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In the context of medical device training, e-Learning can address problems like unstandardized content and different learning paces. However, staff and students value hands-on activities during medical device training. In a blended learning approach, we examined whether using a syringe pump while conducting an e-Learning program improves the procedural skills needed to operate the pump compared to using the e-Learning program only. In two experiments, the e-Learning only group learned using only the e-Learning program. The e-Learning + hands-on group was instructed to use a syringe pump during the e-Learning to repeat the presented content (section “Experiment 1”) or to alternate between learning on the e-Learning program and applying the learned content using the pump (section “Experiment 2”). We conducted a skills test, a knowledge test, and assessed confidence in using the pump immediately after learning and two weeks later. Simply repeating the content (section “Experiment 1”) did not improve performance of e-Learning + hands-on compared with e-Learning only. The instructed learning process (section “Experiment 1”) resulted in significantly better skills test performance for e-Learning + hands-on compared to the e-Learning only. Only a structured learning process based on multi-media learning principles and memory research improved procedural skills in relation to operating a medical device.
The current condition of (Western) academic psychology can be criticized for various reasons. In the past years, many debates have been centered around the so-called “replication crisis” and the “WEIRD people problem”. However, one aspect which has received relatively little attention is the fact that psychological research is typically limited to currently living individuals, while the psychology of the past remains unexplored. We find that more research in the field of historical psychology is required to capture both the similarities and differences between psychological mechanisms both then and now. We begin by outlining the potential benefits of understanding psychology also as a historical science and explore these benefits using the example of stress. Finally, we consider methodological, ideological, and practical pitfalls, which could endanger the attempt to direct more attention toward cross-temporal variation. Nevertheless, we suggest that historical psychology would contribute to making academic psychology a truly universal endeavor that explores the psychology of all humans.
A substantial number of people refused to get vaccinated against COVID-19, which prompts the question as to why. We focus on the role of individual worldviews about the nature and generation of knowledge (epistemic beliefs). We propose a model that includes epistemic beliefs, their relationship to the Dark Factor of Personality (D), and their mutual effect on the probability of having been vaccinated against COVID-19. Based on a US nationally representative sample (N = 1268), we show that stronger endorsement of post-truth epistemic beliefs was associated with a lower probability of having been vaccinated against COVID-19. D was also linked to a lower probability of having been vaccinated against COVID-19, which can be explained by post-truth epistemic beliefs. Our results indicate that the more individuals deliberately refrain from adhering to the better argument, the less likely they are vaccinated. More generally, post-truth epistemic beliefs pose a challenge for rational communication.
Learning about informal fallacies and the detection of fake news: an experimental intervention
(2023)
The philosophical concept of informal fallacies–arguments that fail to provide sufficient support for a claim–is introduced and connected to the topic of fake news detection. We assumed that the ability to identify informal fallacies can be trained and that this ability enables individuals to better distinguish between fake news and real news. We tested these assumptions in a two-group between-participants experiment (N = 116). The two groups participated in a 30-minute-long text-based learning intervention: either about informal fallacies or about fake news. Learning about informal fallacies enhanced participants’ ability to identify fallacious arguments one week later. Furthermore, the ability to identify fallacious arguments was associated with a better discernment between real news and fake news. Participants in the informal fallacy intervention group and the fake news intervention group performed equally well on the news discernment task. The contribution of (identifying) informal fallacies for research and practice is discussed.
Virtual reality applications employing avatar embodiment typically use virtual mirrors to allow users to perceive their digital selves not only from a first-person but also from a holistic third-person perspective. However, due to distance-related biases such as the distance compression effect or a reduced relative rendering resolution, the self-observation distance (SOD) between the user and the virtual mirror might influence how users perceive their embodied avatar. Our article systematically investigates the effects of a short (1 m), middle (2.5 m), and far (4 m) SOD between users and mirror on the perception of their personalized and self-embodied avatars. The avatars were photorealistic reconstructed using state-of-the-art photogrammetric methods. Thirty participants repeatedly faced their real-time animated self-embodied avatars in each of the three SOD conditions, where they were repeatedly altered in their body weight, and participants rated the 1) sense of embodiment, 2) body weight perception, and 3) affective appraisal towards their avatar. We found that the different SODs are unlikely to influence any of our measures except for the perceived body weight estimation difficulty. Here, the participants perceived the difficulty significantly higher for the farthest SOD. We further found that the participants’ self-esteem significantly impacted their ability to modify their avatar’s body weight to their current body weight and that it positively correlated with the perceived attractiveness of the avatar. Additionally, the participants’ concerns about their body shape affected how eerie they perceived their avatars. The participants’ self-esteem and concerns about their body shape influenced the perceived body weight estimation difficulty. We conclude that the virtual mirror in embodiment scenarios can be freely placed and varied at a distance of one to four meters from the user without expecting major effects on the perception of the avatar.
Previous research suggested that people prefer to administer unpleasant electric shocks to themselves rather than being left alone with their thoughts because engagement in thinking is an unpleasant activity. The present research examined this negative reinforcement hypothesis by giving participants a choice of distracting themselves with the generation of electric shock causing no to intense pain. Four experiments (N = 254) replicated the result that a large proportion of participants opted to administer painful shocks to themselves during the thinking period. However, they administered strong electric shocks to themselves even when an innocuous response option generating no or a mild shock was available. Furthermore, participants inflicted pain to themselves when they were assisted in the generation of pleasant thoughts during the waiting period, with no difference between pleasant versus unpleasant thought conditions. Overall, these results question that the primary motivation for the self-administration of painful shocks is avoidance of thinking. Instead, it seems that the self-infliction of pain was attractive for many participants, because they were curious about the shocks, their intensities, and the effects they would have on them.
Introduction
Modern digital devices, such as conversational agents, simulate human–human interactions to an increasing extent. However, their outward appearance remains distinctly technological. While research revealed that mental representations of technology shape users' expectations and experiences, research on technology sending ambiguous cues is rare.
Methods
To bridge this gap, this study analyzes drawings of the outward appearance participants associate with voice assistants (Amazon Echo or Google Home).
Results
Human beings and (humanoid) robots were the most frequent associations, which were rated to be rather trustworthy, conscientious, agreeable, and intelligent. Drawings of the Amazon Echos and Google Homes differed marginally, but “human,” “robotic,” and “other” associations differed with respect to the ascribed humanness, consciousness, intellect, affinity to technology, and innovation ability.
Discussion
This study aims to further elaborate on the rather unconscious cognitive and emotional processes elicited by technology and discusses the implications of this perspective for developers, users, and researchers.
Objective
Global challenges such as climate change or the COVID‐19 pandemic have drawn public attention to conspiracy theories and citizens' non‐compliance to science‐based behavioral guidelines. We focus on individuals' worldviews about how one can and should construct reality (epistemic beliefs) to explain the endorsement of conspiracy theories and behavior during the COVID‐19 pandemic and propose the Dark Factor of Personality (D) as an antecedent of post‐truth epistemic beliefs.
Method and Results
This model is tested in four pre‐registered studies. In Study 1 (N = 321), we found first evidence for a positive association between D and post‐truth epistemic beliefs (Faith in Intuition for Facts, Need for Evidence, Truth is Political). In Study 2 (N = 453), we tested the model proper by further showing that post‐truth epistemic beliefs predict the endorsement of COVID‐19 conspiracies and disregarding COVID‐19 behavioral guidelines. Study 3 (N = 923) largely replicated these results at a later stage of the pandemic. Finally, in Study 4 (N = 513), we replicated the results in a German sample, corroborating their cross‐cultural validity. Interactions with political orientation were observed.
Conclusion
Our research highlights that epistemic beliefs need to be taken into account when addressing major challenges to humankind.
Presence is often considered the most important quale describing the subjective feeling of being in a computer-generated and/or computer-mediated virtual environment. The identification and separation of orthogonal presence components, i.e., the place illusion and the plausibility illusion, has been an accepted theoretical model describing Virtual Reality (VR) experiences for some time. This perspective article challenges this presence-oriented VR theory. First, we argue that a place illusion cannot be the major construct to describe the much wider scope of virtual, augmented, and mixed reality (VR, AR, MR: or XR for short). Second, we argue that there is no plausibility illusion but merely plausibility, and we derive the place illusion caused by the congruent and plausible generation of spatial cues and similarly for all the current model’s so-defined illusions. Finally, we propose congruence and plausibility to become the central essential conditions in a novel theoretical model describing XR experiences and effects.