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One’s own name constitutes a unique part of conscious awareness – but does this also hold true for unconscious processing? The present study shows that the own name has the power to bias a person’s actions unconsciously even in conditions that render any other name ineffective. Participants judged whether a letter string on the screen was a name or a non-word while this target stimulus was preceded by a masked prime stimulus. Crucially, the participant’s own name was among these prime stimuli and facilitated reactions to following name targets whereas the name of another, yoked participant did not. Signal detection results confirmed that participants were not aware of any of the prime stimuli, including their own name. These results extend traditional findings on ‘‘breakthrough’’ phenomena of personally relevant stimuli to the domain of unconscious processing. Thus, the brain seems to possess adroit mechanisms to identify and process such stimuli even in the absence of conscious awareness.
A comparative study of diabetics with autonomic neuropathy (N = 13) as against nonneuropathic diabetics (N = 16) and healthy control persons (N = 20) was carried out with respect 10 heart rate both at rest and under stress, frequency of cardiac arrhythmias in a 24-h ECG and accuracy of heartbeat and arrhythmia perception. In the subjects with diabetic autonomic neuropathy, the spontaneaus variability and stress-induced reactivity of the heart rate as weil as the number of tachycardic episodes were reduced, whereas the frequency of ventricular extrasystoles was somewhat increased. Impaired heartbeat perception and a complete Ioss of perception of arrhythmias as a consequence of neuropathic deafferentation could be demonstrated. Cardiac perception disordersalso playavital roJe in other clinical problems, e.g. silent myocardial infarction and Iack of awareness of hypoglycaemia in diabetes mellitus.
Brain potentials during mental arithmetic: effects of extensive practice and problem difficulty
(1994)
Recent behavioral investigations indicate that the processes underlying mental arithmetic change systematically with practice from deliberate, conscious calculation to automatic, direct retrieval of answers from memory [Bourne, L.E.Jr. and Rickard, T.C., Mental calculation: The development of a cognitive skill, Paper presented at the Interamerican Congress of Psychology, San Jose, Costa Rica, 1991; Psychol. Rev., 95 (1988) 492-527]. Results reviewed by Moscovitch and Winocur [In: The handbook of aging and cognition, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, 1992, pp. 315-372] suggest that consciously controlled processes are more dependent on frontal lobe function than are automatic processes. It is appropriate, therefore to determine whether transitions in the locus of primary brain activity occur with practice on mental calculation. In this experiment, we examine the relationship between characteristics of event-related brain potentials (ERPs) and mental arithmetic. Single-digit mental multiplication problems varying in difficulty (problem size) were used, and subjects were trained on these problems for four sessions. Problem-size and practice effects were reliably found in behavioral measures (RT). The ERP was characterized by a pronounced late positivity after task presentation followed by a slow wave, and a negativity during response indication. These components responded differentially to the practice and problem-size manipulations. Practice mainly affected topography of the amplitude of positivity and offset latency of slow wave, and problem-size mainly offset latency of slow wave and pre-response negativity. Fronto-central positivity diminished from session to session, and the focus of positivity centered finally at centro-parietal regions. This finding suggests that frontal lobe processing is necessary as long as task performance is not automatized, while automatized arithmetic processing requires parietal brain activity only. The pre-response negativity observed in the first session and during more difficult tasks is assumed to reflect excitatory preparatory processes, which could be associated with activation of calculation strategies.
In panic disorder bodily sensations appear to play an important role as a trigger for anxiety. In our psychophysiological model of panic attacks we postulate the following vicious circle: individuals with panic attacks perceive even quite small increases in heart rate and interpret these changes as being catastrophic. This elicits anxiety and a further increase in heart rate. To evaluate this model we conducted a field study of 28 subjects with panic attacks and 20 healthy controls. A 24 hr ambulatory ECG was recorded and the subjects were instructed to report any cardiac perceptions during this period and to rate the anxiety elicited by these perceptions. The incidence of cardiac perceptions was about the same in both groups, but only subjects with panic attacks reported anxiety associated with such perceptions. Analysis of the ECGs revealed that in both groups heart rate accelerations preceded cardiac perceptions. Following cardiac perceptions, the healthy controls showed a heart rate deceleration, whereas the subjects with panic attacks had a further acceleration. This heart rate increase after cardiac perceptions was positively related to the level of anxiety elicited by the perceptions. These results provide clear evidence in support of the vicious circle model of panic attacks.
According to more recent studies on memory development in young children, preschoolers and kindergarteners are able to demonstrate surprisingly good memory skills in natural as weH as in laboratory-type settings. This finding is not consistent with the results of a study by Istomina (1975), conducted in 1948, leading to the concJusion that (a) preschoolers do not use voluntary remembering, and (b) children generally recall better in play situations than in typical experimental settings. In this study, two experiments were conducted to replicate Istomina's research. In the first, it was shown that Istomina's findings were replicable when methodological problems in the procedure were ignored. Experiment 2 improved methodologically upon Istomina's experimental methods and did not produce results to support her concJusions. Four- and 6-year-olds showed voluntary memory in play activities as weH as in laboratory-type settings, and remembered equally weB in both contexts. The results did not support the assumption that memory performance in young children can be substantially facilitated by motivating contexts.
The present research examined whether children's awareness of phonological similarities between words with respect to rhyme and consonantal word onset is of the same importance for learning to read German as it was found to be for learning to read English. In two longitudinal studies differences in phonological sensitivity among children before learning to read (at age 6 to 7) were tested with versions of Bradley & Bryant's (1985) oddity detection task. Children's reading and spelling achievements were tested about one year later at the end of grade one, and again at around the age of 10. The main finding was a developmental change in the predictive relationship of rhyme and word-onset awareness. Rhyme awareness was only minimally predictive for reading and spelling achievement at the end of grade one, but gained substantially in predictive importance for reading and spelling achievement in grades three and four. No such predictive improvement was observed for word-onset awareness. It is proposed that rhyme awareness is initially of little importance, because in the first phase of learning to read German children rely heavily on indirect word recognition via grapheme--phoneme translation and blending. The gain in the predictive importance of rhyme awareness is explained by its helpful effect on the establishment of mental representations of written words. Such mental representations allow fast, direct word recognition and orthographically correct spellings. A wareness of larger phonological units is helpful for the efficient establishment of such representations, by allowing connections of recurring grapheme clusters in written words with phonology.