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Die vorliegende Studie liefert in drei gleichrangigen Teilen empirische Befunde zu den Steuern und Beiträgen auf lokaler Ebene.
In den ersten beiden Teilen wird die Realsteuerpolitik deutscher Kommunen quantitativ datenempirisch und qualitativ in Form einer Expertenbefragung untersucht. Hierbei wird insbesondere der Frage nachgegangen, welche Determinanten das gemeindliche Hebesatzniveau bei der Gewerbesteuer und den Grundsteuern A und B bestimmen.
Der dritte Teil analysiert die Beitragseinnahmen der Industrie- und Handelskammern. Der IHK-Beitrag ist deren zentrale Einnahmeposition und knüpft ebenfalls an der gewerbesteuerlichen Bemessungsgrundlage an. Die Abhängigkeit von einer zum Teil volatilen Bemessungsgrundlage stellt die Kammern bei ihrer Budgetplanung vor große Herausforderungen. Zur Steigerung der Planungsgenauigkeit wurde ein Prognosemodell entwickelt, das einen präziseren Rückschluss auf künftige Beitragseinnahmen zulässt.
In der vorliegenden Studie wird ein entscheidungsmodelltheoretischer Ansatz verwendet, um unter Vernachlässigung von Unsicherheit und Risiko Kennzahlen zu entwickeln, die verschiedene Formen der Altersvorsorge miteinander vergleichbar machen. Zu diesem Zweck werden die steuer- und sozialversicherungsrechtlichen Grundlagen für ausgewählte Altersvorsorgeformen (gesetzliche Rentenversicherung, Basisrentenversicherung, zulagengeförderte Altersvorsorge, betriebliche Altersversorgung und private Rentenversicherung) im Rechtsrahmen des Jahres 2020 erläutert. Darauf aufbauend wird ein eigenes System von Kennzahlen entwickelt, um die Vor- und Nachteile der jeweiligen Alterssicherungsform zu quantifizieren. Die Ergebnisse werden anhand von stilisierten Modellbiografien präsentiert und diskutiert. Eine abschließende Gesamtwürdigung fasst schließlich wesentliche Erkenntnisse zusammen.
Die Unabhängigkeit des Abschlussprüfers ist von anhaltender Relevanz, wird jedoch immer wieder in Frage gestellt. Der Fokus von Regulierungsbehörden und Forschung liegt auf kapitalmarktorientierten Unternehmen. Die Unabhängigkeit kann besonders gefährdet sein, wenn Schutzmechanismen, wie z. B. die Haftung oder das Risiko eines Reputationsverlustes, besonders schwach ausgeprägt sind. Es kann abgeleitet werden, dass bei privaten Unternehmen das Risiko eines Reputationsverlustes im Vergleich zu kapitalmarktorientierten Unternehmen geringer ist. Weiterhin ist das Haftungsrisiko für den Abschlussprüfer in Deutschland verglichen mit angelsächsischen Ländern geringer.
Damit untersucht die Arbeit die Unabhängigkeit in einem Umfeld, in dem diese besonders gefährdet ist. Als Surrogat wird die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Going-Concern-Modifikation („GCM“) herangezogen. GCM können als Indikator für die Prüfungsqualität besonders geeignet sein, da sie ein direktes Ergebnis der Tätigkeit des Abschlussprüfers sind und von ihm formuliert und verantwortet werden. Für das Surrogat GCM ist für Deutschland im Bereich der privaten Unternehmen bislang keine Studie bekannt.
Die Jahresabschlussprüfung verfolgt das Ziel, die Verlässlichkeit der Rechnungslegung zu bestätigen. Folglich kann sie einen wesentlichen Beitrag zu einem hohen Informationsniveau an den Märkten leisten. Angesichts dieser großen ökonomischen Bedeutung unternimmt der deutsche Gesetzgeber zahlreiche Anstrengungen, um eine hohe Prüfungsqualität sicherzustellen.
Die Sichtung der Wirtschaftsprüferordnung zeigt hierbei, dass regulatorische Maßnahmen ergriffen werden, die am Kern der Jahresabschlussprüfung ansetzen, nämlich an den Berufsangehörigen selbst. So wurde der Zugang zum Berufsstand der vereidigten Buchprüfer mehrmals geschlossen und wiedereröffnet. Des Weiteren sind markante Anpassungen des Niveaus des Wirtschaftsprüfungsexamens im Zeitablauf zu erkennen. Bei der Jahresabschlussprüfung der Unternehmen von öffentlichem Interesse sind außerdem besondere Berufspflichten zu erfüllen. Zum einen ist diesen schweren Eingriffen in die Freiheit der Berufswahl und der Berufsausübung gemein, dass sie allesamt die Qualifikation des Abschlussprüfers adressieren. Zum anderen werden die entsprechenden Gesetzesänderungen mehrheitlich mit einer Stärkung der Prüfungsqualität begründet.
Fraglich ist, inwiefern jene Facetten der Prüferqualifikation tatsächlich einen Einfluss auf die Prüfungsqualität ausüben. Aufgrund mangelnder Evidenz ergibt sich die Notwendigkeit, eine empirische Studie am deutschen Prüfermarkt durchzuführen und somit den Beginn zur Schließung der identifizierten Forschungslücke zu setzen.
Das Ziel der vorliegenden Dissertation besteht folglich darin, den Zusammenhang zwischen der Prüferqualifikation und der Prüfungsqualität mittels Regressionsanalysen zu untersuchen. Dazu wurde ein einzigartiger Datensatz zu deutschen privaten prüfungspflichtigen Kapitalgesellschaften mit unkonsolidierten Finanz- und Prüferinformationen im Zeitraum 2006-2018 mit insgesamt 217.585 grundlegenden Beobachtungen erhoben, bereinigt und aufbereitet. Da die Prüfungsqualität nicht direkt beobachtbar ist, wird zwischen wahrgenommener Prüfungsqualität und tatsächlicher Prüfungsqualität unterschieden. Im Rahmen dieser Dissertation wird die wahrgenommene Prüfungsqualität über Fremdkapitalkosten und die tatsächliche Prüfungsqualität über absolute diskretionäre Periodenabgrenzungen approximiert.
Die Ergebnisse der Hauptregressionen zeigen überwiegend, dass kein Zusammenhang zwischen den Maßgrößen der Prüferqualifikation und der wahrgenommenen und tatsächlichen Prüfungsqualität besteht. Die Zusatz- und Sensitivitätsanalysen unterstützen diesen Befund. So können mit Blick auf die Berufszugangsregelungen keine Qualitätsunterschiede zwischen den Berufsständen der Wirtschaftsprüfer und der vereidigten Buchprüfer nachgewiesen werden. Auch innerhalb des Berufstandes der Wirtschaftsprüfer ergeben sich keine Hinweise auf ein Qualitätsgefälle zwischen den Prüfergruppen, die unterschiedliche Examensanforderungen durchlebt haben. Hinsichtlich der Berufsausübungsregelungen ist zu beobachten, dass die zusätzlichen Anforderungen an die Jahresabschlussprüfung der Unternehmen von öffentlichem Interesse nicht mit einer anderen Prüfungsqualität bei privaten Unternehmen verbunden sind. Die beschriebenen regulatorischen Schritte des Gesetzgebers im Bereich der Prüferqualifikation erscheinen somit im Lichte einer verbesserten Prüfungsqualität nicht zwingend gerechtfertigt.
In dieser Dissertation werden ausgewählte Aspekte der Steuervermeidung und grenzüberschreitenden Besteuerung betrachtet. Im Teil B liegt der Fokus auf der Empirie zu Steuervermeidung und Gewinnverlagerung multinationaler Unternehmen mit drei einzelnen Aufsätzen. Der Teil C untersucht die unterschiedliche Besteuerung von Human- und Sachvermögen anhand der beiden fundamentalen Besteuerungsprinzipien des Äquivalenz- und des Leistungsfähigkeitsprinzips. Der letzte Aufsatz (Teil D) analysiert das Werturteilsfreiheitspostulat im Stakeholder-Ansatz und zeigt mithilfe eines Fallbeispiels, wie die Unternehmensbesteuerung in unterschiedliche Stakeholder-Ansätze integriert werden kann. Eine abschließende Gesamtwürdigung geht auf verbleibende Forschungsfragen ein (Teil E).
Somit wird in der vorliegenden Dissertation grenzüberschreitende Besteuerung anhand betriebswirtschaftlicher, besteuerungsprinzipiengestützter bzw. dogmatischer und wissenschaftstheoretischer Gesichtspunkte untersucht.
The interim reporting process provides decision-useful information to investors and market participants. However the legal circumstances of external interim auditor reviews differ worldwide. A mandatory review rule in the US as opposed to a contrary decision of the German legislator raises the question of the cost-benefit-relation of auditor reviews. Using a German sample of 1,023 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2010, I extract the costs and the benefits of voluntary semi-annual reviews. The unique German legal environment makes it possible to split the cost effect of a review in the price effect (included in audit-related fees) and a possible reduction of audit fees resulting from an improved year-around audit process. I observe a significant increase of audit and audit-related fees of around 14.5% (total fee effect). Additionally, the study provides evidence on declining audit fees for reviewed firms as compared to a matched sample of non-reviewed firms. The effect of an interim review on quarterly earnings quality – using discretionary accruals as an earning management proxy – shows no significant influence.
This study investigates the effect of the error announcement risk on the demand for voluntary interim auditor reviews. Material changes in the German legal environment in 2007 introduced an enforcement system for semi-annual financial reports. The demand for voluntary semi-annual reviews increased significantly from 0.8% in 2006 to 14.6% in 2007 and increased further to 19.5% until 2010 for a sample of 1,278 firm-year observations. This study addresses the question whether the enforcement structure and the resulting error announcement risk exposure have an influence on voluntary external monitoring. After controlling for agency costs, the corporate governance structure, and selected review cost factors, results of a logistic regression analysis show a positive influence of error announcement risk on the likelihood of engaging an auditor to review the semi-annual interim report. The findings contribute to the literature by demonstrating that the quality of the enforcement system and the risk of error findings influence the review decision of the board of directors positively.
In 2004 German legislation established the Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel. In 147 cases since then, the panel has ordered the announcement of errors in previously disclosed and audited financial statements of German firms. We use this unique dataset to evaluate the consequences of increasing earnings management over time on enforcement releases and their recognition in audit fees. Ettredge et al. (2010) provide evidence on a phenomenon called ‘balance sheet bloat’ that is due to income increasing earnings management and later influences the disclosure of misstated financial statements. Thus, the evidence of earnings management recognition in audit fees (Abbott et al. 2006) and the hypothesis of future information content in fees by Stanley (2011) leads us to hypothesize that auditors recognize increasing audit risk in audit fees before the enforcement process starts. We extend related earnings management and audit fee literature by modeling the development of earnings management within the misstatement firms and systematically link it to auditor reactions. We find significant predictive power of different commonly used accrual measures for enforcement releases in the period prior and up to the misstatement period. In this period of time, we also observe an audit fee increase, e.g. the recognition of increased audit risk. We investigate an audit fee effect after the misstatement period but find no significant relation.
Accounting plays an essential role in solving the principal-agent problem between managers and shareholders of capital market-oriented companies through the provision of information by the manager. However, this can succeed only if the accounting information is of high quality. In this context, the perceptions of shareholders regarding earnings quality are of particular importance.
The present dissertation intends to contribute to a deeper understanding regarding earnings quality from the perspective of shareholders of capital market-oriented companies. In particular, the thesis deals with indicators of shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality, the influence of the auditor’s independence on these perceptions, and the shareholders’ assessment of the importance of earnings quality in general. Therefore, this dissertation examines market reactions to earnings announcements, measures of earnings quality and the auditor’s independence, as well as shareholders’ voting behavior at annual general meetings.
Following the introduction and a theoretical part consisting of two chapters, which deal with the purposes of accounting and auditing as well as the relevance of shareholder voting at the annual general meeting in the context of the principal-agent theory, the dissertation presents three empirical studies.
The empirical study presented in chapter 4 investigates auditor ratification votes in a U.S. setting. The study addresses the question of whether the results of auditor ratification votes are informative regarding shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality. Using a returns-earnings design, the study demonstrates that the results of auditor ratification votes are associated with market reactions to unexpected earnings at the earnings announcement date. Furthermore, there are indications that this association seems to be positively related to higher levels of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Thus, there is empirical support for the notion that the results of auditor ratification votes are earnings-related information that might help shareholders to make informed investment decisions.
Chapter 5 investigates the relation between the economic importance of the client and perceived earnings quality. In particular, it is examined whether and when shareholders have a negative perception of an auditor’s economic dependence on the client. The results from a Big 4 client sample in the U.S. (fiscal years 2010 through 2014) indicate a negative association between the economic importance of the client and shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality. The results are interpreted to mean that shareholders are still concerned about auditor independence even ten years after the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Furthermore, the association between the economic importance of the client and shareholders’ perceptions of earnings quality applies predominantly to the subsample of clients that are more likely to be financially distressed. Therefore, the empirical results reveal that shareholders’ perceptions of auditor independence are conditional on the client’s circumstances.
The study presented in chapter 6 sheds light on the question of whether earnings quality influences shareholders’ satisfaction with the members of the company’s board. Using data from 1,237 annual general meetings of German listed companies from 2010 through 2015, the study provides evidence that earnings quality – measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals – is related to shareholders’ satisfaction with the company’s board. Moreover, the findings imply that shareholders predominantly blame the management board for inferior earnings quality. Overall, the evidence that earnings quality positively influences shareholders’ satisfaction emphasizes the relevance of earnings quality.
Nicht börsennotierte Unternehmen stellen in den meisten Volkswirtschaften die Mehrzahl der Unternehmen, leisten einen erheblichen Beitrag zur Wirtschaftskraft der Länder und beschäftigen eine Vielzahl von Arbeitnehmern. Bisher ist jedoch nur in geringem Ausmaß darüber bekannt, welche Rolle die Institution „Abschlussprüfung“ bei diesen Unternehmen spielt. Der bisherige Befund der internationalen und nationalen Prüfungsforschung fokussiert sich überwiegend auf das relativ kleine Prüfungsmarktsegment der börsennotierten Unternehmen, vernachlässigt dabei aber den Markt der nicht börsennotierten Prüfungsmandate.
Die vorliegende Studie beschäftigt sich deswegen mit den Fragen, welche Bedeutung der Institution „Abschlussprüfung“ bei nicht börsennotierten Unternehmen zukommt und wie dieses Segment des Prüfungsmarktes charakterisiert werden kann.
Anhand der Untersuchung von Prüfungshonoraren und der Prüferwahlentscheidung werden Faktoren identifiziert, die das Angebot und die Nachfrage nach Prüfungsqualität bei großen, nicht börsennotierten Unternehmen beeinflussen. Besonders beleuchtet werden die Bedeutung von Agency-Konflikten im Hinblick auf den Prüfungsqualitätsbedarf bei nicht börsennotierten Unternehmen, die Rolle von mittelgroßen Prüfungsgesellschaften und das Angebot und die Erbringung von Nichtprüfungsleistungen.
Die multivariaten Analysen zeigen, dass sich vor allem Agency-Konflikte sowie Größen- und Komplexitätsfaktoren auf Angebot und Nachfrage nach Prüfungsqualität auswirken. Honorarprämien für große und mittelgroße Prüfungsgesellschaften sprechen für eine mehrstufige Qualitätsdifferenzierung innerhalb der Gruppe der Anbieter von Prüfungsleistungen. Auch die gleichzeitige Erbringung von Beratungsleistungen durch den Abschlussprüfer übt einen signifikanten Einfluss aus.
Diese Ergebnisse sprechen dafür, dass die Institution „Abschlussprüfung“ auch bei nicht börsennotierten Unternehmen eine wichtige Rolle spielt. Zudem zeigt die Studie auch, dass sich das Prüfungsmarktsegment für diese Mandate in einigen Punkten wesentlich vom börsennotierten Marktsegment unterscheidet.
Chapter 2 concerns the audit market for German credit institutions (excluding savings banks and cooperative banks), and the presented study allows conclusions to be drawn regarding recent concentration levels of this particular audit market. The last reliable (statistical) studies concerning the audit market for German credit institutions were published several years ago (Grothe 2005; Lenz 1996b; Lenz 1997; Lenz 1998). This is surprising because parts of the new regulations concerning the audit market for public-interest entities—which should also apply to credit institutions (European Commission 2006c)—in Europe would require analyses of the audit market concentration to be performed on a regular basis. Therefore, this study begins to fill this research gap, and it reveals that the audit market for German credit institutions was highly concentrated (market leadership: KPMG AG WPG and PricewaterhouseCoopers AG WPG) in 2006 and 2010. Moreover, the findings also highlight that between these years, neither a notable trend toward higher levels of concentration nor a deconcentration process was evident. Finally, it is illustrated that the regulatory requirements for publishing audit fees and the corresponding right to claim exemption (§§ 285 Sentence 1 No. 17, 314 (1) No. 9 Commercial Code) do not allow the calculation of concentration figures that cover the entire audit market for credit institutions. Thus, it will continue to be necessary to use surrogates for audit fees, and analyses reveal that the arithmetic mean of the total business volume (or total assets) of a credit institution and its square root is a very good surrogate for calculating concentration measures based on audit fees.
Chapter 3 seeks to determine whether public oversight of public-interest entities (PIEs) increases audit fees specifically in the financial industry, which is already a highly regulated industry characterized by intense supervision. To answer this question, a sample of 573 German credit institutions is examined over the 2009–2011 period, as not all credit institutions were considered PIEs in Germany (until very recently). First, the results show that a credit institution’s business risk is related to audit fees. In addition, the findings reveal not only that PIE credit institutions pay statistically significantly higher audit fees but also that this effect is economically substantial (representing an audit fee increase of 31.38%). Finally, there are several indications that the relationship between (other) credit institutions’ business risks and audit fees is greater for PIE credit institutions.
Chapter 4 examines the association between the results of auditor ratification votes and perceived external financial reporting quality. As has been recently remarked by Wei et al. (2015), far too little is known about shareholders’ interests in and perceptions of the election, approval or ratification of auditors. Although auditor ratification by shareholders is normally a routine, non-binding action and the voting ratios are in the range of 95% or higher, the SEC emphasized the importance of this process by amending the disclosure requirements for such voting results in 2010 (SEC 2009; SEC 2010). This study demonstrates that the results of auditor ratification votes are associated with market reactions to earnings surprises (SEC registrants; 2010 to 2013). Moreover, there are moderate indications that this effect may be positively related to higher levels of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, that such voting results contain incremental informational content beyond that of other publicly available audit-related information, and that the time lag between the ratification of an auditor and the earnings announcement influences the vote’s importance. Finally, the study sheds additional light on an overlooked audit-related topic (e.g., Dao et al. 2012; Hermanson et al. 2009; Krishnan and Ye 2005; Sainty et al. 2002), and illustrates its relation to accounting. More importantly, the provided evidence indicates that disclosure of the results of auditor ratification votes might benefit (prospective) shareholders.
Chapter 5 addresses the question of whether and when shareholders may have a negative perception of an auditor’s economic dependence on the client. The results for a Big 4 client sample in the U.S. (2010 to 2014) show that the economic importance of the client—measured at the audit office-level—is negatively associated with shareholders’ perceptions of external financial reporting quality—measured in terms of the earnings response coefficient and the ex ante cost of equity capital—and, therefore, is perceived as a threat to auditor independence. Moreover, the study reveals that shareholders primarily regard independence due to client dependence as a problem for firms that are more likely to be in financially distressed conditions.
Banks perform important functions for the economy. Besides financial intermediation, banks provide information, liquidity, maturity- and risk-transformation (Fama, 1985). Banks ensure the transfer of liquidity from depositors to the most profitable investment projects. In addition, they perform important screening and monitoring services over investments hence contributing steadily to the efficient allocation of resources across the economy (Pathan and Faff, 2013). Since banks provide financial services all across the economy, this exposes banks (as opposed to non-banks) to systemic risk: the recent financial crisis revealed that banks can push economies into severe recessions. However, the crisis also revealed that certain bank types appear far more stable than others. For instance, cooperative banks performed better during the crisis than commercial banks. Different business models may reason these performance-differences: cooperative banks focus on relationship lending across their region, hence these banks suffered less from the collapse of the US housing market.
Since cooperative banks performed better during the crisis than commercial banks, it is quite surprising that research concerning cooperative banks is highly underrepresented in the literature. For this reason, the following three studies aim to contribute to current literature by examining three independent contemporaneous research questions in the context of cooperative banks.
Chapter 2 examines whether cooperative banks benefit from revenue diversification: Current banking literature reveals the recent trend in the overall banking industry that banks may opt for diversification by shifting their revenues to non-interest income. However, existing literature also shows that not every bank benefits from revenue diversification (Mercieca et al., 2007; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Goddard et al., 2008). Stiroh and Rumble (2006) find that large commercial banks (US Financial Holding Companies) perceive decreasing performance by shifting revenues towards non-interest income. Revenues from cooperative banks differ from those of commercial banks: commercial banks trade securities and derivatives, sell investment certificates and other trading assets. Concerning the lending business, commercial banks focus on providing loans for medium-sized and large companies rather than for small (private) customers. Cooperative banks rely on commission income (fees) from monetary transactions and selling insurances as a source of non-interest income. They generate most of their interest income by providing loans to small and medium-sized companies as well as to private customers in the region. These differences in revenues raise the question whether findings from Stiroh and Rumble (2006) apply to cooperative banks. For this reason, Chapter 2 evaluates a sample of German cooperative banks over the period 2005 to 2010 and aims to investigate the following research question: which cooperative banks benefit from revenue diversification?
Results show that findings from Stiroh and Rumble (2006) do not apply to cooperative banks. Revenue concentration is positive related to risk-adjusted returns (indirect effect) for cooperative banks. At the same time, non-interest income is more profitable than interest income (direct effect). The evaluation of the underlying non-interest income share shows that banks who heavily focus on non-interest income benefit by shifting towards non-interest income. This finding arises due to the fact, that the positive direct effect dominates the negative indirect effect, leading in a positive (and significant) net effect. Furthermore, results reveal a negative net effect for banks who are heavily exposed to interest generating activities. This indicates that shifting to non-interest income decreases risk-adjusted returns for these banks. Consequently, these banks do better by focusing on the interest business. Overall, results show evidence that banks need time to build capabilities, expertise and experience before trading off return and risk efficiently with regard on revenue diversification.
Chapter 3 deals with the relation between credit risk, liquidity risk, capital risk and bank efficiency: There has been rising competition in the European banking market due to technological development, deregulation and the introduction of the Euro as a common currency in recent decades. In order to remain competitive banks were forced to improve efficiency. That is, banks try to operate closer to a “best practice” production function in the sense that banks improve the input – output relation. The key question in this context is if banks improve efficiency at a cost of higher risk to compensate decreasing earnings. When it comes to bank risk, a large strand of literature discusses the issue of problem loans. Several studies identify that banks hold large shares of non-performing loans in their portfolio before becoming bankrupt (Barr and Siems, 1994; Demirgüc-Kunt, 1989). According to efficiency, studies show that the average bank generates low profits and incorporates high costs compared to the “best practice” production frontier (Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Williams, 2004). At first glance, these two issues do not seem related. However, Berger and DeYoung (1997) show that banks with poor management are less able to handle their costs (low cost-efficiency) as well as to monitor their debtors in an appropriate manner to ensure loan quality. The negative relationship between cost efficiency and non-performing loans leads to declining capital. Existing studies (e.g. Williams, 2004; Berger and DeYoung, 1997) show that banks with a low level of capital tend to engage in moral hazard behavior, which in turn can push these banks into bankruptcy.
However, the business model of cooperative banks is based on the interests of its commonly local customers (the cooperative act: § 1 GenG). This may imply that the common perception of banks engaging in moral hazard behavior may not apply to cooperative banks. Since short-term shareholder interests (as a potential factor for moral hazard behavior) play no role for cooperative banks this may support this notion. Furthermore, liquidity has been widely neglected in the existing literature, since the common perception has been that access to additional liquid funds is not an issue. However, the recent financial crisis revealed that liquidity dried up for many banks due to increased mistrust in the banking sector. Besides investigating moral hazard behavior, using data from 2005 to 2010 this study moves beyond current literature by employing a measure for liquidity risk in order to evaluate how liquidity risk relates to efficiency and capital.
Results mostly apply to current literature in this field since the empirical evaluation reveals that lower cost and profit-efficiency Granger-cause increases in credit risk. At the same time, results indicate that credit risk negatively Granger-causes cost and profit-efficiency, hence revealing a bi-directional relationship between these measures. However, most importantly, results also show a positive relationship between capital and credit risk, thus displaying that moral hazard behavior does not apply to cooperative banks. Especially the business model of cooperative banks, which is based on the interests of its commonly local customers (the cooperative act: § 1 GenG) may reason this finding. Contrary to Fiordelisi et al. (2011), results also show a negative relationship between capital and cost-efficiency, indicating that struggling cooperative banks focus on managing their cost-exposure in following periods. Concerning the employed liquidity risk measure, the authors find that banks who hold a high level of liquidity are less active in market related investments and hold high shares of equity capital. This outcome clearly reflects risk-preferences from the management of a bank.
Chapter 4 examines governance structures of cooperative banks: The financial crisis of 2007/08 led to huge distortions in the banking market. The failure of Lehman Brothers was the beginning of government interventions in various countries all over the world in order to prevent domestic economies from even further disruptions. In the aftermath of the crisis, politicians and regulators identified governance deficiencies as one major factor that contributed to the crisis. Besides existing studies in the banking literature (e.g. Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Diamond and Rajan, 2009; Erkens et al., 2012) an OECD study from 2009 supports this notion (Kirkpatrick, 2009). Public debates increased awareness for the need of appropriate governance mechanisms at that time. Consequently, politicians and regulators called for more financial expertise on bank boards. Accordingly, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision states in principle 2 that “board members should remain qualified, individually and collectively, for their positions. They should understand their oversight and corporate governance role and be able to exercise sound, objective judgement about the affairs of the bank.” (BCBS, 2015). Taking these perceptions into consideration the prevailing question is whether financial experts on bank boards do really foster bank stability?
This chapter aims to investigate this question by referring to the study from Minton et al. (2014). In their study, the authors investigate US commercial bank holding companies between the period 2003 and 2008. The authors find that financial experts on the board of US commercial bank holding companies promote pro-cyclical bank performance. Accordingly, the authors question regulators view of more financial experts on the board leading to more banking stability.
However, Minton et al. (2014) do not examine whether their findings accrue due to financial experts who act in the interests of shareholders or due to the issue that financial experts may have a more risk-taking attitude (due to a better understanding of financial instruments) than other board members.
Supposed that their findings accrue due to financial experts who act in the interests of shareholders. Then financial experts on the board of banks where short-term shareholder interests play no role (cooperative banks) may prove beneficial with regard on bank performance during the crisis as well as in normal times. This would mean that they use their skills and expertise to contribute sustainable growth to the bank. Contrary, if this study reveals pro-cyclical bank performance related to financial experts on the board of cooperative banks, this finding may be addressed solely to the risk-taking attitude of financial experts (since short-term shareholder interests play no role). For this reason, this chapter aims to identify the channel for the relation of financial experts and bank performance by examining the following research question: Do financial experts on the board promote pro-cyclical bank performance in a setting where short-term shareholder interests play no role?
Results show that financial experts on the board of cooperative banks (data from 2006 to 2011) do not promote pro-cyclical bank performance. Contrary, results show evidence that financial experts on the board of cooperative banks appear to foster long-term bank stability. This suggests that regulators should consider ownership structure (and hence business model of banks) when imposing new regulatory constraints for financial experts on the bank board.