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Upstream Competition with Complex and Unobservable Contracts
Zitieren Sie bitte immer diese URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-241161
- This paper examines situations where two vertically integrated firms consider supplying an input to an independent downstream competitor via privately observed contracts. We identify equilibria where competition in the upstream market emerges—the downstream competitor gets supplied—as well as when the downstream firm does not receive the input and is excluded from the market. The likelihood of the outcome in which the downstream firm does not get supplied depends not only on demand parameters, but also on contractual flexibility andThis paper examines situations where two vertically integrated firms consider supplying an input to an independent downstream competitor via privately observed contracts. We identify equilibria where competition in the upstream market emerges—the downstream competitor gets supplied—as well as when the downstream firm does not receive the input and is excluded from the market. The likelihood of the outcome in which the downstream firm does not get supplied depends not only on demand parameters, but also on contractual flexibility and observability. We show that when contracts are unobservable, downstream entry will occur less often. Furthermore, our results suggest that permitting contracts that enable the contracting parties to coordinate their behavior in the downstream market may improve welfare by increasing the likelihood that the downstream firm is supplied.…
Autor(en): | Izak Atiyas, Toker Doganoglu, Firat Inceoglu |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-241161 |
Dokumentart: | Artikel / Aufsatz in einer Zeitschrift |
Institute der Universität: | Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät / Volkswirtschaftliches Institut |
Sprache der Veröffentlichung: | Englisch |
Titel des übergeordneten Werkes / der Zeitschrift (Englisch): | Review of Industrial Organization |
Erscheinungsjahr: | 2021 |
Band / Jahrgang: | 58 |
Seitenangabe: | 399–429 |
Originalveröffentlichung / Quelle: | Review of Industrial Organization 58, 399–429 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-020-09766-y |
DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-020-09766-y |
Allgemeine fachliche Zuordnung (DDC-Klassifikation): | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
Freie Schlagwort(e): | collective refusal to supply; foreclosure; unobservable contracts; upstream competition |
Fachklassifikation (JEL): | L Industrial Organization / L1 Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance / L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets |
L Industrial Organization / L4 Antitrust Issues and Policies / L40 General | |
L Industrial Organization / L4 Antitrust Issues and Policies / L42 Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts | |
Datum der Freischaltung: | 05.07.2021 |
Lizenz (Deutsch): | ![]() |