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Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
Zitieren Sie bitte immer diese URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-188042
- The standard property rights approach is focused on ex ante investment incentives, while there are no transaction costs that might restrain ex post negotiations. We explore the implications of such transaction costs. Prominent conclusions of the property rights theory may be overturned: A party may have stronger investment incentives when a non investing party is the owner, and joint ownership can be the uniquely optimal ownership structure. Intuitively, an ownership structure that is unattractive in the standard model may now be desirable,The standard property rights approach is focused on ex ante investment incentives, while there are no transaction costs that might restrain ex post negotiations. We explore the implications of such transaction costs. Prominent conclusions of the property rights theory may be overturned: A party may have stronger investment incentives when a non investing party is the owner, and joint ownership can be the uniquely optimal ownership structure. Intuitively, an ownership structure that is unattractive in the standard model may now be desirable, because it implies large gains from trade, such that the parties are more inclined to incur the transaction costs.…
Autor(en): | Daniel Müller, Patrick W. Schmitz |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-188042 |
Dokumentart: | Artikel / Aufsatz in einer Zeitschrift |
Institute der Universität: | Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät / Volkswirtschaftliches Institut |
Sprache der Veröffentlichung: | Englisch |
Titel des übergeordneten Werkes / der Zeitschrift (Englisch): | European Economic Review |
Erscheinungsjahr: | 2016 |
Band / Jahrgang: | 87 |
Seitenangabe: | 92-107 |
Originalveröffentlichung / Quelle: | European Economic Review (2016) 87, 92.107. https://doi.lorg/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.04.013 |
DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.04.013 |
Allgemeine fachliche Zuordnung (DDC-Klassifikation): | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
Freie Schlagwort(e): | Incomplete contracts; Joint ownership; Property rights approach; Transaction costs; Vertical integration |
Datum der Freischaltung: | 17.06.2020 |
Lizenz (Deutsch): | CC BY-NC-ND: Creative-Commons-Lizenz: Namensnennung, Nicht kommerziell, Keine Bearbeitungen 4.0 International |