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A theory of managed floating
(2003)
After the experience with the currency crises of the 1990s, a broad consensus has emerged among economists that such shocks can only be avoided if countries that decided to maintain unrestricted capital mobility adopt either independently floating exchange rates or very hard pegs (currency boards, dollarisation). As a consequence of this view which has been enshrined in the so-called impossible trinity all intermediate currency regimes are regarded as inherently unstable. As far as the economic theory is concerned, this view has the attractive feature that it not only fits with the logic of traditional open economy macro models, but also that for both corner solutions (independently floating exchange rates with a domestically oriented interest rate policy; hard pegs with a completely exchange rate oriented monetary policy) solid theoretical frameworks have been developed. Above all the IMF statistics seem to confirm that intermediate regimes are indeed less and less fashionable by both industrial countries and emerging market economies. However, in the last few years an anomaly has been detected which seriously challenges this paradigm on exchange rate regimes. In their influential cross-country study, Calvo and Reinhart (2000) have shown that many of those countries which had declared themselves as ‘independent floaters’ in the IMF statistics were charaterised by a pronounced ‘fear of floating’ and were actually heavily reacting to exchange rate movements, either in the form of an interest rate response, or by intervening in foreign exchange markets. The present analysis can be understood as an approach to develop a theoretical framework for this managed floating behaviour that – even though it is widely used in practice – has not attracted very much attention in monetary economics. In particular we would like to fill the gap that has recently been criticised by one of the few ‘middle-ground’ economists, John Williamson, who argued that “managed floating is not a regime with well-defined rules” (Williamson, 2000, p. 47). Our approach is based on a standard open economy macro model typically employed for the analysis of monetary policy strategies. The consequences of independently floating and market determined exchange rates are evaluated in terms of a social welfare function, or, to be more precise, in terms of an intertemporal loss function containing a central bank’s final targets output and inflation. We explicitly model the source of the observable fear of floating by questioning the basic assumption underlying most open economy macro models that the foreign exchange market is an efficient asset market with rational agents. We will show that both policy reactions to the fear of floating (an interest rate response to exchange rate movements which we call indirect managed floating, and sterilised interventions in the foreign exchange markets which we call direct managed floating) can be rationalised if we allow for deviations from the assumption of perfectly functioning foreign exchange markets and if we assume a central bank that takes these deviations into account and behaves so as to reach its final targets. In such a scenario with a high degree of uncertainty about the true model determining the exchange rate, the rationale for indirect managed floating is the monetary policy maker’s quest for a robust interest rate policy rule that performs comparatively well across a range of alternative exchange rate models. We will show, however, that the strategy of indirect managed floating still bears the risk that the central bank’s final targets might be negatively affected by the unpredictability of the true exchange rate behaviour. This is where the second policy measure comes into play. The use of sterilised foreign exchange market interventions to counter movements of market determined exchange rates can be rationalised by a central bank’s effort to lower the risk of missing its final targets if it only has a single instrument at its disposal. We provide a theoretical model-based foundation of a strategy of direct managed floating in which the central bank targets, in addition to a short-term interest rate, the nominal exchange rate. In particular, we develop a rule for the instrument of intervening in the foreign exchange market that is based on the failure of foreign exchange market to guarantee a reliable relationship between the exchange rate and other fundamental variables.
This dissertation deals with certain business strategies that have become particularly relevant with the spread and development of new information technologies.
The introduction explains the motivation, discusses different ways of defining the term "two-sided market", and briefly summarizes the subsequent essays.
The first essay examines the effects of product information on the pricing and advertising decision of a seller who offers an experience good whose quality is unknown to consumers prior to purchase. It comprises of two theoretical models which differ with respect to their view on advertising. The analysis addresses the question how the availability of additional, potentially misleading information affects the seller's quality-dependent pricing and advertising decision.
In the first model, in which both advertising and product reviews make consumers aware about product existence, the seller's optimal price turns out to be increasing in product quality. However, under certain circumstances, also the seller of a low-quality product prefers setting a high price. Within the given framework, the relationship between product quality and advertising depends on the particular parameter constellation.
In the second model, some consumers are assumed to interpret price as a signal of quality, while others rely on information provided by product reviews. Consequently, and differently from the first part, pricing may indirectly inform consumers about product quality. On the one hand, in spite of asymmetric information on product quality, equilibria exist that feature full information pricing, which is in line with previous results presented by the signaling literature. On the other hand, potentially misleading product reviews may rationalize further pricing patterns. Moreover, assuming that firms can manipulate product reviews by investing in concealed marketing, equilibria can arise in which a high price signals low product quality. However, in these extreme cases, only a few (credulous) consumers consider buying the product.
The second essay deals with trade platforms whose operators not only allow sellers to offer their products to consumers, but also offer products themselves. In this context, the platform operator faces a hold-up problem if he sets classical two-part tariffs (on which previous literature on two-sided markets focussed) as potential competition between the platform operator and sellers reduces platform attractiveness. Since some sellers refuse to join the platform, products whose existence is not known to the platform operator in the first place and which can only be established by better informed sellers may not be offered at all. However, revenue-based fees lower the platform operator's incentives to compete with sellers, increasing platform attractiveness. Therefore, charging such proportional fees can be profitable, what may explain why several trade platforms indeed do charge proportional fees.
The third essay examines settings in which sellers can be active both on an intermediary's trade platform and in other sales channels. It explores the sellers' incentives to set different prices across sales channels within the given setup. Afterwards, it analyzes the intermediary's tariff decision, taking into account the implications on consumers' choice between different sales channels. The analysis particularly focusses on the effects of a no-discrimination rule which several intermediaries impose, but which appears to be controversial from a competition policy view. It identifies under which circumstances the intermediary prefers restricting sellers' pricing decisions by imposing a no-discrimination rule, attaining direct control over the split-up of customers on sales channels. Moreover, it illustrates that such rules can have both positive and negative effects on welfare within the given framework.
This thesis contributes to the understanding of the labor market effects of international trade, with a focus on the effects on wage and earnings inequality. The thesis draws on high-quality micro data and applies modern econometric techniques and theoretical concepts to improve our understanding of the distributional effects of international trade. The thesis focuses on the effects in Germany and the USA.
This book produces three main results. First, from publicly available statistics, it can be inferred that the interest rate risk from on-balance sheet term transformation of banks in Germany exceeds the euro area average and is bound to increase even further. German banks push for shorter-term funding and hardly counteract the increased demand for longer-term loans. Within Germany, savings banks and cooperative banks are particularly engaged. Second, the supervisory interest rate shock scenarios are found to be increasingly detached both from the historic and the forecasted development of interest rates in Germany. In particular, German banks have been exposed to fewer and smaller adverse changes of the term structure. This increasingly limits the informative content of mere exposure measures such as the Basel interest rate coefficient when used as risk measures as is common practice in banking supervision and economic research. An impact assessment further supports the conclusion that the least that is required is a more comprehensive set of shock scenarios. Third and finally, there is a reasonable theoretical rationale and there is strong empirical evidence for banks' search for yield in interest rate risk. In addition to the established positive link between the term spread and the taking of interest rate risk by banks an additional negative link can be explained theoretically and there is significant empirical evidence for its existence and relevance. There is even a threshold of income below which banks' search for yield in interest rate risk surfaces openly.
Die grundlegende Idee dieser Abhandlung liegt in der Vorstellung begründet, dass sich Wettbewerbspolitik nicht auf den Wettkampf konzentrieren sollte. Die traditionelle Vorgehensweise analysiert Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen auf einzelnen Märkten und fordert gegebenenfalls ein wettbewerbspolitisches Eingreifen. Zumeist wird dabei die Existenz des 'spirit of competition' und damit ein aktiver Wettkampf gefordert. Diese Sichtweise ist jedoch symptomatisch auf den einzelnen Markt gerichtet. Stattdessen sollten die grundlegenden Rahmenbedingungen analysiert werden. Wettbewerbspolitik würde sich somit auf die Schaffung von Wettbewerbschancen konzentrieren. Gerade die Umsetzung einer derart gestalteten Wettbewerbspolitik dürfte schwierig sein und erfordert insbesondere ein politökonomisches Fundament. Daher wird hier ein konkreter Vorschlag konkretisiert, der Elemente der direkte Demokratie, der Gewaltenteilung und eine verstärkte politische Meinungsbildung beinhaltet. Die herkömmliche Wettbewerbspolitik unterliegt folglich drei grundlegenden Mängel: Zunächst ist sie durch eine mangelnde Zielorientierung und zahlreiche Zielkonflikte gekennzeichnet. Weiterhin ist sie symptomatisch auf Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen auf einzelnen Märkten konzentriert und vernachlässigt die jeweils relevanten Rahmenbedingungen. Schließlich wird die Wahl angemessener wettbewerbspolitischer Träger häufig vernachlässigt. Die Ziele dieser Arbeit sind darauf basierend die Begründung der Notwendigkeit einer Neuausrichtung, die Ausarbeitung der Grundzüge eines alternativen wettbewerbspolitischen Ansatzes und eine Abgrenzung dieses von geläufigen wettbewerbspolitischen Konzeptionen. Zur Analyse dient die Ableitung eines Referenzschemas auf fünf Ebenen der Wettbewerbspolitik. Dabei werden sieben Fallstudien in die Abhandlung integriert.
This thesis deals with three selected dimensions of strategic behavior, namely investment in R&D, mergers and acquisitions, and inventory decisions in dynamic oligopolies. The question the first essay addresses is how the market structure evolves due to innovative activities when firms' level of technological competence is valuable for more than one project. The focus of the work is the analysis of the effect of learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting in R&D on firms' incentives to innovate. A dynamic step-by-step innovation model with history dependency is developed. Firms can accumulate knowledge by investing in R&D. As a benchmark without knowledge accumulation it is shown that relaxing the usual assumption of imposed imitation yields additional strategic effects. Therefore, the leader's R&D effort increases with the gap as she is trying to avoid competition in the future. When firms gain experience by performing R&D, the resulting effect of knowledge induces technological leaders to rest on their laurels which allows followers to catch up. Contrary to the benchmark case the leader's innovation effort declines with the lead. This causes an equilibrium where the incentives to innovate are highest when competition is most intense. Using a model of oligopoly in general equilibrium the second essay analyzes the integration of economies that might be accompanied by cross-border merger waves. Studying economies which prior to trade were in stable equilibrium where mergers were not profitable, we show that globalization can trigger cross-border merger waves for a sufficiently large heterogeneity in marginal cost. In partial equilibrium, consumers benefit from integration even when a merger wave is triggered which considerably lowers intensity of competition. Welfare increases. In contrast, in general equilibrium where interactions between markets and therefore effects on factor prices are considered, gains from trade can only be realized by reallocation of resources. The higher the technological dissimilarity between countries the better can efficiency gains be realized in integrated general equilibrium. The overall welfare effect of integration is positive when all firms remain active but indeterminate when firms exit or are absorbed due to a merger wave. It is possible for decreasing competition to dominate the welfare gain from more efficient resource allocation across sectors. Allowing for firms' entry alters results as in an integrated world coexistence of firms of different countries is never possible. Comparative advantages with respect to entry and production are important for realizing efficiency gains from trade. The third essay analyzes the interaction between price and inventory decisions in an oligopoly industry and its implications for the dynamics of prices. The work extends existing literature and especially the work of Hall and Rust (2007) to endogenous prices and strategic oligopoly competition. We show that the optimal decision rule is an (S,s) order policy and prices and inventories are strategic substitutes. Fixed ordering costs generate infrequent orders. Additionally, with strategic competition in prices, (S,s) inventory behavior together with demand uncertainty generates cyclical pattern in prices The last chapter presents some concluding remarks on the results of the essays.
Innerhalb der Verkehrsinfrastrukturen ist das Straßenwesen mit seinen individualistischen und flexiblen Kraftfahrzeugen der große Gewinner des letzen Jahrhunderts. Trotz seines individualistischen Nutzungscharakters und privatwirtschaftlichen Beispielen in anderen Ländern ist in Deutschland heute keine andere Verkehrsinfrastruktur so weit von einer Deregulierung entfernt wie die Straßen. Den Ausgangspunkt der Erklärung dieser Rigidität bildet eine Situationsaufnahme der bestehenden Marktorganisation. Prägnant erweist sich die tiefe Integration der Straßenbereitstellung in die öffentliche Verwaltung und Entscheidungen über den politischen Prozess unter Beteiligung aller Gesellschaftsgruppierungen. Fragen wirft dabei unter anderen die kontroverse Diskussion um die Externalitäten der Straßen und ihres Verkehrs auf. Die Klärung verweist auf eine Effizienzbetrachtung des bestehenden Bereitstellungssystems. Problematisch zeigt sich hier aufgrund der politischen Heterogenität der Gesellschaftsgruppierungen insbesondere der politische Entscheidungsprozess. Die Suche nach einer Lösung verweist auf privatwirtschaftliche Bereitstellungsalternativen. Es zeigt sich, dass hierfür sowohl in rechtlicher wie auch technischer Hinsicht die notwendigen Rahmenbedingungen für eine privatwirtschaftliche Organisation ebenso bestehen wie auch erhebliche Effizienzgewinne zu erwarten wären. Als eigentliches Hindernis identifiziert sich auch hier eine Neuordnung, die notwendigerweise über den politischen Prozess stattfindenden muss. Der eigene Erfolg der Straßen mit seiner gewachsenen verkehrs- und fiskalpolitischen Bedeutung blockiert damit heute mehr denn je Hoffnungen auf eine Lösung der aufgelaufenen Probleme im Straßenwesen.
Within three self-contained studies, this dissertation studies the impact and interactions between different macroeconomic policy measures in the context of financial markets empirically and quantitatively. The first study of this dissertation sheds light on the financial market effects of unconventional central bank asset purchase programs in the Eurozone, in particular sovereign bond asset purchase programs. The second study quantifies the direct implications of unconventional monetary policy on decisions by German public debt management regarding the maturity structure of gross issuance. The third study provides novel evidence on the role of private credit markets in the propagation of public spending toward private consumption in the U.S. economy. Across these three studies a set of different time-series econometric methods is applied including error correction models and event study frameworks to analyze contemporaneous interactions in financial and macroeconomic data in the context of unconventional monetary policy, as well as vector auto regressions (VARs) and local projections to trace the dynamic consequences of macroeconomic policies over time.
This thesis analyzes the 2001-2006 labor market reforms in Germany. The aim of this work is twofold. First, an overview of the most important reform measures and the intended effects is given. Second, two specific and very fundamental amendments, namely the merging of unemployment assistance and social benefits, as well as changes in the duration of unemployment insurance benefits, are analyzed in detail to evaluate their effects on individuals and the entire economy. Using a matching model with optimal search intensity and Semi-Markov methods, the effects of these two amendments on the duration of unemployment, optimal search intensity and unemployment are analyzed.
This article introduces a new consistent variance-based estimator called ordinal consistent partial least squares (OrdPLSc). OrdPLSc completes the family of variance-based estimators consisting of PLS, PLSc, and OrdPLS and permits to estimate structural equation models of composites and common factors if some or all indicators are measured on an ordinal categorical scale. A Monte Carlo simulation (N =500) with different population models shows that OrdPLSc provides almost unbiased estimates. If all constructs are modeled as common factors, OrdPLSc yields estimates close to those of its covariance-based counterpart, WLSMV, but is less efficient. If some constructs are modeled as composites, OrdPLSc is virtually without competition.