Before the movement execution, the length of a visual distance had to be judged. These visual distances were judged to be larger, the larger the amplitude of the concurrently prepared hand movement was. In Experiment 2, in which numerical cues were merely memorized without concurrent movement planning, this general increase of distance with cue size was not observed. The results of these experiments indicate that visual perception of near space is specifically affected by the costs of planned hand movements.
The present study explored the origin of perceptual changes repeatedly observed in the context of actions. In Experiment 1, participants tried to hit a circular target with a stylus movement under restricted feedback conditions. We measured the perception of target size during action planning and observed larger estimates for larger movement distances. In Experiment 2, we then tested the hypothesis that this action specific influence on perception is due to changes in the allocation of spatial attention. For this purpose, we replaced the hitting task by conditions of focused and distributed attention and measured the perception of the former target stimulus. The results revealed changes in the perceived stimulus size very similar to those observed in Experiment 1. These results indicate that action's effects on perception root in changes of spatial attention.
The present study examined the perceptual consequences of learning arbitrary mappings between visual stimuli and hand movements. Participants moved a small cursor with their unseen hand twice to a large visual target object and then judged either the relative distance of the hand movements (Exp.1), or the relative number of dots that appeared in the two consecutive target objects (Exp.2) using a two-alternative forced choice method. During a learning phase, the numbers of dots that appeared in the target object were correlated with the hand movement distance. In Exp.1, we observed that after the participants were trained to expect many dots with larger hand movements, they judged movements made to targets with many dots as being longer than the same movements made to targets with few dots. In Exp.2, another group of participants who received the same training judged the same number of dots as smaller when larger rather than smaller hand movements were executed. When many dots were paired with smaller hand movements during the learning phase of both experiments, no significant changes in the perception of movements and of visual stimuli were observed. These results suggest that changes in the perception of body states and of external objects can arise when certain body characteristics co-occur with certain characteristics of the environment. They also indicate that the (dis)integration of multimodal perceptual signals depends not only on the physical or statistical relation between these signals, but on which signal is currently attended.
Neuroanatomical variations across the visual field of human observers go along with corresponding variations of the perceived coarseness of visual stimuli. Here we show that horizontal gratings are perceived as having lower spatial frequency than vertical gratings when occurring along the horizontal meridian of the visual field, whereas gratings occurring along the vertical meridian show the exact opposite effect. This finding indicates a new peculiarity of processes operating along the cardinal axes of the visual field.
Changes in body perception often arise when observers are confronted with related yet discrepant multisensory signals. Some of these effects are interpreted as outcomes of sensory integration of various signals, whereas related biases are ascribed to learning-dependent recalibration of coding individual signals. The present study explored whether the same sensorimotor experience entails changes in body perception that are indicative of multisensory integration and those that indicate recalibration. Participants enclosed visual objects by a pair of visual cursors controlled by finger movements. Then either they judged their perceived finger posture (indicating multisensory integration) or they produced a certain finger posture (indicating recalibration). An experimental variation of the size of the visual object resulted in systematic and opposite biases of the perceived and produced finger distances. This pattern of results is consistent with the assumption that multisensory integration and recalibration had a common origin in the task we used.
Previous research has revealed changes in the perception of objects due to changes of object-oriented actions. In present study, we varied the arm and finger postures in the context of a virtual reaching and grasping task and tested whether this manipulation can simultaneously affect the perceived size and distance of external objects. Participants manually controlled visual cursors, aiming at reaching and enclosing a distant target object, and judged the size and distance of this object. We observed that a visual-proprioceptive discrepancy introduced during the reaching part of the action simultaneously affected the judgments of target distance and of target size (Experiment 1). A related variation applied to the grasping part of the action affected the judgments of size, but not of distance of the target (Experiment 2). These results indicate that perceptual effects observed in the context of actions can directly arise through sensory integration of multimodal redundant signals and indirectly through perceptual constancy mechanisms.
Action feedback affects the perception of action-related objects beyond actual action success
(2014)
Successful object-oriented action typically increases the perceived size of aimed target objects. This phenomenon has been assumed to reflect an impact of an actor's current action ability on visual perception. The actual action ability and the explicit knowledge of action outcome, however, were confounded in previous studies. The present experiments aimed at disentangling these two factors. Participants repeatedly tried to hit a circular target varying in size with a stylus movement under restricted feedback conditions. After each movement they were explicitly informed about the success in hitting the target and were then asked to judge target size. The explicit feedback regarding movement success was manipulated orthogonally to actual movement success. The results of three experiments indicated the participants' bias to judge relatively small targets as larger and relatively large targets as smaller after explicit feedback of failure than after explicit feedback of success. This pattern was independent of the actual motor performance, suggesting that the actors' evaluations of motor actions may bias perception of target objects in itself.
It has been argued that several reported non-visual influences on perception cannot be truly perceptual. If they were, they should affect the perception of target objects and reference objects used to express perceptual judgments, and thus cancel each other out. This reasoning presumes that non-visual manipulations impact target objects and comparison objects equally. In the present study we show that equalizing a body-related manipulation between target objects and reference objects essentially abolishes the impact of that manipulation so as it should do when that manipulation actually altered perception. Moreover, the manipulation has an impact on judgements when applied to only the target object but not to the reference object, and that impact reverses when only applied to the reference object but not to the target object. A perceptual explanation predicts this reversal, whereas explanations in terms of post-perceptual response biases or demand effects do not. Altogether these results suggest that body-related influences on perception cannot as a whole be attributed to extra-perceptual factors.
It has been proposed that statistical integration of multisensory cues may be a suitable framework to explain temporal binding, that is, the finding that causally related events such as an action and its effect are perceived to be shifted towards each other in time. A multisensory approach to temporal binding construes actions and effects as individual sensory signals, which are each perceived with a specific temporal precision. When they are integrated into one multimodal event, like an action-effect chain, the extent to which they affect this event's perception depends on their relative reliability. We test whether this assumption holds true in a temporal binding task by manipulating certainty of actions and effects. Two experiments suggest that a relatively uncertain sensory signal in such action-effect sequences is shifted more towards its counterpart than a relatively certain one. This was especially pronounced for temporal binding of the action towards its effect but could also be shown for effect binding. Other conceptual approaches to temporal binding cannot easily explain these results, and the study therefore adds to the growing body of evidence endorsing a multisensory approach to temporal binding.
Objects which a human agent controls by efferent activities (such as real or virtual tools) can be perceived by the agent as belonging to his or her body. This suggests that what an agent counts as “body” is plastic, depending on what she or he controls. Yet there are possible limitations for such momentary plasticity. One of these limitations is that sensations stemming from the body (e.g., proprioception) and sensations stemming from objects outside the body (e.g., vision) are not integrated if they do not sufficiently “match”. What “matches” and what does not is conceivably determined by long–term experience with the perceptual changes that body movements typically produce. Children have accumulated less sensorimotor experience than adults have. Consequently, they express higher flexibility to integrate body-internal and body-external signals, independent of their “match” as suggested by rubber hand illusion studies. However, children’s motor performance in tool use is more affected by mismatching body-internal and body-external action effects than that of adults, possibly because of less developed means to overcome such mismatches. We review research on perception-action interactions, multisensory integration, and developmental psychology to build bridges between these research fields. By doing so, we account for the flexibility of the sense of body ownership for actively controlled events and its development through ontogeny. This gives us the opportunity to validate the suggested mechanisms for generating ownership by investigating their effects in still developing and incomplete stages in children. We suggest testable predictions for future studies investigating both body ownership and motor skills throughout the lifespan.
Spatial action–effect binding denotes the mutual attraction between the perceived position of an effector (e.g., one’s own hand) and a distal object that is controlled by this effector. Such spatial binding can be construed as an implicit measure of object ownership, thus the belonging of a controlled object to the own body. The current study investigated how different transformations of hand movements (body-internal action component) into movements of a visual object (body-external action component) affect spatial action–effect binding, and thus implicit object ownership. In brief, participants had to bring a cursor on the computer screen into a predefined target position by moving their occluded hand on a tablet and had to estimate their final hand position. In Experiment 1, we found a significantly lower drift of the proprioceptive position of the hand towards the visual object when hand movements were transformed into laterally inverted cursor movements, rather than cursor movements in the same direction. Experiment 2 showed that this reduction reflected an elimination of spatial action–effect binding in the inverted condition. The results are discussed with respect to the prerequisites for an experience of ownership over artificial, noncorporeal objects. Our results show that predictability of an object movement alone is not a sufficient condition for ownership because, depending on the type of transformation, integration of the effector and a distal object can be fully abolished even under conditions of full controllability.
Movements of a tool typically diverge from the movements of the hand manipulating that tool, such as when operating a pivotal lever where tool and hand move in opposite directions. Previous studies suggest that humans are often unaware of the position or movements of their effective body part (mostly the hand) in such situations. It has been suggested that this might be due to a "haptic neglect" of bodily sensations to decrease the interference of representations of body and tool movements. However, in principle this interference could also be decreased by neglecting sensations regarding the tool and focusing instead on body movements. While in most tool use situations the tool-related action effects are task-relevant and thus suppression of body-related rather than tool-related sensations is more beneficial for successful goal achievement, we manipulated this task-relevance in a controlled experiment. The results showed that visual, tool-related effect representations can be suppressed just as proprioceptive, body-related ones in situations where effect representations interfere, given that task-relevance of body-related effects is increased relative to tool-related ones.
Perceptual changes that an agent produces by efferent activity can become part of the agent’s minimal self. Yet, in human agents, efferent activities produce perceptual changes in various sensory modalities and in various temporal and spatial proximities. Some of these changes occur at the “biological” body, and they are to some extent conveyed by “private” sensory signals, whereas other changes occur in the environment of that biological body and are conveyed by “public” sensory signals. We discuss commonalties and differences of these signals for generating selfhood. We argue that despite considerable functional overlap of these sensory signals in generating self-experience, there are reasons to tell them apart in theorizing and empirical research about development of the self.