Volkswirtschaftliches Institut
Refine
Has Fulltext
- yes (7)
Is part of the Bibliography
- yes (7)
Document Type
- Journal article (7) (remove)
Keywords
- Incomplete contracts (1)
- Joint ownership (1)
- Property rights approach (1)
- Transaction costs (1)
- Ungleichheit (1)
- Vertical integration (1)
- central bank information (1)
- collective refusal to supply (1)
- common factors (1)
- composites (1)
Institute
We study nominal exchange rate dynamics in the aftermath of U.S. monetary policy announcements. Using high-frequency interest rate and stock price movements around FOMC announcements, we distinguish between pure monetary policy shocks and information shocks, which are associated with new information contained in the announcements. Contractionary pure policy shocks give rise to a strong, but transitory, appreciation on impact. Information shocks also appreciate the exchange rate, but the effect builds up only slowly over time and is highly persistent. Thus, we conclude that although the short-run effects on the exchange rate are primarily due to pure policy shocks, the medium-run response is driven by information effects.
Salience bias and overwork
(2022)
In this study, we enrich a standard principal–agent model with hidden action by introducing salience-biased perception on the agent's side. The agent's misguided focus on salient payoffs, which leads the agent's and the principal's probability assessments to diverge, has two effects: First, the agent focuses too much on obtaining a bonus, which facilitates incentive provision. Second, the principal may exploit the diverging probability assessments to relax participation. We show that salience bias can reverse the nature of the inefficiency arising from moral hazard; i.e., the principal does not necessarily provide insufficient incentives that result in inefficiently low effort but instead may well provide excessive incentives that result in inefficiently high effort.
Over the last few decades, hours worked per capita have declined substantially in many OECD economies. Using the standard neoclassical growth model with endogenous work–leisure choice, we assess the role of trend growth slowdown in accounting for the decline in hours worked. In the model, a permanent reduction in technological growth decreases steady‐state hours worked by increasing the consumption–output ratio. Our empirical analysis exploits cross‐country variation in the timing and size of the decline in technological growth to show that technological growth has a highly significant positive effect on hours. A decline in the long‐run trend of technological growth by 1 percentage point is associated with a decline in trend hours worked in the range of 1–3%. This result is robust to controlling for taxes, which have been found in previous studies to be an important determinant of hours. Our empirical finding is quantitatively in line with the one implied by a calibrated version of the model, though evidence for the model’s implication that the effect on hours works via changes in the consumption–output ratio is rather mixed.
This paper examines situations where two vertically integrated firms consider supplying an input to an independent downstream competitor via privately observed contracts. We identify equilibria where competition in the upstream market emerges—the downstream competitor gets supplied—as well as when the downstream firm does not receive the input and is excluded from the market. The likelihood of the outcome in which the downstream firm does not get supplied depends not only on demand parameters, but also on contractual flexibility and observability. We show that when contracts are unobservable, downstream entry will occur less often. Furthermore, our results suggest that permitting contracts that enable the contracting parties to coordinate their behavior in the downstream market may improve welfare by increasing the likelihood that the downstream firm is supplied.
The standard property rights approach is focused on ex ante investment incentives, while there are no transaction costs that might restrain ex post negotiations. We explore the implications of such transaction costs. Prominent conclusions of the property rights theory may be overturned: A party may have stronger investment incentives when a non investing party is the owner, and joint ownership can be the uniquely optimal ownership structure. Intuitively, an ownership structure that is unattractive in the standard model may now be desirable, because it implies large gains from trade, such that the parties are more inclined to incur the transaction costs.
This article introduces a new consistent variance-based estimator called ordinal consistent partial least squares (OrdPLSc). OrdPLSc completes the family of variance-based estimators consisting of PLS, PLSc, and OrdPLS and permits to estimate structural equation models of composites and common factors if some or all indicators are measured on an ordinal categorical scale. A Monte Carlo simulation (N =500) with different population models shows that OrdPLSc provides almost unbiased estimates. If all constructs are modeled as common factors, OrdPLSc yields estimates close to those of its covariance-based counterpart, WLSMV, but is less efficient. If some constructs are modeled as composites, OrdPLSc is virtually without competition.