Institut für Psychologie
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The question of how behavior is represented in the mind lies at the core of psychology as the science of mind and behavior. While a long-standing research tradition has established two opposing fundamental views of perceptual representation, Structuralism and Gestalt psychology, we test both accounts with respect to action representation: Are multiple actions (characterizing human behavior in general) represented as the sum of their component actions (Structuralist view) or holistically (Gestalt view)? Using a single-/dual-response switch paradigm, we analyzed switches between dual ([A + B]) and single ([A], [B]) responses across different effector systems and revealed comparable performance in partial repetitions and full switches of behavioral requirements (e.g., in [A + B] → [A] vs. [B] → [A], or [A] → [A + B] vs. [B] → [A + B]), but only when the presence of dimensional overlap between responses allows for Gestalt formation. This evidence for a Gestalt view of behavior in our paradigm challenges some fundamental assumptions in current (tacitly Structuralist) action control theories (in particular the idea that all actions are represented compositionally with reference to their components), provides a novel explanatory angle for understanding complex, highly synchronized human behavior (e.g., dance), and delimitates the degree to which complex behavior can be analyzed in terms of its basic components.
The Wuertual Reality XR Meeting 2023 was initiated to bring together researchers from many fields who use VR/AR/XR. There was a focus on applied XR and social VR.
In this conference band, you can find the abstracts of the two keynotes, the 34 posters and poster pitches, the 29 talks and the four workshops.
The Wuertual Reality XR Meeting 2023 was initiated to bring together researchers from many fields who use VR/AR/XR. There was a focus on applied XR and social VR.
In this conference band, you can find the abstracts of the two keynotes, the 34 posters and poster pitches, the 29 talks and the four workshops.
Although most protective behaviors related to the COVID‐19 pandemic come with personal costs, they will produce the largest benefit if everybody cooperates. This study explores two interacting factors that drive cooperation in this tension between private and collective interests. A preregistered experiment (N = 299) examined (a) how the quality of the relation among interacting partners (social proximity), and (b) how focusing on the risk of self‐infection versus onward transmission affected intentions to engage in protective behaviors. The results suggested that risk focus was an important moderator of the relation between social proximity and protection intentions. Specifically, participants were more willing to accept the risk of self‐infection from close others than from strangers, resulting in less caution toward a friend than toward a distant other. However, when onward transmission was the primary concern, participants were more reluctant to effect transmission to close others, resulting in more caution toward friends than strangers. These findings inform the debate about effective nonclinical measures against the pandemic. Practical implications for risk communication are discussed.
An important cognitive requirement in multitasking is the decision of how multiple tasks should be temporally scheduled (task order control). Specifically, task order switches (vs. repetitions) yield performance costs (i.e., task-order switch costs), suggesting that task order scheduling is a vital part of configuring a task set. Recently, it has been shown that this process takes specific task-related characteristics into account: task order switches were easier when switching to a preferred (vs. non-preferred) task order. Here, we ask whether another determinant of task order control, namely the phenomenon that a task order switch in a previous trial facilitates a task order switch in a current trial (i.e., a sequential modulation of task order switch effect) also takes task-specific characteristics into account. Based on three experiments involving task order switches between a preferred (dominant oculomotor task prior to non-dominant manual/pedal task) and a non-preferred (vice versa) order, we replicated the finding that task order switching (in Trial N) is facilitated after a previous switch (vs. repetition in Trial N - 1) in task order. There was no substantial evidence in favor of a significant difference when switching to the preferred vs. non-preferred order and in the analyses of the dominant oculomotor task and the non-dominant manual task. This indicates different mechanisms underlying the control of immediate task order configuration (indexed by task order switch costs) and the sequential modulation of these costs based on the task order transition type in the previous trial.
The experience of threat was found to result—mostly—in increased pain, however it is still unclear whether the exact opposite, namely the feeling of safety may lead to a reduction of pain. To test this hypothesis, we conducted two between-subject experiments (N = 94; N = 87), investigating whether learned safety relative to a neutral control condition can reduce pain, while threat should lead to increased pain compared to a neutral condition. Therefore, participants first underwent either threat or safety conditioning, before entering an identical test phase, where the previously conditioned threat or safety cue and a newly introduced visual cue were presented simultaneously with heat pain stimuli. Methodological changes were performed in experiment 2 to prevent safety extinction and to facilitate conditioning in the first place: We included additional verbal instructions, increased the maximum length of the ISI and raised CS-US contingency in the threat group from 50% to 75%. In addition to pain ratings and ratings of the visual cues (threat, safety, arousal, valence, and contingency), in both experiments, we collected heart rate and skin conductance. Analysis of the cue ratings during acquisition indicate successful threat and safety induction, however results of the test phase, when also heat pain was administered, demonstrate rapid safety extinction in both experiments. Results suggest rather small modulation of subjective and physiological pain responses following threat or safety cues relative to the neutral condition. However, exploratory analysis revealed reduced pain ratings in later trials of the experiment in the safety group compared to the threat group in both studies, suggesting different temporal dynamics for threat and safety learning and extinction, respectively.
Perspective: The present results demonstrate the challenge to maintain safety in the presence of acute pain and suggest more research on the interaction of affective learning mechanism and pain processing.
Changes in body perception often arise when observers are confronted with related yet discrepant multisensory signals. Some of these effects are interpreted as outcomes of sensory integration of various signals, whereas related biases are ascribed to learning-dependent recalibration of coding individual signals. The present study explored whether the same sensorimotor experience entails changes in body perception that are indicative of multisensory integration and those that indicate recalibration. Participants enclosed visual objects by a pair of visual cursors controlled by finger movements. Then either they judged their perceived finger posture (indicating multisensory integration) or they produced a certain finger posture (indicating recalibration). An experimental variation of the size of the visual object resulted in systematic and opposite biases of the perceived and produced finger distances. This pattern of results is consistent with the assumption that multisensory integration and recalibration had a common origin in the task we used.
In three experiments, we examined the cognitive underpinnings of self-serving dishonesty by manipulating cognitive load under different incentive structures. Participants could increase a financial bonus by misreporting outcomes of private die rolls without any risk of detection. At the same time, they had to remember letter strings of varying length. If honesty is the automatic response tendency and dishonesty is cognitively demanding, lying behavior should be less evident under high cognitive load. This hypothesis was supported by the outcome of two out of three experiments. We further manipulated whether all trials or only one random trial determined payoff to modulate reward adaptation over time (Experiment 2) and whether payoff was framed as a financial gain or loss (Experiment 3). The payoff scheme of one random or all trials did not affect lying behavior and, discordant to earlier research, facing losses instead of gains did not increase lying behavior. Finally, cognitive load and incentive frame interacted significantly, but contrary to our assumption gains increased lying under low cognitive load. While the impact of cognitive load on dishonesty appears to be comparably robust, motivational influences seem to be more elusive than commonly assumed in current theorizing.
We assessed the relation of creativity and unethical behaviour by manipulating the thinking style of participants (N = 450 adults) and measuring the impact of this manipulation on the prevalence of dishonest behaviour. Participants performed one of three inducer tasks: the alternative uses task to promote divergent thinking, the remote associates task to promote convergent thinking, or a simple classification task for rule-based thinking. Before and after this manipulation, participants conducted the mind game as a straightforward measure of dishonesty. Dishonest behaviour increased from before to after the intervention, but we found no credible evidence that this increase differed between induced mindsets. Exploratory analyses did not support any relation of trait creativity and dishonesty either. We conclude that the influence of creative thinking on unethical behaviour seems to be more ambiguous than assumed in earlier research or might be restricted to specific populations or contexts.
These pre-registered studies shed light on the cues that individuals use to identify rich people. In two studies (N = 598), we first developed a factor-analytical model that describes the content and the mental structure of 24 wealth cues. A third within-subject study (N = 89) then assessed the perception of rich subgroups based on this model of wealth cues. Participants evaluated the extent to which the wealth cues applied to two distinct subgroups of rich people. The results show: German and US-American participants think that one can identify rich people based on the same set of cues which can be grouped along the following dimensions: luxury consumption, expensive hobbies, spontaneous spending, greedy behavior, charismatic behavior, self-presentation, and specific possessions. However, Germans and US-Americans relied on these cues to different degrees to diagnose wealth in others. Moreover, we found evidence for subgroup-specific wealth cue profiles insofar as target individuals who acquired their wealth via internal (e.g., hard work) compared to external means (e.g., lottery winners) were evaluated differently on these wealth cues, presumably because of their perceived differences in valence and competence. Together, this research provides new insights in the cognitive representation of the latent construct of wealth. Practical implications for research on the perception of affluence, and implications for political decision makers, are discussed in the last section.