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„Perspective-taking“ is the ability to put yourself into the place of somebody else. Psychological research distinguishes three kinds of perspective-taking, namely, perceptual (visuo-spatial), affective (empathy), and cognitive (theory of mind) perspective-taking. The last two kinds of perspective-taking are often summarized as “psychological perspective-taking”. This dissertation tackles the question of whether these three kinds of perspective-taking should be conceptualized as independent constructs or as facets of one and the same construct.
Prior research findings concerning this are equivocal. While some authors consider correlations between the different kinds of perspective-taking as too low for a unitary construct, others interpret correlations of the same magnitude as evidence for this. A less arbitrary way of deciding this would be to identify common mechanisms that underlie all kinds of perspective-taking and to examine whether manipulating these mechanisms in psychological experiments affects measures of perceptual, affective, and cognitive perspective-taking in parallel.
In accordance with this reasoning, the present dissertation assumes that the mental self-rotation of the body schema into the physical location of another person, the main mechanism of perceptual perspective-taking, is a common mechanism of all kinds of perspective-taking. Thus, contrary to previous research a unitary construct is not only justified on the grounds of a common central functionality of all kinds of perspective-taking, that is, overcoming one’s egocentrism in favor of an alternative (perceptual, affective or cognitive) point of view, but additionally on the grounds of a common psychological mechanism. From this, the simple hypothesis that inducing visuo-spatial perspective-taking also leads to psychological consequences is derived. This hypothesis was tested in 6 experiments.
In these experiments, participants first had to adopt the visual perspective of another person. To this end, they saw a person sitting at a table with two objects. During every trial, participants had to decide which hand the person would have to use in order to grab one of the two objects. Furthermore, the angular disparity between the participant and the target was manipulated in such a way that during half of the trials the target person was within the same visuo-spatial reference frame as the participant and thus no perspective-taking was necessary to solve the task correctly. During the remaining trials, the target person was sitting in another visuo-spatial reference frame so that the participants had to engage in perspective-taking to solve the task correctly. After every such trial, the target person was imbued with a mental state. This was done using an adapted paradigm for the investigation of the anchoring heuristic. Specifically, participants were asked to answer a trivia question and also saw what the target person from the visuo-spatial perspective-taking task was guessing.
In line with the hypothesis that visuo-spatial perspective-taking leads to psychological outcomes, too, it was found that participants adopted the thoughts of the target person more strongly after visuo-spatial perspective-taking. This was evident in the absolute size of the anchoring effect, as well as the differences between participant and target estimations. Further experiments ruled out sample and stimulus characteristics and task difficulty as alternative explanations for these effects. The last two experiments furthermore established that the effects were specific to constellations where an embodied self-rotation into the target’s perspective was necessary and that the adoption of the target’s thoughts was associated with feelings of similarity.
Taken together, these findings support the theoretically elaborated unitary view of perspective-taking and furthermore distinguish this construct from other related phenomena. In the general discussion, the significance of these findings for research on empathy, theory of mind, and perspective-taking, as well as practical implications are discussed.
To simplify a judgment, people often base it on easily accessible information. One cue that is usually readily available is processing fluency – a metacognitive feeling of ease of cognitive processing. Consequently, processing fluency is used as a cue for many different types of judgment, such as judgment of truth, confidence, and novelty. The present work describes results of three studies investigating various aspects of processing fluency effects on judgment.
Processing fluency has been sometimes equated with speed of a cognitive process. Therefore, response times have been used for evaluation of processing fluency. However, response times in experimental tasks often do not encompass only the time needed for a given process, but also the time needed for a decision based on the resulting information. The study described in Chapter II uses a novel experimental method that enables separation of reading and decision times. The results show that people make a decision about liking of pseudowords faster when the pseudowords are hard-to-pronounce (i.e., disfluent) than when they are moderate in pronounceability. This suggests that response times cannot be used as a proxy for processing fluency when they include the time needed to make a decision.
One of the studies of judgmental effects of processing fluency showed that food additives with easier pronounceable names are judged to be less harmful than those with hard-to-pronounce names. While people encounter food additives that are safe more often, this environmental association may be in the opposite direction for some categories of objects. For example, people are more likely to see names of especially dangerous criminals in the news. Chapter III describes a study which initially tested whether the fluency-safety association may be in the opposite direction for some categories of objects as a consequence of this selective exposure to especially dangerous exemplars. The results did not show support for this hypothesis. Furthermore, subsequent studies suggest that the previously found association between fluency and safety is replicable with the original stimuli used in the previous research, but not with newly constructed stimuli.
Chapter IV describes a study which applied a finding from the processing fluency literature to a positive psychology exercise in order to increase its effectiveness. Namely, the experiment manipulated the number of good things that participants listed daily for two weeks as part of the exercise. While listing more things was considered harder, the number of things listed each day had no effect on effectiveness of the exercise.