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Although questionable research practices (QRPs) and p-hacking have received attention in recent years, little research has focused on their prevalence and acceptance in students. Students are the researchers of the future and will represent the field in the future. Therefore, they should not be learning to use and accept QRPs, which would reduce their ability to produce and evaluate meaningful research. 207 psychology students and fresh graduates provided self-report data on the prevalence and predictors of QRPs. Attitudes towards QRPs, belief that significant results constitute better science or lead to better grades, motivation, and stress levels were predictors. Furthermore, we assessed perceived supervisor attitudes towards QRPs as an important predictive factor. The results were in line with estimates of QRP prevalence from academia. The best predictor of QRP use was students’ QRP attitudes. Perceived supervisor attitudes exerted both a direct and indirect effect via student attitudes. Motivation to write a good thesis was a protective factor, whereas stress had no effect. Students in this sample did not subscribe to beliefs that significant results were better for science or their grades. Such beliefs further did not impact QRP attitudes or use in this sample. Finally, students engaged in more QRPs pertaining to reporting and analysis than those pertaining to study design. We conclude that supervisors have an important function in shaping students’ attitudes towards QRPs and can improve their research practices by motivating them well. Furthermore, this research provides some impetus towards identifying predictors of QRP use in academia.
Arrow cues and other overlearned spatial symbols automatically orient attention according to their spatial meaning. This renders them similar to exogenous cues that occur at stimulus location. Exogenous cues trigger shifts of attention even when they are presented subliminally. Here, we investigate to what extent the mechanisms underlying the orienting of attention by exogenous cues and by arrow cues are comparable by analyzing the effects of visible and masked arrow cues on attention. In Experiment 1, we presented arrow cues with overall 50% validity. Visible cues, but not masked cues, lead to shifts of attention. In Experiment 2, the arrow cues had an overall validity of 80%. Now both visible and masked arrows lead to shifts of attention. This is in line with findings that subliminal exogenous cues capture attention only in a top-down contingent manner, that is, when the cues fit the observer’s intentions.
The present study investigated event-related brain potentials elicited by true and false negated statements to evaluate if discrimination of the truth value of negated information relies on conscious processing and requires higher-order cognitive processing in healthy subjects across different levels of stimulus complexity. The stimulus material consisted of true and false negated sentences (sentence level) and prime-target expressions (word level). Stimuli were presented acoustically and no overt behavioral response of the participants was required. Event-related brain potentials to target words preceded by true and false negated expressions were analyzed both within group and at the single subject level. Across the different processing conditions (word pairs and sentences), target words elicited a frontal negativity and a late positivity in the time window from 600-1000 msec post target word onset. Amplitudes of both brain potentials varied as a function of the truth value of the negated expressions. Results were confirmed at the single-subject level. In sum, our results support recent suggestions according to which evaluation of the truth value of a negated expression is a time-and cognitively demanding process that cannot be solved automatically, and thus requires conscious processing. Our paradigm provides insight into higher-order processing related to language comprehension and reasoning in healthy subjects. Future studies are needed to evaluate if our paradigm also proves sensitive for the detection of consciousness in non-responsive patients.
Background:
This study investigated the relation between social desirability and self-reported physical activity in web-based research.
Findings:
A longitudinal study (N = 5,495, 54% women) was conducted on a representative sample of the Dutch population using the Marlowe-Crowne Scale as social desirability measure and the short form of the International Physical Activity Questionnaire. Social desirability was not associated with self-reported physical activity (in MET-minutes/week), nor with its sub-behaviors (i.e., walking, moderate-intensity activity, vigorous-intensity activity, and sedentary behavior). Socio-demographics (i.e., age, sex, income, and education) did not moderate the effect of social desirability on self-reported physical activity and its sub-behaviors.
Conclusions:
This study does not throw doubt on the usefulness of the Internet as a medium to collect self-reports on physical activity.
The Concealed Information Test (CIT) is a well-validated means to detect whether someone possesses certain (e.g., crime-relevant) information. The current study investigated whether alcohol intoxication during CIT administration influences reaction time (RT) CIT-effects. Two opposing predictions can be made. First, by decreasing attention to critical information, alcohol intoxication could diminish CIT-effects. Second, by hampering the inhibition of truthful responses, alcohol intoxication could increase CIT-effects. A correlational field design was employed. Participants (n = 42) were recruited and tested at a bar, where alcohol consumption was voluntary and incidental. Participants completed a CIT, in which they were instructed to hide knowledge of their true identity. BAC was estimated via breath alcohol ratio. Results revealed that higher BAC levels were correlated with higher CIT-effects. Our results demonstrate that robust CIT effects can be obtained even when testing conditions differ from typical laboratory settings and strengthen the idea that response inhibition contributes to the RT-CIT effect.
Our object recognition abilities, a direct product of our experience with objects, are fine-tuned to perfection. Left temporal and lateral areas along the dorsal, action related stream, as well as left infero-temporal areas along the ventral, object related stream are engaged in object recognition. Here we show that expertise modulates the activity of dorsal areas in the recognition of man-made objects with clearly specified functions. Expert chess players were faster than chess novices in identifying chess objects and their functional relations. Experts’ advantage was domain-specific as there were no differences between groups in a control task featuring geometrical shapes. The pattern of eye movements supported the notion that experts’ extensive knowledge about domain objects and their functions enabled superior recognition even when experts were not directly fixating the objects of interest. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) related exclusively the areas along the dorsal stream to chess specific object recognition. Besides the commonly involved left temporal and parietal lateral brain areas, we found that only in experts homologous areas on the right hemisphere were also engaged in chess specific object recognition. Based on these results, we discuss whether skilled object recognition does not only involve a more efficient version of the processes found in non-skilled recognition, but also qualitatively different cognitive processes which engage additional brain areas
Human actions are generally not determined by external stimuli, but by internal goals and by the urge to evoke desired effects in the environment. To reach these effects, humans typically have to act. But at times, deciding not to act can be better suited or even the only way to reach a desired effect. What mental processes are involved when people decide not to act to reach certain effects? From the outside it may seem that nothing remarkable is happening, because no action can be observed. However, I present three studies which disclose the cognitive processes that control nonactions.
The present experiments address situations where people intentionally decide to omit certain actions in order to produce a predictable effect in the environment. These experiments are based on the ideomotor hypothesis, which suggests that bidirectional associations can be formed between actions and the resulting effects. Because of these associations, anticipating the effects can in turn activate the respective action. The results of the present experiments show that associations can be formed between nonactions (i.e., the intentional decision not to act) and the resulting effects. Due to these associations, perceiving the nonaction effects encourages not acting (Exp. 1–3). What is more, planning a nonaction seems to come with an activation of the effects that inevitably follow the nonaction (Exp. 4–5). These results suggest that the ideomotor hypothesis can be expanded to nonactions and that nonactions are cognitively represented in terms of their sensory effects. Furthermore, nonaction effects can elicit a sense of agency (Exp. 6–8). That is, even though people refrain from acting, the resulting nonaction effects are perceived as self-produced effects.
In a nutshell, these findings demonstrate that intentional nonactions include specific mechanisms and processes, which are involved, for instance, in effect anticipation and the sense of agency. This means that, while it may seem that nothing remarkable is happening when people decide not to act, complex processes run on the inside, which are also involved in intentional actions.
The present article introduces a model based on cognitive consistency principles to predict how new identities become integrated into the self-concept, with consequences for intergroup attitudes. The model specifies four concepts (self-concept, stereotypes, identification, and group compatibility) as associative connections. The model builds on two cognitive principles, balance-congruity and imbalance-dissonance, to predict identification with social groups that people currently belong to, belonged to in the past, or newly belong to. More precisely, the model suggests that the relative strength of self-group associations (i.e., identification) depends in part on the (in)compatibility of the different social groups. Combining insights into cognitive representation of knowledge, intergroup bias, and explicit/implicit attitude change, we further derive predictions for intergroup attitudes. We suggest that intergroup attitudes alter depending on the relative associative strength between the social groups and the self, which in turn is determined by the (in)compatibility between social groups. This model unifies existing models on the integration of social identities into the self-concept by suggesting that basic cognitive mechanisms play an important role in facilitating or hindering identity integration and thus contribute to reducing or increasing intergroup bias.
The limbic system and especially the amygdala have been identified as key structures in emotion induction and regulation. Recently research has additionally focused on the influence of prefrontal areas on emotion processing in the limbic system and the amygdala. Results from fMRI studies indicate that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is involved not only in emotion induction but also in emotion regulation. However, studies using fNIRS only report prefrontal brain activation during emotion induction. So far it lacks the attempt to compare emotion induction and emotion regulation with regard to prefrontal activation measured with fNIRS, to exclude the possibility that the reported prefrontal brain activation in fNIRS studies are mainly caused by automatic emotion regulation processes. Therefore this work tried to distinguish emotion induction from regulation via fNIRS of the prefrontal cortex. 20 healthy women viewed neutral pictures as a baseline condition, fearful pictures as induction condition and reappraised fearful pictures as regulation condition in randomized order. As predicted, the view-fearful condition led to higher arousal ratings than the view-neutral condition with the reappraise-fearful condition in between. For the fNIRS results the induction condition showed an activation of the bilateral PFC compared to the baseline condition (viewing neutral). The regulation condition showed an activation only of the left PFC compared to the baseline condition, although the direct comparison between induction and regulation condition revealed no significant difference in brain activation. Therefore our study underscores the results of previous fNIRS studies showing prefrontal brain activation during emotion induction and rejects the hypothesis that this prefrontal brain activation might only be a result of automatic emotion regulation processes.